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
Motley, John L.

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The life and death of John of
Barneveldt

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The Complete Works of
John L. Motley

The Life and Death of John of Barneveldt
Advocate of Holland

With a View of the Primary Causes and Movements
of the Thirty Years' War

Volume II

SOCIETY OF ENGLISH AND FRENCH
LITERATURE : : NEW YORK

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THE LIFE AND DEATH OF JOHN OF BARNEVELDT

CHAPTER VI

Establishment of the Condominium in the duchies—Dissensions between the Neuburgers and Brandenburgers—Occupation of Jülich by the Brandenburgers assisted by the States-General—Indignation in Spain and at the court of the archdukes—Subsidy despatched to Brussels—Spinola descends upon Aix-la-Chapelle and takes possession of Orsoy and other places—Surrender of Wesel—Conference at Xanten—Treaty permanently dividing the territory between Brandenburg and Neuburg—Prohibition from Spain—Delays and disagreements.

THUS the Condominium had been peaceably established.

Three or four years passed away, in the course of which the evils of a joint and undivided sovereignty of two rival houses over the same territory could not fail to manifest themselves. Brandenburg, Calvinist in religion, and for other reasons more intimately connected with and more favored by the states' government than his rival, gained ground in the duchies. The Palatine of Neuburg, originally of Lutheran faith like his father, soon manifested Catholic tendencies,

which excited suspicion in the Netherlands. These suspicions grew into certainties at the moment when he espoused the sister of Maximilian of Bavaria and of the Elector of Cologne. That this close connection with the very heads of the Catholic League could bode no good to the cause of which the States-General were the great promoters was self-evident. Very soon afterward the Palatine, a man of mature age and of considerable talents, openly announced his conversion to the ancient church. Obviously the sympathies of the states could not thenceforth fail to be on the side of Brandenburg. The elector died, and was succeeded in the governorship of the Condominium by the elector's brother, a youth of eighteen. He took up his abode in Cleves, leaving Düsseldorf to be the sole residence of his co-stadholder.

Rivalry growing warmer, on account of this difference of religion, between the respective partizans of Neuburg and Brandenburg, an attempt was made in Düsseldorf by a sudden entirely unsuspected rising of the Brandenburgers to drive their antagonist colleagues and their portion of the garrison out of the city. It failed, but excited great anger. A more successful effort was soon afterward made in Jülich; the Neuburgers were driven out, and the Brandenburgers remained in sole possession of the town and citadel, far the most important stronghold in the whole territory. This was partly avenged by the Neuburgers, who gained absolute control of Düsseldorf.¹ Here were, however, no important fortifications, the place being

¹ Bentivoglio, *Relazione della Mossa d' arme che sigui in Fiandra d' anno 1614 per haver le Provincie Unite occupato la Terra e Castello di Giuliers, etc.* (Opere, ed. Parigi, 1747).

merely an agreeable palatial residence and a thriving mart. The States-General, not concealing their predilection for Brandenburg, but under pretext of guarding the peace which they had done so much to establish, placed a garrison of one thousand infantry and a troop or two of horse in the citadel of Jülich.

Dire was the anger not unjustly excited in Spain when the news of this violation of neutrality reached that government. Jülich, placed midway between Liège and Cologne, and commanding those fertile plains which make up the opulent duchy, seemed virtually converted into a province of the detested heretical Republic. The German gate of the Spanish Netherlands was literally in the hands of its most formidable foe.

The Spaniards about the court of the archduke did not dissemble their rage. The seizure of Jülich was a stain upon his reputation, they cried. Was it not enough, they asked, for the United Provinces to have made a truce to the manifest detriment and discredit of Spain, and to have treated her during all the negotiation with such insolence? Were they now to be permitted to invade neutral territory, to violate public faith, to act under no responsibility save to their own will? What was left for them to do except to set up a tribunal in Holland for giving laws to the whole of northern Europe? Arrogating to themselves absolute power over the controverted states of Cleves, Jülich, and the dependencies, they now pretended to dispose of them at their pleasure in order at the end insolently to take possession of them for themselves.

These were the egregious fruits of the truce, they

said tauntingly to the discomfited archduke. It had caused a loss of reputation, the very soul of empires, to the crown of Spain. And now, to conclude her abasement, the troops in Flanders had been shaven down with such parsimony as to make the monarch seem a shopkeeper, not a king. One would suppose the obedient Netherlands to be in the heart of Spain rather than outlying provinces surrounded by their deadliest enemies. The heretics had gained possession of the government at Aix-la-Chapelle; they had converted the insignificant town of Mülheim into a thriving and fortified town in defiance of Cologne and to its manifest detriment, and in various other ways they had insulted the Catholics throughout those regions. And who could wonder at such insolence, seeing that the army in Flanders, formerly the terror of heretics, had become since the truce so weak as to be the laughing-stock of the United Provinces?¹ If it was expensive to maintain these armies in the obedient Netherlands, let there be economy elsewhere, they urged. From India came gold and jewels. From other kingdoms came ostentation and a long series of vain titles for the crown of Spain. Flanders was its place of arms, its nursery of soldiers, its bulwark in Europe, and so it should be preserved.²

There was ground for these complaints. The army at the disposition of the archduke had been reduced to eight thousand infantry and a handful of cavalry. The peace establishment of the Republic amounted to twenty thousand foot, three thousand horse, besides the French and English regiments.³

So soon as the news of the occupation of Jülich was

¹ Bentivoglio, *Relazione*, etc.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

officially communicated to the Spanish cabinet, a subsidy of four hundred thousand crowns was at once despatched to Brussels. Levies of Walloons and Germans were made without delay by order of Archduke Albert and under guidance of Spinola, so that by midsummer the army was swollen to eighteen thousand foot and three thousand horse. With these the great Genoese captain took the field in the middle of August. On the 22d of that month the army was encamped on some plains midway between Maestricht and Aachen. There was profound mystery both at Brussels and at The Hague as to the objective point of these military movements. Anticipating an attack upon Jülich, the states had meantime strengthened the garrison of that important place with three thousand infantry and a regiment of horse. It seemed scarcely probable, therefore, that Spinola would venture a foolhardy blow at a citadel so well fortified and defended. Moreover, there was not only no declaration of war, but strict orders had been given by each of the apparent belligerents to their military commanders to abstain from all offensive movements against the adversary. And now began one of the strangest series of warlike evolutions that were ever recorded. Maurice, at the head of an army of fourteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, manœvered in the neighborhood of his great antagonist and professional rival without exchanging a blow. It was a phantom campaign, the prophetic rehearsal of dreadful marches and tragic histories yet to be, and which were to be enacted on that very stage and on still wider ones during a whole generation of mankind. That cynical commerce in human lives which was to become one of the chief

branches of human industry in the century had already begun.

Spinola, after hovering for a few days in the neighborhood, descended upon the imperial city of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle). This had been one of the earliest towns in Germany to embrace the Reformed religion, and up to the close of the sixteenth century the control of the magistracy had been in the hands of the votaries of that creed. Subsequently the Catholics had contrived to acquire and keep the municipal ascendancy, secretly supported by Archduke Albert, and much oppressing the Protestants with imprisonments, fines, and banishment, until a new revolution which had occurred in the year 1610, and which aroused the wrath of Spinola.¹ Certainly, according to the ideas of that day, it did not seem unnatural in a city where a very large majority of the population were Protestants that Protestants should have a majority in the town council.² It seemed, however, to those who surrounded the archduke an outrage which could no longer be tolerated, especially as a garrison of six hundred Germans, supposed to have formed part of the states' army, had recently been introduced into the town. Aachen, lying mostly on an extended plain, had but very slight fortifications, and it was commanded by a neighboring range of hills. It had no garrison but the six hundred Germans. Spinola placed a battery or two on the hills, and within three days the town surrendered. The inhabitants expected a scene of carnage and pillage, but not a life was lost. No injury whatever was inflicted on person or property, accord-

¹ Grotii Historia, lxxvii. 472. Wagenaer, x. 74, 75.

² Bentivoglio, Relazione, etc.

ing to the strict injunctions of the archduke. The six hundred Germans were driven out, and twelve hundred other Germans, then serving under Catholic banners, were put in their places to protect the Catholic minority, to whose keeping the municipal government was now confided.¹

Spinola, then entering the territory of Cleves, took possession of Orsoy, an important place on the Rhine, besides Düren, Duisburg, Kaster, Grevenbroich, and Berchem. Leaving garrisons in these places, he razed the fortifications of Mülheim, much to the joy of the archbishop and his faithful subjects of Cologne, then crossed the Rhine at Rheinberg, and swooped down upon Wesel. This flourishing and prosperous city had formerly belonged to the duchy of Cleves. Placed at the junction of the Rhine and Lippe, and commanding both rivers, it had become both powerful and Protestant, and had set itself up as a free imperial city, recognizing its dukes no longer as sovereigns, but only as protectors. So fervent was it in the practice of the Reformed religion that it was called the Rhenish Geneva, the very cradle of German Calvinism. So important was its preservation considered to the cause of Protestantism that the States-General had urged its authorities to accept from them a garrison. They refused. Had they complied, the city would have been saved, because it was the rule in this extraordinary campaign that the belligerents made war not upon each other, nor in each other's territory, but against neutrals and upon neutral soil. The Catholic forces under Spinola or his lieutenants, meeting occasionally and accidentally with the Protestants under Maurice

¹ Bentivoglio, *Relazione*, etc. Wagenaer, x. 76.

or his generals, exchanged no cannon-shots or buffets, but only acts of courtesy; falling away each before the other, and each ceding to the other with extreme politeness the possession of towns which one had preceded the other in besieging.¹

The citizens of Wesel were amazed at being attacked, considering themselves as imperial burghers. They regretted too late that they had refused a garrison from Maurice, which would have prevented Spinola from assailing them. They had now nothing for it but to surrender, which they did within three days. The principal condition of the capitulation was that when Jülich should be given up by the states Wesel should be restored to its former position. Spinola then took and garrisoned the city of Xanten, but went no farther. Having weakened his army sufficiently by the garrisons taken from it for the cities captured by him, he declined to make any demonstration upon the neighboring and important towns of Emmerich and Rees. The Catholic commander falling back, the Protestant moved forward. Maurice seized both Emmerich and Rees, and placed garrisons within them, besides occupying Goch, Kranenburg, Gennep, and various places in the county of Mark. This closed the amicable campaign.²

Spinola established himself and his forces near Wesel. The prince encamped near Rees. The two armies were within two hours' march of each other. The Duke of Neuburg—for the Palatine had now succeeded on his father's death to the ancestral dukedom and to his share of the Condominium of the debatable prov-

¹ Wagenaer, x. 76. Bentivoglio.

² Baudartius, vi. 42, 43. Wagenaer, x. 76, 77. Bentivoglio.

inces—now joined Spinola with an army of four thousand foot and four hundred horse. The young Prince of Brandenburg came to Maurice with eight hundred cavalry and an infantry regiment of the Elector Palatine.

Negotiations destined to be as spectral and fleeting as the campaign had been illusory now began. The whole Protestant world was aflame with indignation at the loss of Wesel. The states' government had already proposed to deposit Jülich in the hands of a neutral power if the archduke would abstain from military movements. But Albert, proud of his achievements in Aachen, refused to pause in his career. Let them make the deposit first, he said.

Both belligerents, being now satiated with such military glory as could flow from the capture of defenseless cities belonging to neutrals, agreed to hold conferences at Xanten. To this town, in the duchy of Cleves, and midway between the rival camps, came Sir Henry Wotton and Sir Dudley Carleton, ambassadors of Great Britain; De Refuge and De Russy, the special and the resident ambassador of France at The Hague; Chancellor Peter Pecquius and Councilor Visser, to represent the archdukes; seven deputies from the United Provinces, three from the Elector of Cologne, three from Brandenburg, three from Neuburg, and two from the Elector Palatine, as representative of the Protestant League.¹

In the earlier conferences the envoys of the archduke and of the Elector of Cologne were left out, but they were informed daily of each step in the negotiation. The most important point at starting was thought to

¹ Wagenaer, x. 78-80.

be to get rid of the Condominium. There could be no harmony nor peace in joint possession. The whole territory should be cut provisionally in halves, and each possessory prince rule exclusively within the portion assigned to him. There might also be an exchange of domain between the two every six months. As for Wesel and Jülich, they could remain respectively in the hands then holding them, or the fortifications of Jülich might be dismantled and Wesel restored to the *status quo*.¹ The latter alternative would have best suited the states, who were growing daily more irritated at seeing Wesel, that Protestant stronghold, with an exclusively Calvinistic population, in the hands of Catholics.

The Spanish ambassador at Brussels remonstrated, however, at the thought of restoring his precious conquest, obtained without loss of time, money, or blood, into the hands of heretics, at least before consultation with the government at Madrid and without full consent of the king.

“How important to your Majesty’s affairs in Flanders,” wrote Guadaleste to Philip, “is the acquisition of Wesel may be seen by the manifest grief of your enemies. They see with immense displeasure your royal ensigns planted on the most important place on the Rhine, and one which would become the chief military station for all the armies of Flanders to assemble in at any moment.

“As no acquisition could therefore be greater, so your Majesty should never be deprived of it without thorough consideration of the case. The archduke fears, and so do his ministers, that if we refuse to re-

¹ Wagenaer, x. 78-80. Bentivoglio.

store Wesel the United Provinces would break the truce. For my part I believe, and there are many who agree with me, that they would, on the contrary, be more inclined to stand by the truce, hoping to obtain by negotiation that which it must be obvious to them they cannot hope to capture by force. But let Wesel be at once restored, let that be done which is so much desired by the United Provinces and other great enemies and rivals of your Majesty, and what security will there be that the same provinces will not again attempt the same invasion? Is not the example of Jülich fresh? And how much more important is Wesel! Jülich was, after all, not situate on their frontiers, while Wesel lies at their principal gates. Your Majesty now sees the good and upright intentions of those provinces and their friends. They have made a settlement between Brandenburg and Neuburg, not in order to breed concord, but confusion, between those two, not tranquillity for the country, but greater turbulence than ever before. Nor have they done this with any other thought than that the United Provinces might find new opportunities to derive the same profit from fresh tumults as they have already done so shamelessly from those which are past. After all, I don't say that Wesel should never be restored, if circumstances require it, and if your Majesty, approving the treaty of Xanten, should sanction the measure. But such a result should be reached only after full consultation with your Majesty, to whose glorious military exploits these splendid results are chiefly owing."¹

The treaty finally decided upon rejected the principle of alternate possession, and established a perma-

¹ Bentivoglio, *Relazione*, etc.

ment division of the territory in dispute between Brandenburg and Neuburg.

The two portions were to be made as equal as possible, and lots were to be thrown or drawn by the two princes for the first choice. To the one side were assigned the duchy of Cleves, the county of Mark, and the seigniories of Ravensburg and Ravenstein, with some other baronies and feuds in Brabant and Flanders; to the other the duchies of Jülich and Berg, with their dependencies. Each prince was to reside exclusively within the territory assigned to him by lot. The troops introduced by either party were to be withdrawn, fortifications made since the preceding month of May to be razed, and all persons who had been expelled or who had emigrated to be restored to their offices, property, or benefices. It was also stipulated that no place within the whole debatable territory should be put in the hands of a third power.¹

These articles were signed by the ambassadors of France and England, by the deputies of the Elector Palatine and of the United Provinces, all binding their superiors to the execution of the treaty. The arrangement was supposed to refer to the previous conventions between those two crowns, with the Republic and the Protestant princes and powers. Count Zollern, whom we have seen bearing himself so arrogantly as envoy from the Emperor Rudolph to Henry IV., was now despatched by Matthias on as fruitless a mission to the congress at Xanten, and did his best to prevent the signature of the treaty, except with full concurrence of the imperial government. He likewise renewed the frivolous proposition that the emperor should hold all

¹ Bentivoglio, *Relazione*, etc. Wagenaer, x. 78, 79.

the provinces in sequestration until the question of rightful sovereignty should be decided. The "proud and haggard" ambassador was not more successful in this than in the diplomatic task previously intrusted to him, and he then went to Brussels, there to renew his remonstrances, menaces, and intrigues.

For the treaty thus elaborately constructed, and in appearance a triumphant settlement of questions so complicated and so burning as to threaten to set Christendom at any moment in a blaze, was destined to an impotent and most unsatisfactory conclusion.

The signatures were more easily obtained than the ratifications. Execution was surrounded with insurmountable difficulties which in negotiation had been lightly skipped over at the stroke of a pen. At the very first step, that of military evacuation, there was a stumble. Maurice and Spinola were expected to withdraw their forces, and to undertake to bring in no troops in the future, and to make no invasion of the disputed territory.

But Spinola construed this undertaking as absolute; the prince as only binding in consequence of, with reference to, and for the duration of the treaty of Xanten. The ambassadors and other commissioners, disgusted with the long controversy which ensued, were making up their minds to depart when a courier arrived from Spain, bringing not a ratification, but strict prohibition, of the treaty. The articles were not to be executed, no change whatever was to be made, and, above all, Wesel was not to be restored without fresh negotiations with Philip, followed by his explicit concurrence.¹

¹ Wagenaer, Bentivoglio, Baudartius, ubi sup.

Thus the whole great negotiation began to dissolve into a shadowy, unsatisfactory pageant. The solid barriers which were to imprison the vast threatening elements of religious animosity and dynastic hatreds, and to secure a peaceful future for Christendom, melted into films of gossamer, and the great war of demons, no longer to be quelled by the commonplaces of diplomatic exorcism, revealed its close approach. The prospects of Europe grew blacker than ever.

The ambassadors, thoroughly disheartened and disgusted, all took their departure from Xanten, and the treaty remained rather a byword than a solution or even a suggestion.

“The accord could not be prevented,” wrote Archduke Albert to Philip, “because it depended alone on the will of the signers. Nor can the promise to restore Wesel be violated, should Jülich be restored. Who can doubt that such contravention would arouse great jealousies in France, England, the United Provinces, and all the members of the heretic League of Germany? Who can dispute that those interested ought to procure the execution of the treaty? Suspicious will not remain suspicions, but they light up the flames of public evil and disturbance. Either your Majesty wishes to maintain the truce, in which case Wesel must be restored, or to break the truce, a result which is certain if Wesel be retained. But the reasons which induced your Majesty to lay down your arms remain the same as ever. Our affairs are not looking better, nor is the requisition of Wesel of so great importance as to justify our involving Flanders in a new and more atrocious war than that which has so lately been suspended. The restitution is due to the tribunal of public faith.

It is a great advantage when actions done for the sole end of justice are united to that of utility. Consider the great successes we have had: how well the affairs of Aachen and Mülheim have been arranged; those of the Duke of Neuburg how completely reëstablished. The Catholic cause, always identical with that of the house of Austria, remains in great superiority to the cause of the heretics. We should use these advantages well, and to do so we should not immaturity pursue greater ones. Fortune changes, flies when we most depend on her, and delights in making her chief sport of the highest quality of mortals.”¹

Thus wrote the archduke sensibly, honorably from his point of view, and with an intelligent regard to the interests of Spain and the Catholic cause. After months of delay came conditional consent from Madrid to the conventions, but with express condition that there should be absolute undertaking on the part of the United Provinces never to send or maintain troops in the duchies. Tedious and futile correspondence followed between Brussels, The Hague, London, Paris. But the difficulties grew every moment. It was a Penelope’s web of negotiation, said one of the envoys. Amid pertinacious and wire-drawn subtleties, every trace of practical business vanished. Neuburg departed to look after his patrimonial estates, leaving his interests in the duchies to be watched over by the archduke. Even Count Zollern, after six months of wrangling in Brussels, took his departure. Prince Maurice distributed his army in various places within the debatable land, and Spinola did the same, leaving a garrison of three thousand foot and three hundred

¹ Bentivoglio, *Relazione*.

horse in the important city of Wesel. The town and citadel of Jülich were as firmly held by Maurice for the Protestant cause. Thus the duchies were jointly occupied by the forces of Catholicism and Protestantism, while nominally possessed and administered by the Princes of Brandenburg and Neuburg. And so they were destined to remain until that Thirty Years' War, now so near its outbreak, should sweep over the earth, and bring its fiery solution at last to all these great debates.

CHAPTER VII

Proud position of the Republic—France obeys her—Hatred of Carleton—Position and character of Aertsens—Claim for the “Third”—Recall of Aertsens—Rivalry between Maurice and Barneveldt, who always sustains the separate sovereignties of the provinces—Conflict between church and state added to other elements of discord in the commonwealth—Religion a necessary element in the life of all classes.

THUS the Republic had placed itself in as proud a position as it was possible for commonwealth or kingdom to occupy. It had dictated the policy and directed the combined military movements of Protestantism. It had gathered into a solid mass the various elements out of which the great Germanic mutiny against Rome, Spain, and Austria had been compounded. A breathing-space of uncertain duration had come to interrupt and postpone the general and inevitable conflict. Meantime the Republic was encamped upon the enemy's soil.

France, which had hitherto commanded, now obeyed. England, vacillating and discontented, now threatening and now cajoling, saw, for the time at least, its influence over the counsels of the Netherlands neutralized by the genius of the great statesman who still governed the provinces, supreme in all but name. The hatred of the British government toward the Republic, while in reality more malignant than at any previous

period, could now only find vent in tremendous theological pamphlets, composed by the king in the form of diplomatic instructions, and hurled almost weekly at the heads of the States-General by his ambassador, Dudley Carleton.

Few men hated Barneveldt more bitterly than did Carleton.

I wish to describe as rapidly, but as faithfully, as I can the outline at least of the events by which one of the saddest and most superfluous catastrophes in modern history was brought about. The web was a complex one, wrought apparently of many materials; but the more completely it is unraveled the more clearly we shall detect the presence of the few simple but elemental fibers which make up the tissue of most human destinies, whether illustrious or obscure, and out of which the most moving pictures of human history are composed.

The religious element, which seems at first view to be the all-pervading and controlling one, is in reality rather the atmosphere which surrounds and colors than the essence which constitutes the tragedy to be delineated.

Personal, sometimes even paltry, jealousy; love of power, of money, of place; rivalry between civil and military ambition for predominance in a free state; struggles between church and state to control and oppress each other; conflict between the cautious and healthy, but provincial and centrifugal, spirit on the one side, and the ardent centralizing, imperial, but dangerous instinct on the other, for ascendancy in a federation; mortal combat between aristocracy disguised in the plebeian form of trading and political



SIR DUDLEY CARLETON

corporations and democracy sheltering itself under a famous sword and an ancient and illustrious name—all these principles and passions will be found hotly at work in the melancholy five years with which we are now to be occupied, as they have entered, and will always enter, into every political combination in the great tragi-comedy which we call human history. As a study, a lesson, and a warning, perhaps the fate of Barneveldt is as deserving of serious attention as most political tragedies of the last few centuries.

Francis Aertsens, as we have seen, continued to be the Dutch ambassador after the murder of Henry IV. Many of the preceding pages of this volume have been occupied with his opinions, his pictures, his conversations, and his political intrigues during a memorable epoch in the history of the Netherlands and of France. He was beyond all doubt one of the ablest diplomatists in Europe. Versed in many languages, a classical student, familiar with history and international law, a man of the world and familiar with its usages, accustomed to associate with dignity and tact on friendliest terms with sovereigns, eminent statesmen, and men of letters; endowed with a facile tongue, a fluent pen, and an eye and ear of singular acuteness and delicacy; distinguished for unflagging industry and singular aptitude for secret and intricate affairs, he had by the exercise of these various qualities during a period of nearly twenty years at the court of Henry the Great been able to render inestimable services to the Republic which he represented. Of respectable but not distinguished lineage, not a Hollander, but a Belgian by birth, son of Cornelis Aertsens, greffier of the States-General, long employed in that important post, he had

been brought forward from a youth by Barneveldt and early placed by him in the diplomatic career, of which through his favor and his own eminent talents he had now achieved the highest honors.

He had enjoyed the intimacy and even the confidence of Henry IV., so far as any man could be said to possess that monarch's confidence, and his friendly relations and familiar access to the king gave him political advantages superior to those of any of his colleagues at the same court.¹

Acting entirely and faithfully according to the instructions of the advocate of Holland, he always gratefully and copiously acknowledged the privilege of being guided and sustained in the difficult paths he had to traverse by so powerful and active an intellect. I have seldom alluded in terms to the instructions and despatches of the chief, but every position, negotiation, and opinion of the envoy—and the reader has seen many of them—is pervaded by their spirit. Certainly the correspondence of Aertsens is full to overflowing of gratitude; respect, fervent attachment to the person, and exalted appreciation of the intellect and high character, of the advocate.²

There can be no question of Aertsen's consummate abilities. Whether his heart were as sound as his head, whether his protestations of devotion had the ring of true gold or not, time would show. Hitherto Barne-

¹ I pass over with disdain one of the causes which scandalous chronicles once assigned to the influence of the Dutch ambassador, being satisfied that the rumor was as malignant and false as political rumors often are.

² Correspondence of Aertsens with Barneveldt, Royal Archives of The Hague MSS., *passim*.

veldt had not doubted him, nor had he found cause to murmur at Barneveldt.

But the France of Henry IV., where the Dutch envoy was so all-powerful, had ceased to exist. A duller eye than that of Aertsens could have seen at a glance that the potent kingdom and firm ally of the Republic had been converted, for a long time to come at least, into a Spanish province. The double Spanish marriages (that of the young Louis XIII. with the Infanta Anna, and of his sister with the Infante, one day to be Philip IV.) were now certain, for it was to make them certain that the knife of Ravallac had been employed. The condition precedent to those marriages had long been known. It was the renunciation of the alliance between France and Holland. It was the condemnation to death, so far as France had the power to condemn her to death, of the young Republic. Had not Don Pedro de Toledo pompously announced this condition a year and a half before? Had not Henry spurned the bribe with scorn? And now had not Francis Aertsens been the first to communicate to his masters the fruit which had already ripened upon Henry's grave? As we have seen, he had revealed these intrigues long before they were known to the world, and the French court knew that he had revealed them. His position had become untenable. His friendship for Henry could not be of use to him with the delicate-featured, double-chinned, smooth and sluggish Florentine, who had passively authorized and actively profited by her husband's murder.

It was time for the envoy to be gone. The queen regent and Concini thought so. And so did Villeroy and Sillery and the rest of the old servants of the king,

now become pensionaries of Spain. But Aertsens did not think so. He liked his position, changed as it was. He was deep in the plottings of Bouillon and Condé and the other malcontents against the queen regent. These schemes, being entirely personal, the rank growth of the corruption and apparent disintegration of France, were perpetually changing, and could be reduced to no principle. It was a mere struggle of the great lords of France to wrest places, money, governments, military commands from the queen regent, and frantic attempts on her part to save as much as possible of the general wreck for her lord and master Concini.

It was ridiculous to ascribe any intense desire on the part of the Duc de Bouillon to aid the Protestant cause against Spain at that moment, acting as he was in combination with Condé, whom we have just seen employed by Spain as the chief instrument to effect the destruction of France and the bastardy of the queen's children. Nor did the sincere and devout Protestants who had clung to the cause through good and bad report, men like Duplessis-Mornay, for example, and those who usually acted with him, believe in any of these schemes for partitioning France on pretense of saving Protestantism. But Bouillon, greatest of all French fishermen in troubled waters, was brother-in-law of Prince Maurice of Nassau, and Aertsens instinctively felt that the time had come when he should anchor himself to firm holding-ground at home.

The ambassador had also a personal grievance. Many of his most secret despatches to the States-General, in which he expressed himself very freely, forcibly, and accurately on the general situation in

France, especially in regard to the Spanish marriages and the treaty of Hampton Court, had been transcribed at The Hague and copies of them sent to the French government. No baser act of treachery to an envoy could be imagined. It was not surprising that Aertsens complained bitterly of the deed. He secretly suspected Barneveldt, but with injustice, of having played him this evil turn, and the incident first planted the seeds of the deadly hatred which was to bear such fatal fruit.

“A notable treason has been played upon me,” he wrote to Jacques de Maldere, “which has outraged my heart. All the despatches which I have been sending for several months to M. de Barneveldt have been communicated by copy in whole or in extracts to this court. Villeroy quoted from them at our interview to-day, and I was left as it were without power of reply. The despatches were long, solid, omitting no particularity for giving means to form the best judgment of the designs and intrigues of this court. No greater damage could be done to me and my usefulness. All those from whom I have hitherto derived information, princes and great personages, will shut themselves up from me. . . . What can be more ticklish than to pass judgment on the tricks of those who are governing this state? This single blow has knocked me down completely. For I was moving about among all of them, making my profit of all, without any reserve. M. de Barneveldt knew by this means the condition of this kingdom as well as I do. Certainly in a well-ordered republic it would cost the life of a man who had thus trifled with the reputation of an ambassador. I believe M. de Barneveldt will be sorry, but

this will never restore to me the confidence which I have lost. If one was jealous of my position at this court, certainly I deserved rather pity from those who should contemplate it closely. If one wished to procure my downfall in order to raise one's self above me, there was no need of these tricks. I have been offering to resign my embassy this long time, which will now produce nothing but thorns for me. How can I negotiate after my private despatches have been read? L'Hoste, the clerk of Villeroy, was not so great a criminal as the man who revealed my despatches; and L'Hoste was torn by four horses after his death. Four months long I have been complaining of this to M. de Barneveldt. . . . Patience! I am groaning without being able to hope for justice. I console myself, for my term of office will soon arrive. Would that my embassy could have finished under the agreeable and friendly circumstances with which it began. The man who may succeed me will not find that this vile trick will help him much. . . . Pray find out whence and from whom this intrigue has come."¹

Certainly an envoy's position could hardly be more utterly compromised. Most unquestionably Aertsens had reason to be indignant, believing as he did that his conscientious efforts in the service of his government had been made use of by his chief to undermine his credit and blast his character. There was an intrigue between the newly appointed French minister, De Russy, at The Hague and the enemies of Aertsens to represent him to his own government as mischievous, passionate, unreasonably vehement in supporting the claims and dignity of his own country at the court

¹ Aertsens to Maldere, February 26, 1611, Hague Archives MS.

to which he was accredited. Not often in diplomatic history has an ambassador of a free state been censured or removed for believing and maintaining in controversy that his own government is in the right. It was natural that the French government should be disturbed by the vivid light which he had flashed upon their pernicious intrigues with Spain to the detriment of the Republic, and at the pertinacity with which he resisted their preposterous claim to be reimbursed for one third of the money which the late king had advanced as a free subsidy toward the war of the Netherlands for independence. But no injustice could be more outrageous than for the envoy's own government to unite with the foreign state in damaging the character of its own agent for the crime of fidelity to itself.

Of such cruel perfidy Aertsens had been the victim, and he most wrongfully suspected his chief as its real perpetrator.

The claim for what was called the "Third" had been invented after the death of Henry. As already explained, the Third was not a gift from England to the Netherlands. It was a loan from England to France, or more properly a consent to abstain from pressing for payment for this proportion of an old debt. James, who was always needy, had often desired, but never obtained, the payment of this sum from Henry. Now that the king was dead, he applied to the regent's government, and the regent's government called upon the Netherlands, to pay the money.

Aertsens, as the agent of the Republic, protested firmly against such claim. The money had been advanced by the king as a free gift, as his contribution to a war in which he was deeply interested, although

he was nominally at peace with Spain. As to the private arrangements between France and England, the Republic, said the Dutch envoy, was in no sense bound by them. He was no party to the treaty of Hampton Court, and knew nothing of its stipulations.¹

Courtiers and politicians in plenty at the French court, now that Henry was dead, were quite sure that they had heard him say over and over again that the Netherlands had bound themselves to pay the Third.

¹ "Ils me disent . . . qu'ils ont tous la mémoire assez fraîche pour se souvenir que le feu Roy avait parlé souvent et étoit résolu d'obliger Messieurs les États à reconnaître ce qui a été fourny au nom du Roi de Grande Bretagne, se contentant de ne nous rien demander des deux tiers payés pour sa part. S'il vivait il s'abahiroit de cette excuse. . . . Ma repartie étoit que nous avons reçu ce secours pour pur don employé par nos voisins en notre guerre par raison d'état, pour notre défense et occupation de leur ennemy, que en l'envoyant on ne nous a point parlé ni d'obligation ni de restitution."—Aertsens to Maldere, February 26, 1611, Hague Archives MS.

" . . . je n'ay pas jugé cette demande moins esloignée de la volonté du feu Roy que de la raison. Ce tiers n'a jamais été distingué des autres deux, on ne nous a point dit qu'il a été fourny au nom du Roy de la G. Bretagne. Nos acquits desquels on s'est contenté n'en font nulle mention, et nous avons employé cette somme comme les autres qui ont fait accroître (?) la dépense de nos préparatifs sans que ayons jamais fait estat d'en rien rendre ni eux de le prétendre. Le traité fait en Angleterre a été negocié entre le Roy et M. de Sully. Vous, Monsieur, qui lors y étiez présent n'y intervenistes jamais pour ouyr la distinction de ces payements quand la protestation a été faicte contre la continuation de ce traité. Elle ne vous a point été insinuée, et d'ici on ne s'est pas départ y d'en continuer le payement de manière que nous devons, et de fait pouvons ignorer ce qu'il ait rien traité entre ces deux couronnes que nous ait peu concerner. On me reproche là dessus notre ingratitude de ne vouloir pas seulement avouer par écrit qu'avons reçu ce Tiers au nom des Anglois. Je les renvoie à l'inspection de nos acquits."—Same to same, August 28, 1610.

They persuaded Mary de' Medici that she likewise had often heard him say so, and induced her to take high ground on the subject in her interviews with Aertsens. The luckless queen, who was always in want of money to satisfy the insatiable greed of her favorites and to buy off the enmity of the great princes, was very vehement—although she knew as much of those transactions as of the finances of Prester John or the Lama of Tibet—in maintaining this claim of her government upon the states.

"After talking with the ministers," said Aertsens, "I had an interview with the queen. I knew that she had been taught her lesson, to insist on the payment of the Third. So I did not speak at all of the matter, but talked exclusively and at length of the French regiments in the states' service. She was embarrassed, and did not know exactly what to say. At last, without replying a single word to what I had been saying, she became very red in the face, and asked me if I were not instructed to speak of the money due to England. Whereupon I spoke in the sense already indicated. She interrupted me by saying she had a perfect recollection that the late king intended and understood that we were to pay the Third to England, and had talked with her very seriously on the subject. If he were living, he would think it very strange, she said, that we refused; and so on.

"Soyssons, too, pretends to remember perfectly that such were the king's intentions. 'T is a very strange thing, sir. Every one knows now the secrets of the late king, if you are willing to listen. Yet he was not in the habit of taking all the world into his confidence. The queen takes her opinions as they give them to her.

'T is a very good princess, but I am sorry she is so ignorant of affairs. As she says she remembers, one is obliged to say one believes her. But I, who knew the king so intimately and saw him so constantly, know that he could only have said that the Third was paid in acquittal of his debts to and for account of the King of England, and not that we were to make restitution thereof. The chancellor tells me my refusal has been taken as an affront by the queen, and Puysieux says it is a contempt which she can't swallow."¹

Aertsens on his part remained firm, his pertinacity being the greater as he thoroughly understood the subject which he was talking about, an advantage which was rarely shared in by those with whom he conversed. The queen, highly scandalized by his demeanor, became from that time forth his bitter enemy, and, as already stated, was resolved to be rid of him.

Nor was the envoy at first desirous of remaining. He had felt after Henry's death and Sully's disgrace, and the complete transformation of the France which he had known, that his power of usefulness was gone. "Our enemies," he said, "have got the advantage which I used to have in times past, and I recognize a great coldness toward us, which is increasing every day."² Nevertheless, he yielded reluctantly to Barneveldt's request that he should, for the time at least, remain at his post. Later on, as the intrigues against him began to unfold themselves, and his faithful services were made use of at home to blacken his character and procure his removal, he refused to resign, as to do so would be to play into the hands of his enemies,

¹ Aertsens to Barneveldt, April 13, 1611, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to same, August 31, 1610, Hague Archives MS.

and by inference at least to accuse himself of infidelity to his trust.

But his concealed rage and his rancor grew more deadly every day. He was fully aware of the plots against him, although he found it difficult to trace them to their source.

"I doubt not," he wrote to Jacques de Maldere, the distinguished diplomatist and senator, who had recently returned from his embassy to England, "that this beautiful proposition of De Russy has been sent to your province of Zealand. Does it not seem to you a plot well woven as well in Holland as at this court to remove me from my post with disreputation? What have I done that should cause the queen to disapprove my proceedings? Since the death of the late king I have always opposed the Third, which they have been trying to fix upon the treasury, on the ground that Henry never spoke to me of restitution, that the receipts given were simple ones, and that the money given was spent for the common benefit of France and the states under direction of the king's government. But I am expected here to obey M. de Villeroy, who says that it was the intention of the late king to oblige us to make the payment. I am not accustomed to obey authority if it be not supported by reason. It is for my masters to reply and to defend me. The queen has no reason to complain. I have maintained the interests of my superiors. But this is not the cause of the complaints. My misfortune is that all my despatches have been sent from Holland in copy to this court. Most of them contained free pictures of the condition and dealings of those who govern here. M. de Villeroy has found himself depicted often, and now under pretext of a

public negotiation he has found an opportunity of revenging himself. . . . Besides this cause which Villeroy has found for combing my head, Russy has given notice here that I have kept my masters in the hopes of being honorably exempted from the claims of this government. The long letter which I wrote to M. de Barneveldt justifies my proceedings.”¹

It is no wonder that the ambassador was galled to the quick by the outrage which those concerned in the government were seeking to put upon him. How could an honest man fail to be overwhelmed with rage and anguish at being dishonored before the world by his masters for scrupulously doing his duty and for maintaining the rights and dignity of his own country? He knew that the charges were but pretexts, that the motives of his enemies were as base as the intrigues themselves, but he also knew that the world usually sides with the government against the individual, and that a man's reputation is rarely strong enough to maintain itself unsullied in a foreign land when his own government stretches forth its hand not to shield, but to stab, him.

“I know,” he said, “that this plot has been woven partly in Holland and partly here by good correspondence, in order to drive me from my post with disreputation. To this has tended the communication of my despatches to make me lose my best friends. This, too, was the object of the particular imparting to De Russy of all my propositions, in order to draw a complaint against me from this court.

“But as I have discovered this accurately, I have resolved to offer to my masters the continuance of my

¹ Aertsens to Jacques de Maldere, April 20, 1611, MS.

very humble service for such time and under such conditions as they may think good to prescribe. I prefer forcing my natural and private inclinations to giving an opportunity for the ministers of this kingdom to discredit us, and to my enemies to succeed in injuring me, and by fraud and malice to force me from my post. . . . I am truly sorry, being ready to retire, wishing to have an honorable testimony in recompense of my labors, that one is in such hurry to take advantage of my fall. I cannot believe that my masters wish to suffer this. They are too prudent, and cannot be ignorant of the treachery which has been practised on me. I have maintained their cause. If they have chosen to throw down the fruits of my industry, the blame should be imputed to those who consider their own ambition more than the interests of the public. . . . What envoy will ever dare to speak with vigor if he is not sustained by the government at home? . . . My enemies have misrepresented my actions and my language as passionate, exaggerated, mischievous, but I have no passion except for the service of my superiors. They say that I have a dark and distrustful disposition, but I have been alarmed at the alliance now forming here with the King of Spain, through the policy of M. de Villeroy. I was the first to discover this intrigue, which they thought buried in the bosom of the Triumvirate. I gave notice of it to my lords the states, as in duty bound. It all came back to the government in the copies furnished of my secret despatches. This is the real source of the complaints against me. The rest of the charges, relating to the Third and other matters, are but pretexts. To parry the blow, they pretend that all that is said and done

with the Spaniard is but feigning. Who is going to believe that? Has not the pope intervened in the affair? . . . I tell you they are furious here because I have my eyes open. I see too far into their affairs to suit their purposes. A new man would suit them better.”¹

His position was hopelessly compromised. He remained in Paris, however, month after month, and even year after year, defying his enemies both at the queen’s court and in Holland, feeding fat the grudge he bore to Barneveldt as the supposed author of the intrigue against him, and drawing closer the personal bonds which united him to Bouillon, and through him to Prince Maurice.

The wrath of the ambassador flamed forth without disguise against Barneveldt and all his adherents when his removal, as will be related on a subsequent page, was at last effected. And his hatred was likely to be deadly. A man with a shrewd, vivid face, cleanly cut features, and a restless eye; wearing a close-fitting skullcap, which gave him something the look of a monk, but with the thoroughbred and facile demeanor of one familiar with the world; stealthy, smooth, and cruel, a man coldly intellectual, who feared no one, loved but few, and never forgot or forgave, Francis d’Aertsens, devoured by ambition and burning with revenge, was a dangerous enemy.

Time was soon to show whether it was safe to injure him. Barneveldt, from well-considered motives of public policy, was favoring his honorable recall. But he allowed a decorous interval of more than three years to elapse in which to terminate his affairs and to take

¹ Aertsens to Jacques de Maldere, May 3, 1611, MS.

a deliberate departure from that French embassy to which the advocate had originally promoted him, and in which there had been so many years of mutual benefit and confidence between the two statesmen. He used no underhand means. He did not abuse the power of the States-General which he wielded to cast him suddenly and brutally from the distinguished post which he occupied, and so to attempt to dishonor him before the world. Nothing could be more respectful and conciliatory than the attitude of the government from first to last toward this distinguished functionary. The Republic respected itself too much to deal with honorable agents whose services it felt obliged to dispense with as with vulgar malefactors who had been detected in crime. But Aertsens believed that it was the advocate who had caused copies of his despatches to be sent to the French court, and that he had deliberately and for a fixed purpose been undermining his influence at home and abroad and blackening his character. All his ancient feelings of devotion, if they had ever genuinely existed, toward his former friend and patron, turned to gall. He was almost ready to deny that he had ever respected Barneveldt, appreciated his public services, admired his intellect, or felt gratitude for his guidance.

A fierce controversy—to which at a later period it will be necessary to call the reader's attention, because it is intimately connected with dark scenes afterward to be enacted—took place between the late ambassador and Cornelis van der Myle. Meantime Barneveldt pursued the policy which he had marked out for the States-General in regard to France.

Certainly it was a difficult problem. There could be no doubt that metamorphosed France could only be a

dangerous ally for the Republic. It was in reality impossible that she should be her ally at all. And this Barneveldt knew. Still it was better, so he thought, for the Netherlands that France should exist than that it should fall into utter decomposition. France, though under the influence of Spain and doubly allied by marriage contracts to Spain, was better than Spain itself in the place of France. This seemed to be the only choice between two evils. Should the whole weight of the States-General be thrown into the scale of the malcontent and mutinous princes against the established but tottering government of France, it was difficult to say how soon Spain might literally, as well as inferentially, reign in Paris.

Between the rebellion and the legitimate government, therefore, Barneveldt did not hesitate. France, corporate France, with which the Republic had been so long in close and mutually advantageous alliance, and from whose late monarch she had received such constant and valuable benefits, was in the advocate's opinion the only power to be recognized, papal and Spanish though it was. The advantage of an alliance with the fickle, self-seeking, and ever-changing mutiny, that was seeking to make use of Protestantism to effect its own ends, was in his eyes rather specious than real.

By this policy, while making the breach irreparable with Aertsens and as many leading politicians as Aertsens could influence, he first brought on himself the stupid accusation of swerving toward Spain. Dull murmurs like these, which were now but faintly making themselves heard against the reputation of the advocate, were destined ere long to swell into a mighty roar; but he hardly listened now to insinuations which

seemed infinitely below his contempt. He still effectually ruled the nation through his influence in the states of Holland, where he reigned supreme. Thus far Barneveldt and my lords the States-General were one personage.

But there was another great man in the state who had at last grown impatient of the advocate's power and was secretly resolved to brook it no longer. Maurice of Nassau had felt himself too long rebuked by the genius of the advocate. The prince had perhaps never forgiven him for the political guardianship which he had exercised over him ever since the death of William the Silent. He resented the leading-strings by which his youthful footstep had been sustained, and which he seemed always to feel about his limbs so long as Barneveldt existed. He had never forgotten the unpalatable advice given to him by the advocate through the princess dowager.

The brief campaign in Cleves and Jülich was the last great political operation in which the two were likely to act in even apparent harmony. But the rivalry between the two had already pronounced itself emphatically during the negotiations for the truce. The advocate had felt it absolutely necessary for the Republic to suspend the war at the first moment when she could treat with her ancient sovereign on a footing of equality. Spain, exhausted with the conflict, had at last consented to what she considered the humiliation of treating with her rebellious provinces as with free states over which she claimed no authority. The peace party, led by Barneveldt, had triumphed, notwithstanding the steady opposition of Prince Maurice and his adherents.

Why had Maurice opposed the treaty? Because his vocation was over, because he was the greatest captain of the age, because his emoluments, his consideration, his dignity before the world, his personal power, were all vastly greater in war than in his opinion they could possibly be in peace. It was easy for him to persuade himself that what was manifestly for his individual interest was likewise essential to the prosperity of the country.

The diminution in his revenues consequent on the return to peace was made good to him, his brother, and his cousin by most munificent endowments and pensions. And it was owing to the strenuous exertions of the advocate that these large sums were voted. A hollow friendship was kept up between the two during the first few years of the truce, but resentment and jealousy lay deep in Maurice's heart.

At about the period of the return of Aertsens from his French embassy, the suppressed fire was ready to flame forth at the first fanning by that artful hand. It was impossible, so Aertsens thought and whispered, that two heads could remain on one body politic. There was no room in the Netherlands for both the advocate and the prince. Barneveldt was in all civil affairs dictator, chief magistrate, supreme judge; but he occupied this high station by the force of intellect, will, and experience, not through any constitutional provision. In time of war the prince was generalissimo, commander-in-chief of all the armies of the Republic. Yet constitutionally he was not captain-general at all. He was only stadholder of five out of seven provinces.

Barneveldt suspected him of still wishing to make

himself sovereign of the country. Perhaps his suspicions were incorrect. Yet there was every reason why Maurice should be ambitious of that position. It would have been in accordance with the openly expressed desire of Henry IV. and other powerful allies of the Netherlands. His father's assassination had alone prevented his elevation to the rank of sovereign Count of Holland. The federal policy of the provinces had drifted into a republican form after their renunciation of their Spanish sovereign, not because the people, or the states as representing the people, had deliberately chosen a republican system, but because they could get no powerful monarch to accept the sovereignty. They had offered to become subjects of Protestant England and of Catholic France. Both powers had refused the offer, and refused it with something like contumely. However deep the subsequent regret on the part of both, there was no doubt of the fact. But the internal policy in all the provinces and in all the towns was republican. Local self-government existed everywhere. Each city magistracy was a little republic in itself. The death of William the Silent, before he had been invested with the sovereign power of all seven provinces, again left that sovereignty in abeyance. Was the supreme power of the Union, created at Utrecht in 1579, vested in the States-General?

They were beginning theoretically to claim it, but Barneveldt denied the existence of any such power either in law or fact. It was a league of sovereignties, he maintained; a confederacy of seven independent states, united for certain purposes by a treaty made some thirty years before. Nothing could be more imbecile, judging by the light of subsequent events and

the experience of centuries, than such an organization. The independent and sovereign republic of Zealand or of Groningen, for example, would have made a poor figure campaigning or negotiating or exhibiting itself on its own account before the world. Yet it was difficult to show any charter, precedent, or prescription for the sovereignty of the States-General. Necessary as such an incorporation was for the very existence of the Union, no constitutional union had ever been enacted. Practically the province of Holland, representing more than half the population, wealth, strength, and intellect of the whole confederation, had achieved an irregular supremacy in the States-General. But its undeniable superiority was now causing a rank growth of envy, hatred, and jealousy throughout the country, and the great advocate of Holland, who was identified with the province and had so long wielded its power, was beginning to reap the full harvest of that malice.

Thus while there was so much of vagueness in theory and practice as to the sovereignty, there was nothing criminal on the part of Maurice if he was ambitious of obtaining the sovereignty himself. He was not seeking to compass it by base artifice or by intrigue of any kind. It was very natural that he should be restive under the dictatorship of the advocate. If a simple burgher and lawyer could make himself despot of the Netherlands, how much more reasonable that he—with the noblest blood of Europe in his veins, whose direct ancestor three centuries before had been emperor not only of those provinces, but of all Germany and half Christendom besides, whose immortal father had under God been the creator and savior of the new common-

wealth, had made sacrifices such as man never made for a people, and had at last laid down his life in its defense, who had himself fought daily from boyhood upward in the great cause, who had led national armies from victory to victory till he had placed his country as a military school and a belligerent power foremost among the nations, and had at last so exhausted and humbled the great adversary and former tyrant that he had been glad of a truce, while the rebel chief would have preferred to continue the war—should aspire to rule by hereditary right a land with which his name and his race were indelibly associated by countless sacrifices and heroic achievements!

It was no crime in Maurice to desire the sovereignty. It was still less a crime in Barneveldt to believe that he desired it. There was no special reason why the prince should love the republican form of government, provided that an hereditary one could be legally substituted for it. He had sworn allegiance to the statutes, customs, and privileges of each of the provinces of which he had been elected stadholder, but there would have been no treason on his part if the name and dignity of stadholder should be changed by the states themselves for those of king or sovereign prince.

Yet it was a chief grievance against the advocate on the part of the prince that Barneveldt believed him capable of this ambition.

The Republic existed as a fact, but it had not long existed, nor had it ever received a formal baptism. So undefined was its constitution, and so conflicting were the various opinions in regard to it of eminent men, that it would be difficult to say how high treason could be committed against it. Great lawyers of highest in-

telleet and learning believed the sovereign power to reside in the separate states, others found that sovereignty in the city magistracies, while during a feverish period of war and tumult the supreme function had, without any written constitution, any organic law, practically devolved upon the States-General, who had now begun to claim it as a right. The Republic was neither venerable by age nor impregnable in law. It was an improvised aristocracy of lawyers, manufacturers, bankers, and corporations which had done immense work and exhibited astonishing sagacity and courage, but which might never have achieved the independence of the provinces unaided by the sword of Orange-Nassau and the magic spell which belonged to that name.

Thus a bitter conflict was rapidly developing itself in the heart of the commonwealth. There was the civil element struggling with the military for predominance; sword against gown; states' rights against central authority; peace against war; above all, the rivalry of one prominent personage against another, whose mutual hatred was now artfully inflamed by partizans.

And now another element of discord had come, more potent than all the rest—the terrible, never-ending struggle of church against state. Theological hatred, which forty years long had found vent in the exchange of acrimony between the ancient and the Reformed churches, was now assuming other shapes. Religion in that age and country was, more than has often been the case in history, the atmosphere of men's daily lives. But during the great war for independence, although the hostility between the two religious forces was always intense, it was modified, especially toward the

close of the struggle, by other controlling influences. The love of independence and the passion for nationality, the devotion to ancient political privileges, was often as fervid and genuine in Catholic bosoms as in those of Protestants, and sincere adherents of the ancient church had fought to the death against Spain in defense of chartered rights.

At that very moment it is probable that half the population of the United Provinces was Catholic. Yet it would be ridiculous to deny that the aggressive, uncompromising, self-sacrificing, intensely believing, perfectly fearless spirit of Calvinism had been the animating soul, the motive power, of the great revolt. For the provinces to have encountered Spain and Rome without Calvinism, and relying upon municipal enthusiasm only, would have been to throw away the sword and fight with the scabbard.

But it is equally certain that those hot gospelers who had suffered so much martyrdom and achieved so many miracles were fully aware of their power and despotic in its exercise. Against the oligarchy of commercial and juridical corporations they stood there the most terrible aristocracy of all—the aristocracy of God's elect, predestined from all time and to all eternity to take precedence of and to look down upon their inferior and lost fellow-creatures. It was inevitable that this aristocracy, which had done so much, which had breathed into a new-born commonwealth the breath of its life, should be intolerant, haughty, dogmatic.

The Church of Rome, which had been dethroned after inflicting such exquisite tortures during its period of power, was not to raise its head. Although so large a proportion of the inhabitants of the country were

secretly or openly attached to that faith, it was a penal offense to participate openly in its rites and ceremonies. Religious equality, except in the minds of a few individuals, was an unimaginable idea. There was still one church which arrogated to itself the sole possession of truth, the Church of Geneva. Those who admitted the possibility of other forms and creeds were either atheists or, what was deemed worse than atheists, papists, because papists were assumed to be traitors also, and desirous of selling the country to Spain. An undevout man in that land and at that epoch was an almost unknown phenomenon. Religion was as much a recognized necessity of existence as food or drink. It were as easy to find people going about without clothes as without religious convictions. The advocate, who had always adhered to the humble spirit of his ancestral device, "*Nil scire tutissima fides*," and almost alone among his fellow-citizens (save those immediate apostles and pupils of his who became involved in his fate) in favor of religious toleration, began to be suspected of treason and papacy because, had he been able to give the law, it was thought he would have permitted such horrors as the public exercise of the Roman Catholic religion.

The hissings and screamings of the vulgar against him as he moved forward on his steadfast course he heeded less than those of geese on a common. But there was coming a time when this proud and scornful statesman, conscious of the superiority conferred by great talents and unparalleled experience, would find it less easy to treat the voice of slanderers, whether idiots or powerful and intellectual enemies, with contempt.

CHAPTER VIII

Schism in the church a public fact—Struggle for power between the sacerdotal and political orders—Dispute between Arminius and Gomarus—Rage of James I. at the appointment of Vorstius—Arminians called Remonstrants—Hague Conference—Contra-Remonstrance by Gomarites of Seven Points to the Remonstrants' Five—Fierce theological disputes throughout the country—Ryswyk secession—Maurice wishes to remain neutral, but finds himself the chieftain of the Contra-Remonstrant party—The states of Holland Remonstrant by a large majority—The States-General Contra-Remonstrant—Sir Ralph Winwood leaves The Hague—Three armies to take the field against Protestantism.

SCHISM in the church had become a public fact, and theological hatred was in full blaze throughout the country.

The great practical question in the church had been as to the appointment of preachers, wardens, schoolmasters, and other officers. By the ecclesiastical arrangements of 1591 great power was conceded to the civil authority in church matters, especially in regard to such appointments, which were made by a commission consisting of four members named by the churches and four by the magistrates in each district.¹

Barneveldt, who above all things desired peace in

¹ Wagenaer, x. 59. Groot Plakkaatboek, iii. deel, bl. 459. Groot Utrechtsch Plakkaatboek, i. d. 359. Van Rees and Brill, Continuation of Arend, iii. d. ii. stukk. 499 seq.

the church, had wished to revive this ordinance, and in 1612 it had been resolved by the states of Holland that each city or village should, if the magistracy approved, provisionally conform to it. The states of Utrecht made at the same time a similar arrangement.

It was the controversy which has been going on since the beginning of history and is likely to be prolonged to the end of time—the struggle for power between the sacerdotal and political orders; the controversy whether priests shall control the state or the state govern the priests.

This was the practical question involved in the fierce dispute as to dogma. The famous duel between Arminius and Gomarus, the splendid theological tournaments which succeeded, six champions on a side armed in full theological panoply and swinging the sharpest curtal-axes which learning, passion, and acute intellect could devise, had as yet produced no beneficent result. Nobody had been convinced by the shock of argument, by the exchange of those desperate blows. The High Council of The Hague had declared that no difference of opinion in the church existed sufficient to prevent fraternal harmony and happiness. But Gomarus loudly declared that, if there were no means of putting down the heresy of Arminius, there would before long be a struggle such as would set province against province, village against village, family against family, throughout the land.¹ He should be afraid to die in such doctrine. He shuddered that any one should dare to come before God's tribunal with such blasphemies. Meantime his great adversary, the learned and eloquent, the musical, frolicsome, hospitable heresi-

¹ Van Rees and Brill, *Vad. Gesch.*, iii. 419, 422 seq.

arch, was no more. Worn out with controversy, but peaceful and happy in the convictions which were so bitterly denounced by Gomarus and a large proportion of both preachers and laymen in the Netherlands, and convinced that the schism which in his view had been created by those who called themselves the orthodox would weaken the cause of Protestantism throughout Europe, Arminius died at the age of forty-nine.

The magistrates throughout Holland, with the exception of a few cities, were Arminian, the preachers Gomarian; for Arminius ascribed to the civil authority the right to decide upon church matters, while Gomarus maintained that ecclesiastical affairs should be regulated in ecclesiastical assemblies. The overseers of Leyden University appointed Conrad Vorstius to be professor of theology in place of Arminius. The selection filled to the brim the cup of bitterness, for no man was more audaciously latitudinarian than he. He was even suspected of Socinianism. There came a shriek from King James, fierce and shrill enough to rouse Arminius from his grave. James foamed at the mouth at the insolence of the overseers in appointing such a monster of infidelity to the professorship. He ordered his books to be publicly burned in St. Paul's Churchyard and at both universities,¹ and would have burned the professor himself, with as much delight as Torquemada or Peter Titelman ever felt in roasting their victims, had not the day for such festivities gone by. He ordered the states of Holland, on pain of forever forfeiting his friendship, to exclude Vorstius at once from the theological chair and to forbid him from "nestling anywhere in the country."

¹ Van Rees and Brill, *Vad. Gesch.*, iii. 495.

He declared his amazement that they should tolerate such a pest as Conrad Vorstius. Had they not had enough of the seed sown by that foe of God, Arminius? He ordered the States-General to chase the blasphemous monster from the land, or else he would cut off all connection with their false and heretic churches and make the other Reformed churches of Europe do the same, nor should the youth of England ever be allowed to frequent the University of Leyden.¹

In point of fact, the professor was never allowed to qualify, to preach, or to teach, so tremendous was the outcry of Peter Plancius and many orthodox preachers, echoing the wrath of the king. He lived at Gouda in a private capacity for several years, until the Synod of Dordrecht at last publicly condemned his opinions and deprived him of his professorship.

Meantime the preachers who were disciples of Arminius had in a private assembly drawn up what was called a Remonstrance, addressed to the states of Holland, and defending themselves from the reproach that they were seeking change in the divine service and desirous of creating tumult and schism.²

¹ Van Rees and Brill, *Vad. Gesch.*, iii. 495. Carleton Letters.

² Wagenaer, x. 36, 37. *Haagsche Conferentie*, i. 425. Brandt, *Hist. der Ref.*, ii. 128. Uytenbogat, 524, 525.

They formulated their position in the famous Five Points:

"I. God has from eternity resolved to choose to eternal life those who through his grace believe in Jesus Christ, and in faith and obedience so continue to the end, and to condemn the unbelieving and unconverted to eternal damnation.

"II. Jesus Christ died for all; so, nevertheless, that no one actually except believers is redeemed by his death.

"III. Man has not the saving belief from himself, nor out of his free will, but he needs thereto God's grace in Christ.

"IV. This grace is the beginning, continuation, and comple-

This Remonstrance, set forth by the pen of the famous Uytenbogart, whom Gomarus called the "Court Trumpeter," because for a long time he had been Prince Maurice's favorite preacher, was placed in the hands of Barneveldt, for delivery to the states of Holland. Thenceforth the Arminians were called Remonstrants.

The Hague Conference followed, six preachers on a side, and the states of Holland exhorted to fraternal compromise. Until further notice, they decreed that no man should be required to believe more than had been laid down in the Five Points.

Before the conference, however, the Gomarite preachers had drawn up a Contra-Remonstrance of Seven Points in opposition to the Remonstrants' Five.¹

tion of man's salvation; all good deeds must be ascribed to it, but it does not work irresistibly.

"V. God's grace gives sufficient strength to the true believers to overcome evil; but whether they cannot lose grace should be more closely examined before it should be taught in full security."

Afterward they expressed themselves more distinctly on this point, and declared that a true believer, through his own fault, can fall away from God and lose faith.

¹ Authorities last cited.

These were the Seven Points:

"I. God has chosen from eternity certain persons out of the human race, which in and with Adam fell into sin and has no more power to believe and convert itself than a dead man to restore himself to life, in order to make them blessed through Christ; while he passes by the rest through his righteous judgment, and leaves them lying in their sins.

"II. Children of believing parents, as well as full-grown believers, are to be considered as elect so long as they with action do not prove the contrary.

"III. God in his election has not looked at the belief and the repentance of the elect, but, on the contrary, in his eternal and

They demanded the holding of a national synod to settle the difference between these Five and Seven Points, or the sending of them to foreign universities for arbitration, a mutual promise being given by the contending parties to abide by the decision.

Thus much it has been necessary to state concerning what in the seventeenth century was called the platform of the two great parties—a term which has been perpetuated in our own country, and is familiar to all the world in the nineteenth.

There shall be no more setting forth of these subtle and finely wrought abstractions in our pages. We aspire not to the lofty heights of theological and supernatural contemplation, where the atmosphere becomes too rarefied for ordinary constitutions. Rather we at-

unchangeable design, has resolved to give to the elect faith and steadfastness, and thus to make them blessed.

“IV. He, to this end, in the first place, presented to them his only begotten Son, whose sufferings, although sufficient for the expiation of all men’s sins, nevertheless, according to God’s decree, serve alone to the reconciliation of the elect.

“V. God causes the gospel to be preached to them, making the same, through the Holy Ghost, of strength upon their minds, so that they not merely obtain power to repent and to believe, but also actually and voluntarily do repent and believe.

“VI. Such elect, through the same power of the Holy Ghost through which they have once become repentant and believing, are kept in such wise that they indeed through weakness fall into heavy sins, but can never wholly and for always lose the true faith.

“VII. True believers from this, however, draw no reason for fleshly quiet, it being impossible that they who through a true faith were planted in Christ should bring forth no fruits of thankfulness; the promises of God’s help and the warnings of Scripture tending to make their salvation work in them in fear and trembling, and to cause them more earnestly to desire help from that Spirit without which they can do nothing.”

tempt an objective and level survey of remarkable phenomena manifesting themselves on the earth, direct or secondary emanations from those distant spheres.

For in those days, and in that land especially, theology and politics were one. It may be questioned at least whether this practical fusion of elements, which may with more safety to the commonwealth be kept separate, did not tend quite as much to lower and contaminate the religious sentiments as to elevate the political idea. To mix habitually the solemn phraseology which men love to reserve for their highest and most sacred needs with the familiar slang of politics and trade seems to our generation not a very desirable proceeding.

The aroma of doubly distilled and highly sublimated dogma is more difficult to catch than to comprehend the broader and more practical distinctions of everyday party strife.

King James was furious at the thought that common men—the vulgar, the people in short—should dare to discuss deep problems of divinity which, as he confessed, had puzzled even his royal mind. Barneveldt modestly disclaimed the power of seeing with absolute clearness into things beyond the reach of the human intellect. But the honest Netherlanders were not abashed by thunder from the royal pulpit, nor perplexed by hesitations which darkened the soul of the great advocate.

In burghers' mansions, peasants' cottages, mechanics' back parlors; on board herring-smacks, canal-boats, and East-Indiamen; in shops, counting-rooms, farmyards, guard-rooms, ale-houses; on the exchange, in the tennis-court, on the mall; at banquets, at burials,

christenings, or bridals—wherever and whenever human creatures met each other, there was ever to be found the fierce wrangle of Remonstrant and Contra-Remonstrant, the hissing of red-hot theological rhetoric, the pelting of hostile texts. The blacksmith's iron cooled on the anvil, the tinker dropped a kettle half mended, the broker left a bargain unclenched, the Scheveningen fisherman in his wooden shoes forgot the cracks in his pinky, while each paused to hold high converse with friend or foe on fate, free will, or absolute foreknowledge, losing himself in wandering mazes whence there was no issue. Province against province, city against city, family against family: it was one vast scene of bickering, denunciation, heartburnings, mutual excommunication and hatred.

Alas! a generation of mankind before, men had stood banded together to resist, with all the might that comes from union, the fell spirit of the Holy Inquisition, which was dooming all who had wandered from the ancient fold or resisted foreign tyranny to the ax, the fagot, the living grave. There had been small leisure then for men who fought for fatherland and for comparative liberty of conscience to tear each other's characters in pieces, and to indulge in mutual hatreds and loathing on the question of predestination.

As a rule the population, especially of the humbler classes, and a great majority of the preachers were Contra-Remonstrant; the magistrates, the burgher patricians, were Remonstrant. In Holland the controlling influence was Remonstrant; but Amsterdam and four or five other cities of that province held to the opposite doctrine. These cities formed, therefore, a small minority in the states' assembly of Holland, sus-

tained by a large majority in the States-General. The province of Utrecht was almost unanimously Remonstrant. The five other provinces were decidedly Contra-Remonstrant.

It is obvious, therefore, that the influence of Barneveldt, hitherto so all-controlling in the States-General, and which rested on the complete submission of the states of Holland to his will, was tottering. The battle-line between church and state was now drawn up, and it was at the same time a battle between the union and the principles of state sovereignty.

It had long since been declared through the mouth of the advocate, but in a solemn state manifesto, that my lords the States-General were the foster-fathers and the natural protectors of the church, to whom supreme authority in church matters belonged.¹

The Contra-Remonstrants, on the other hand, maintained that all the various churches made up one indivisible church, seated above the states, whether provincial or general, and governed by the Holy Ghost acting directly upon the congregations.

As the schism grew deeper and the States-General receded from the position which they had taken up under the lead of the advocate, the scene was changed. A majority of the provinces being Contra-Remonstrant, and therefore in favor of a national synod, the States-General as a body were of necessity for the synod.

It was felt by the clergy that, if many churches existed, they would all remain subject to the civil authority. The power of the priesthood would thus sink before that of the burgher aristocracy. There must be one church, the Church of Geneva and Heidelberg, if

¹ Van Rees and Brill, iii. 422. Baudart., i. 9, 10.

that theocracy which the Gomarites meant to establish was not to vanish as a dream. It was founded on divine right, and knew no chief magistrate but the Holy Ghost. A few years before, the States-General had agreed to a national synod, but with a condition that there should be revision of the Netherland Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. Against this the orthodox infallibilists had protested and thundered, because it was an admission that the vile Arminian heresy might perhaps be declared correct. It was now, however, a matter of certainty that the States-General would cease to oppose the unconditional synod, because the majority sided with the priesthood.

The magistrates of Leyden had not long before opposed the demand for a synod on the ground that the war against Spain was not undertaken to maintain one sect; that men of various sects and creeds had fought with equal valor against the common foe; that religious compulsion was hateful, and that no synod had a right to claim Netherlanders as slaves.¹

To thoughtful politicians like Barneveldt, Hugo Grotius, and men who acted with them, that seemed a doctrine fraught with danger to the state, by which mankind were not regarded as saved or doomed according to belief or deeds, but as individuals divided from all eternity into two classes which could never be united, but must ever mutually regard each other as enemies.

And like enemies Netherlanders were indeed beginning to regard each other. The men who, banded like brothers, had so heroically fought for two generations long for liberty against an almost superhuman despotism, now howling and jeering against each other like

¹ Van Rees and Brill, *Vad. Gesch.*, iii. 499 seq.

demons, seemed determined to bring the very name of liberty into contempt.

Where the Remonstrants were in the ascendant, they excited the hatred and disgust of the orthodox by their overbearing determination to carry their Five Points. A broker in Rotterdam of the Contra-Remonstrant persuasion, being about to take a wife, swore he had rather be married by a pig than a parson. For this sparkling epigram he was punished by the Remonstrant magistracy with loss of his citizenship for a year and the right to practise his trade for life.¹ A casuistical tinker, expressing himself violently in the same city against the Five Points, and disrespectfully toward the magistrates for tolerating them, was banished from the town.² A printer in the neighborhood, disgusted with these and similar efforts of tyranny on the part of the dominant party, thrust a couple of lines of doggerel into the lottery:

In name of the Prince of Orange, I ask once and again,
What difference between the Inquisition of Rotterdam and Spain?

For this poetical effort the printer was sentenced to forfeit the prize that he had drawn in the lottery, and to be kept in prison on bread and water for a fortnight.³

Certainly such punishments were hardly as severe as being beheaded or burned or buried alive, as would have been the lot of tinkers and printers and brokers who opposed the established church in the days of Alva; but the demon of intolerance, although its fangs were drawn, still survived, and had taken possession of

¹ Wagenaer, x. 82, 83.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

both parties in the Reformed Church. For it was the Remonstrants who had possession of the churches at Rotterdam, and the printer's distich is valuable as pointing out that the name of Orange was beginning to identify itself with the Contra-Remonstrant faction. At this time, on the other hand, the gabble that Barneveldt had been bought by Spanish gold and was about to sell his country to Spain became louder than a whisper. Men were not ashamed, from theological hatred, to utter such senseless calumnies against a venerable statesman whose long life had been devoted to the cause of his country's independence and to the death-struggle with Spain.

As if, because a man admitted the possibility of all his fellow-creatures being saved from damnation through repentance and the grace of God, he must inevitably be a traitor to his country and a pensionary of her deadliest foe!

And where the Contra-Remonstrants held possession of the churches and the city governments, acts of tyranny which did not then seem ridiculous were of every-day occurrence. Clergymen suspected of the Five Points were driven out of the pulpits with bludgeons or assailed with brickbats at the church door. At Amsterdam, Simon Goulart, for preaching the doctrine of universal salvation and for disputing the eternal damnation of young children, was forbidden thenceforth to preach at all.¹

But it was at The Hague that the schism in religion and politics first fatally widened itself. Henry Rosaeus, an eloquent divine, disgusted with his colleague Uytenbogart, refused all communion with him, and was

¹ Wagenaer, x. 86, 87. Brandt, *Hist. der Ref.*, ii. 261 seq.

in consequence suspended. Excluded from the Great Church, where he had formerly ministered, he preached every Sunday at Ryswyk, two or three miles distant.¹ Seven hundred Contra-Remonstrants of The Hague followed their beloved pastor, and, as the roads to Ryswyk were muddy and sloppy in winter, acquired the unsavory nickname of the "Mud Beggars." The vulgarity of heart which suggested the appellation does not inspire to-day great sympathy with the Remonstrant party, even if one were inclined to admit, what is not the fact, that they represented the cause of religious equality. For even the illustrious Grotius was at that very moment repudiating the notion that there could be two religions in one state. "Difference in public worship," he said, "was in kingdoms pernicious, but in free commonwealths in the highest degree destructive."²

It was the struggle between church and state for supremacy over the whole body politic. "The Reformation," said Grotius, "was not brought about by synods, but by kings, princes, and magistrates." It was the same eternal story, the same terrible two-edged weapon, "*Cujus regio ejus religio*," found in the arsenal of the first Reformers and in every politico-religious arsenal of history.

"By an eternal decree of God," said Gomarus, in accordance with Calvin, "it has been fixed who are to be saved and who damned. By his decree some are drawn to faith and godliness, and, being drawn, can never fall away. God leaves all the rest in the general corruption of human nature and their own misdeeds."³

¹ Van der Kemp, iv. 2.

² Wagenaer, x. 137.

³ Ibid, x. 15, 16. Gomari Opera, part i. 428; part ii. 27, 277, 280.

“God has from eternity made this distinction in the fallen human race,” said Arminius, “that he pardons those who desist from their sins and put their faith in Christ, and will give them eternal life, but will punish those who remain impenitent. Moreover, it is pleasanter to God that all men should repent, and, coming to knowledge of truth, remain therein, but he compels none.”¹

This was the vital difference of dogma. And it was because they could hold no communion with those who believed in the efficacy of repentance that Rosaeus and his followers had seceded to Ryswyk, and the Reformed Church had been torn into two very unequal parts. But it is difficult to believe that out of this arid field of controversy so plentiful a harvest of hatred and civil convulsion could have ripened. More practical than the insoluble problems whether repentance could effect salvation, and whether dead infants were hopelessly damned, was the question who should rule both church and state.

There could be but one church. On that Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants were agreed. But should the Five Points or the Seven Points obtain the mastery? Should that framework of hammered iron, the Confession and Catechism, be maintained in all its rigidity around the sheepfold, or should the disciples of the arch-heretic Arminius, the salvation-mongers, be permitted to prowl within it?

Was Barneveldt, who hated the Reformed religion² (so men told each other), and who believed in nothing, to continue dictator of the whole Republic through his

¹ *Arminii Opera*, 283, 288, 389, 943. *Wagenaer*, *ubi sup.*

² *Van der Kemp*, iv. 5.

influence over one province, prescribing its religious dogmas and laying down its laws, or had not the time come for the States-General to vindicate the rights of the church and to crush forever the pernicious principle of state sovereignty and burgher oligarchy?

The abyss was wide and deep, and the wild waves were raging more madly every hour. The advocate, anxious and troubled, but undismayed, did his best in the terrible emergency. He conferred with Prince Maurice on the subject of the Ryswyk secession, and men said that he sought to impress upon him, as chief of the military forces, the necessity of putting down religious schism with the armed hand.

The prince had not yet taken a decided position. He was still under the influence of John Uytenbogart, who with Arminius and the advocate made up the fatal three from whom deadly disasters were deemed to have come upon the commonwealth. He wished to remain neutral. But no man can be neutral in civil contentions threatening the life of the body politic any more than the heart can be indifferent if the human frame is sawn in two.

"I am a soldier," said Maurice, "not a divine. These are matters of theology, which I don't understand, and about which I don't trouble myself."¹

On another occasion he is reported to have said: "I know nothing of predestination, whether it is green or whether it is blue; but I do know that the advocate's pipe and mine will never play the same tune."²

It was not long before he fully comprehended the part which he must necessarily play. To say that he

¹ Brandt, ii. 558. Van der Kemp, iv. 20.

² Van Kampen, vol. ii.

was indifferent to religious matters was as ridiculous as to make a like charge against Barneveldt. Both were religious men. It would have been almost impossible to find an irreligious character in that country, certainly not among its highest-placed and leading minds. Maurice had strong intellectual powers. He was a regular attendant on divine worship, and was accustomed to hear daily religious discussions. To avoid them, indeed, he would have been obliged not only to fly his country, but to leave Europe. He had a profound reverence for the memory of his father, "Calbo y Calbanista," as William the Silent had called himself. But the great prince had died before these fierce disputes had torn the bosom of the Reformed Church, and while Reformers still were brethren. But if Maurice were a religious man, he was also a keen politician; a less capable politician, however, than a soldier, for he was confessedly the first captain of his age. He was not rapid in his conceptions, but he was sure in the end to comprehend his opportunity.

The church, the people, the Union,—the sacerdotal, the democratic, and the national element,—united under a name so potent to conjure with as the name of Orange-Nassau, was stronger than any other possible combination. Instinctively and logically, therefore, the stadholder found himself the chieftain of the Contra-Remonstrant party, and without the necessity of an apostasy such as had been required of his great contemporary to make himself master of France.

The power of Barneveldt and his partizans was now put to a severe strain. His efforts to bring back The Hague seceders were powerless. The influence of Uytenbogart over the stadholder steadily diminished.

He prayed to be relieved from his post in the Great Church of The Hague, especially objecting to serve with a Contra-Remonstrant preacher whom Maurice wished to officiate there in place of the seceding Rosaeus. But the stadholder refused to let him go, fearing his influence in other places. "There is stuff in him," said Maurice, "to outweigh half a dozen Contra-Remonstrant preachers."¹ Everywhere in Holland the opponents of the Five Points refused to go to the churches, and set up tabernacles for themselves in barns, outhouses, canal-boats. And the authorities in town and village nailed up the barn doors and dispersed the canal-boat congregations, while the populace pelted them with stones. The seceders appealed to the stadholder, pleading that at least they ought to be allowed to hear the Word of God as they understood it without being forced into churches where they were obliged to hear Arminian blasphemy. At least their barns might be left them. "Barns," said Maurice, "barns and outhouses! Are we to preach in barns? The churches belong to us, and we mean to have them, too."²

Not long afterward the stadholder, clapping his hand on his sword-hilt, observed that these differences could only be settled by force of arms.³ An ominous remark, and a dreary comment on the forty years' war against the Inquisition.

And the same scenes that were enacting in Holland were going on in Overijssel and Friesland and Groningen, but with a difference. Here it was the Five Points men who were driven into secession, whose barns

¹ Van der Kemp, iv. 21.

² Ibid. 22.

³ Wagenaer, x. 201. Uytenbogarts Leven, c. ix. 122.

were nailed up, and whose preachers were mobbed. A lugubrious spectacle, but less painful, certainly, than the hangings and drownings and burnings alive in the previous century to prevent secession from the indivisible church.

It is certain that stadholders and all other magistrates ever since the establishment of independence were sworn to maintain the Reformed religion and to prevent a public divine worship under any other form. It is equally certain that by the thirteenth article of the Act of Union—the organic law of the confederation, made at Utrecht in 1579—each province reserved for itself full control of religious questions. It would indeed seem almost unimaginable, in a country where not only every province, but every city, every municipal board, was so jealous of its local privileges and traditional rights, that the absolute disposition over the highest, gravest, and most difficult questions that can aspire and perplex humanity should be left to a general government, and one, moreover, which had scarcely come into existence.

Yet into this entirely illogical position the commonwealth was steadily drifting. The cause was simple enough. The states of Holland, as already observed, were Remonstrant by a large majority. The States-General were Contra-Remonstrant by a still greater majority. The church, rigidly attached to the Confession and Catechism, and refusing all change except through decree of a synod to be called by the general government which it controlled, represented the national idea. It thus identified itself with the Republic, and was in sympathy with a large majority of the population.

Logic, law, historical tradition, were on the side of the advocate and the states'-right party. The instinct of national self-preservation, repudiating the narrow and destructive doctrine of provincial sovereignty, was on the side of the States-General and the church.

Meantime James of Great Britain had written letters both to the states of Holland and the States-General expressing his satisfaction with the Five Points, and deciding that there was nothing objectionable in the doctrine of predestination therein set forth. He had recommended unity and peace in church and assembly, and urged especially that these controverted points should not be discussed in the pulpit, to the irritation and perplexity of the common people.

The king's letters had produced much satisfaction in the moderate party. Barneveldt and his followers were then still in the ascendant, and it seemed possible that the commonwealth might enjoy a few moments of tranquillity. That James had given a new exhibition of his astounding inconsistency was a matter very indifferent to all but himself, and he was the last man to trouble himself for that reproach.

It might happen, when he should come to realize how absolutely he had obeyed the tuition of the advocate and favored the party which he had been so vehemently opposing, that he might regret and prove willing to retract. But for the time being the course of politics had seemed running smoother. The acrimony of the relations between the English government and the dominant party at The Hague was sensibly diminished. The king seemed for an instant to have obtained a true insight into the nature of the struggle in the states. That it was, after all, less a theological

than a political question which divided parties had at last dawned upon him.

"If you have occasion to write on the subject," said Barneveldt,¹ "*it is, above all, necessary to make it clear that ecclesiastical persons and their affairs must stand under the direction of the sovereign authority,*"² for our preachers understand that the disposal of ecclesiastical persons and affairs belongs to them, so that they alone are to appoint preachers, elders, deacons, and other clerical persons, and to regulate the whole ecclesiastical administration according to their pleasure or by a popular government which they call the community.

"The counts of Holland from all ancient times were never willing under the papacy to surrender their right of presentation to the churches and control of all spiritual and ecclesiastical benefices. The Emperor Charles and King Philip even, as counts of Holland, kept these rights to themselves, save that they, in enfeoffing more than a hundred gentlemen of noble and ancient families with seigniorial manors, enfeoffed them also with the right of presentation to churches and benefices on their respective estates. Our preachers pretend to have won this right against the countship, the gentlemen, nobles, and others, and that it belongs to them."³

It is easy to see that this was a grave constitutional, legal, and historical problem, not to be solved offhand by vehement citations from Scripture, nor by prag-

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, February 11, 1613, Hague Archives MS

² These lines are underlined in the original despatch: "*dat die kerkelycke personen ende hare zaecken moeten staan onder die directie van de souveraine Overicheyt,*" etc.

³ Barneveldt to Caron, April 3, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

matical dissertations from the lips of foreign ambassadors.

"I believe this point," continued Barneveldt, "to be the most difficult question of all, importing far more than subtle searchings and conflicting sentiments as to passages of Holy Writ, or disputations concerning God's eternal predestination and other points thereupon depending. Of these doctrines the Archbishop of Canterbury well observed, in the Conference of 1604, that one ought to teach them *ascendendo* and not *descendendo*."

The letters of the king had been very favorably received both in the States-General and in the assembly of Holland. "You will present the replies," wrote Barneveldt to the ambassador in London, "at the best opportunity and with becoming compliments. You may be assured and assure his majesty that they have been very agreeable to both assemblies. Our commissioners over there on the East India matter ought to know nothing of these letters."¹

This statement is worthy of notice, as Grotius was one of those commissioners, and, as will subsequently appear, was accused of being the author of the letters.

"I understand from others," continued the advocate, "that the gentleman well known to you² is not well pleased that through other agency than his these letters have been written and presented. I think, too, that the other business is much against his grain, but, on the whole, since your departure he has accommodated himself to the situation."

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, April 3, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

² Obviously Francis Aertsens.

But if Aertsens for the moment seemed quiet, the orthodox clergy were restive.

“I know,” said Barneveldt,¹ “that some of our ministers are so audacious that of themselves or through others they mean to work by direct or indirect means against these letters. They mean to show likewise that there are other and greater differences of doctrine than those already discussed. You will keep a sharp eye on the sails and provide against the effect of counter-currents. To maintain the authority of their Great Mightinesses over ecclesiastical matters is more than necessary for the conservation of the country’s welfare and of the true Christian religion. As his Majesty would not allow this principle to be controverted in his own realms, as his books clearly prove, so we trust that he will not find it good that it should be controverted in our state, as sure to lead to a very disastrous and inequitable sequel.”

And a few weeks later the advocate and the whole party of toleration found themselves, as is so apt to be the case, between two fires. The Catholics became as turbulent as the extreme Calvinists, and already hopes were entertained by Spanish emissaries and spies that this rapidly growing schism in the Reformed Church might be dexterously made use of to bring the provinces, when they should become fairly distracted, back to the dominion of Spain.

“Our precise zealots in the Reformed religion on the one side,” wrote Barneveldt,² “and the Jesuits on the other, are vigorously kindling the fire of discord. Keep a good lookout for the countermines which is now

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, April 3, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to same, May 3, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

working against the good advice of his Majesty for mutual toleration. The publication of the letters was done without order, but I believe with good intent, in the hope that the vehemence and exorbitance of some precise Puritans in our state should thereby be checked. That which is now doing against us in printed libels is the work of the aforesaid Puritans and a few Jesuits. The pretense in those libels that there are other differences in the matter of doctrine is mere fiction designed to make trouble and confusion."

In the course of the autumn Sir Ralph Winwood departed from The Hague, to assume soon afterward in England the position of secretary of state for foreign affairs. He did not take personal farewell of Barneveldt, the advocate being absent in North Holland at the moment, and detained there by indisposition. The leave-taking was therefore by letter.¹ He had done much to injure the cause which the Dutch statesman held vital to the Republic, and in so doing he had faithfully carried out the instructions of his master. Now that James had written these conciliatory letters to the states recommending toleration, letters destined to be famous, Barneveldt was anxious that the retiring ambassador should foster the spirit of moderation which for a moment prevailed at the British court. But he was not very hopeful in the matter.

"Mr. Winwood is doubtless over there now," he wrote to Caron. "He has promised in public and private to do all good offices. The States-General made him a present on his departure of the value of four thousand pounds. I fear, nevertheless, that he, especially in religious matters, will not do the best offices.

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, September 10, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

For besides that he is himself very hard and precise, those who in this country are hard and precise have made a dead set at him,¹ and tried to make him devoted to their cause through many fictitious and untruthful means.”²

The advocate, as so often before, sent assurances to the king that “the States-General, and especially the states of Holland, were resolved to maintain the genuine Reformed religion and oppose all novelties and impurities conflicting with it,” and the ambassador was instructed to see that the countermine worked so industriously against his Majesty’s service and the honor and reputation of the provinces did not prove successful.

“To let the good mob play the master,” he said, “and to permit hypocrites and traitors in the Flemish manner to get possession of the government of the provinces and cities, and to cause upright patriots whose faith and truth have so long been proved to be abandoned, by the blessing of God, shall never be accomplished. Be of good heart, and cause these Flemish tricks to be understood on every occasion, and let men know that we mean to maintain with unchanging constancy the authority of the government, the privileges and laws of the country, as well as the true Reformed religion.”

The statesman was more than ever anxious for moderate counsels in the religious questions, for it was now more important than ever that there should be concord in the provinces, for the cause of Protestantism, and with it the existence of the Republic, seemed

¹ “. . . hem zeer aengeloopen.”—Barneveldt to Caron, September 10, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

² Ibid.

in greater danger than at any moment since the truce. It appeared certain that the alliance between France and Spain had been arranged, and that the pope, Spain, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and their various adherents had organized a strong combination and were enrolling large armies to take the field in the spring against the Protestant League of the princes and electors in Germany. The great king was dead. The queen regent was in the hand of Spain, or dreamed at least of an impossible neutrality, while the priest who was one day to resume the part of Henry, and to hang upon the sword of France the scales in which the opposing weights of Protestantism and Catholicism in Europe were through so many awful years to be balanced, was still an obscure bishop.

The premonitory signs of the great religious war in Germany were not to be mistaken. In truth, the great conflict had already opened in the duchies, although few men as yet comprehended the full extent of that movement. The superficial imagined that questions of hereditary succession, like those involved in the dispute, were easily to be settled by statutes of descent, expounded by doctors of law, and sustained, if needful, by a couple of comparatively bloodless campaigns. Those who looked more deeply into causes felt that the limitations of imperial authority, the ambition of a great republic suddenly starting into existence out of nothing, and the great issues of the religious Reformation were matters not so easily arranged. When the scene shifted, as it was so soon to do, to the heart of Bohemia, when Protestantism had taken the Holy Roman Empire by the beard in its ancient palace and thrown imperial stadholders out of window, it would

be evident to the blindest that something serious was taking place.

Meantime Barneveldt, ever watchful of passing events, knew that great forces of Catholicism were marshaling in the South. Three armies were to take the field against Protestantism at the orders of Spain and the pope. One, at the door of the Republic, and directed especially against the Netherlands, was to resume the campaign in the duchies and to prevent any aid going to Protestant Germany from Great Britain or from Holland. Another, in the Upper Palatinate, was to make the chief movement against the Evangelical hosts. A third, in Austria, was to keep down the Protestant party in Bohemia, Hungary, Austria, Moravia, and Silesia. To sustain this movement, it was understood that all the troops then in Italy were to be kept all the winter on a war footing.¹

Was this a time for the great Protestant party in the Netherlands to tear itself in pieces for a theological subtlety about which good Christians might differ without taking each other by the throat?

“I do not lightly believe or fear,” said the advocate, in communicating a survey of European affairs at that moment to Caron, “but present advices from abroad make me apprehend dangers.”²

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, October 29, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

² Ibid.

CHAPTER IX

Aertsens remains two years longer in France—Derives many personal advantages from his post—He visits the States-General—Aubéry du Maurier appointed French ambassador—He demands the recall of Aertsens—Peace of Ste.-Menehould—Asperen de Langerac appointed in Aertsens's place.

FRANCIS AERTSENS had remained longer at his post than had been intended by the resolution of the states of Holland passed in May, 1611.

It is an exemplification of the very loose constitutional framework of the United Provinces that the nomination of the ambassador to France belonged to the states of Holland, by whom his salary was paid, although, of course, he was the servant of the States-General, to whom his public and official correspondence was addressed. His most important despatches were, however, written directly to Barneveldt so long as he remained in power, who had also the charge of the whole correspondence, public or private, with all the envoys of the states.

Aertsens had, it will be remembered, been authorized to stay one year longer in France if he thought he could be useful there. He stayed two years, and on the whole was not useful. He had too many eyes and too many ears. He had become mischievous by the very activity of his intelligence. He was too zealous. There

were occasions in France at that moment in which it was as well to be blind and deaf. It was impossible for the Republic, unless driven to it by dire necessity, to quarrel with its great ally. It had been calculated by Duplessis-Mornay that France had paid subsidies to the provinces amounting from first to last to two hundred millions of livres.¹ This was an enormous exaggeration. It was Barneveldt's estimate that before the truce the states had received from France eleven millions of florins in cash, and during the truce up to the year 1613 three million six hundred thousand in addition, besides a million still due, making a total of about fifteen millions. During the truce France kept two regiments of foot, amounting to forty-two hundred soldiers, and two companies of cavalry in Holland at the service of the states, for which she was bound to pay yearly six hundred thousand livres. And the queen regent had continued all the treaties by which these arrangements were secured, and professed sincere and continuous friendship for the states. While the French-Spanish marriages gave cause for suspicion, uneasiness, and constant watchfulness in the states, still the neutrality of France was possible in the coming storm. So long as that existed, particularly when the relations of England with Holland through the unfortunate character of King James were perpetually strained to a point of imminent rupture, it was necessary to hold as long as it was possible to the slippery embrace of France.

But Aertsens was almost aggressive in his attitude.

¹ Duplessis-Mornay, *Vie et Corresp.*, viii. 514; x. 227. Ouvré, Aubéry du Maurier (Paris, 1855), 172. Barneveldt to states of Holland, March 31, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

He rebuked the vacillations, the shortcomings, the imbecility, of the queen's government in offensive terms. He consorted openly with the princes who were on the point of making war upon the queen regent. He made a boast to the secretary of state, Villeroy, that he had unraveled all his secret plots against the Netherlands. He declared it to be understood in France, since the king's death, by the dominant and jesuitical party that the crown depended temporally as well as spiritually on the good pleasure of the pope. No doubt he was perfectly right in many of his opinions. No ruler or statesman in France worthy of the name would hesitate, in the impending religious conflict throughout Europe and especially in Germany, to maintain for the kingdom that all-controlling position which was its splendid privilege. But to preach this to Mary de' Medici was waste of breath. She was governed by the Concinis, and the Concinis were governed by Spain. The woman who was believed to have known beforehand of the plot to murder her great husband, who had driven the one powerful statesman on whom the king relied, Maximilian de Béthune, into retirement, and whose foreign affairs were now completely in the hands of the ancient Leaguer Villeroy—who had served every government in the kingdom for forty years—was not likely to be accessible to high views of public policy.

Two years had now elapsed since the first private complaints against the ambassador, and the French government was becoming impatient at his presence. Aertsens had been supported by Prince Maurice, to whom he had long paid his court. He was likewise loyally protected by Barneveldt, whom he publicly flattered and secretly maligned. But it was now necessary that

he should be gone if peaceful relations with France were to be preserved.

After all, the ambassador had not made a bad business of his embassy from his own point of view. A stranger in the Republic, for his father the greffier was a refugee from Brabant, he had achieved through his own industry and remarkable talents, sustained by the favor of Barneveldt, to whom he owed all his diplomatic appointments, an eminent position in Europe. Secretary to the legation to France in 1594, he had been successively advanced to the post of resident agent, and when the Republic had been acknowledged by the great powers, to that of ambassador. The highest possible functions that representatives of emperors and kings could enjoy had been formally recognized in the person of the minister of a new-born republic. And this was at a moment when, with exception of the brave but insignificant cantons of Switzerland, the Republic had long been an obsolete idea.

In a pecuniary point of view, too, he had not fared badly during his twenty years of diplomatic office. He had made much money in various ways. The king not long before his death sent him one day twenty thousand florins as a present, with a promise soon to do much more for him.¹

Having been placed in so eminent a post, he considered it as due to himself to derive all possible advantage from it. "Those who serve at the altar," he said a little while after his return, "must learn to live by it. I served their High Mightinesses at the court of a great

¹ From Aertsens's own statements, "*Stukken rakende den Twist tussehen Aertsens ende van der Myle, anno 1618,*" Hague Archives MS.

king, and his Majesty's liberal and gracious favors were showered upon me. My upright conscience and steady obsequiousness greatly aided me. I did not look upon opportunity with folded arms, but siezed it and made my profit by it. Had I not met with such fortunate accidents, my office would not have given me dry bread."¹

Nothing could exceed the frankness and indeed the cynicism with which the ambassador avowed his practice of converting his high and sacred office into merchandise. And these statements of his should be scanned closely, because at this very moment a cry was distantly rising, which at a later day was to swell into a roar, that the great advocate had been bribed and pensioned. Nothing had occurred to justify such charges, save that at the period of the truce he had accepted from the King of France a fee of twenty thousand florins for extra official and legal services rendered him a dozen years before, and had permitted his younger son to hold the office of gentleman in waiting at the French court, with the usual salary attached to it. The post, certainly not dishonorable in itself, had been intended by the king as a kindly compliment to the leading statesman of his great and good ally the Republic. It would be difficult to say why such a favor conferred on the young man should be held more discreditable to the receiver than the Order of the Garter recently bestowed upon the great soldier of the Republic by another friendly sovereign. It is instructive, however, to note the language in which Francis Aertsens spoke of favors and money bestowed by a foreign monarch upon himself, for Aertsens had come

¹ Stukken rakende den Twist, etc.

back from his embassy full of gall and bitterness against Barneveldt. Thenceforth he was to be his evil demon.

“I did n’t inherit property,”¹ said this diplomatist. “My father and mother, thank God, are yet living. I have enjoyed the king’s liberality. It was from an ally, not an enemy, of our country. Were every man obliged to give a reckoning of everything he possesses over and above his hereditary estates, who in the government would pass muster? Those who declare that they have served their country in her greatest trouble, and lived in splendid houses and in service of princes and great companies and the like on a yearly salary of four thousand florins, may not approve these maxims.”

It should be remembered that Barneveldt, if this was a fling at the advocate, had acquired a large fortune by marriage, and, although certainly not averse from gathering gear, had, as will be seen on a subsequent page, easily explained the manner in which his property had increased. No proof was ever offered or attempted of the anonymous calumnies leveled at him in this regard.

“I never had the management of finances,” continued Aertsens. “My profits I have gained in foreign parts. My condition of life is without excess, and in my opinion every means are good so long as they are honorable and legal. They say my post was given me by the advocate; *ergo*, all my fortune comes from the advocate. Strenuously to have striven to make myself agreeable to the king and his councilors, while fulfilling my office with fidelity and honor, these are the arts by

¹ Stukken rakende den Twist, etc.

which I have prospered, so that my splendor dazzles the eyes of the envious. The greediness of those who believe that the sun should shine for them alone was excited, and so I was obliged to resign the embassy."¹

So long as Henry lived, the Dutch ambassador saw him daily and at all hours, privately, publicly, when he would. Rarely has a foreign envoy at any court, at any period of history, enjoyed such privileges of being useful to his government. And there is no doubt that the services of Aertsens had been most valuable to his country, notwithstanding his constant care to increase his private fortune through his public opportunities. He was always ready to be useful to Henry likewise. When that monarch, some time before the truce, and occasionally during the preliminary negotiations for it, had formed a design to make himself sovereign of the provinces, it was Aertsens who charged himself with the scheme, and would have furthered it with all his might, had the project not met with opposition both from the advocate and the stadholder. Subsequently it appeared probable that Maurice would not object to the sovereignty himself, and the ambassador in Paris, with the king's consent, was not likely to prove himself hostile to the prince's ambition. "There is but this means alone," wrote Jeannin² to Villeroy, "that can content him, although hitherto he has done like the

¹ These passages are from an address to the States-General, June 18, 1618, five years later than the date of his return from France, with which we are at this moment occupied. As they paint the character of the man and refer precisely to his feelings at the instant of his recall, it is necessary to give them here. From the collection of MSS. in the Archives at The Hague already cited, *Stukken rakende*, etc.

² Jeannin, *Négociations*, t. ii. 13a, 159, 291; t. iii. 4. *Ouvré*, 179.

rowers, who never look toward the place whither they wish to go.”¹ The attempt of the prince to sound Barneveldt on this subject through the princess dowager has already been mentioned, and has much intrinsic probability. Thenceforward the republican form of government, the municipal oligarchies, began to consolidate their power. Yet although the people as such were not sovereigns, but subjects, and rarely spoken of by the aristocratic magistrates save with a gentle and patronizing disdain, they enjoyed a larger liberty than was known anywhere else in the world. Buzanval was astonished at the “infinite and almost unbridled freedom” which he witnessed there during his embassy, and which seemed to him, however, “without peril to the state.”²

The extraordinary means possessed by Aertsens to be important and useful vanished with the king's death. His secret despatches, painting in somber and sarcastic colors the actual condition of affairs at the French court, were sent back in copy to the French court itself. It was not known who had played the ambassador this vilest of tricks, but it was done during an illness of Barneveldt, and without his knowledge. Early in the year 1613 Aertsens resolved, not to take his final departure, but to go home on leave of absence. His private intention was to look for some substantial office of honor and profit at home. Failing of this, he meant to return to Paris. But with an eye to the main chance as usual, he ingeniously caused it to be understood at court, without making positive statements to that effect, that his departure was final. On

¹ Jéannin, *Négotiations*, iv. 212, 310, 321; v. 33. Ouvré, 184.

² *Ibid.*, 199.

his leave-taking, accordingly, he received larger presents from the crown than had been often given to a retiring ambassador. At least twenty thousand florins were thus added to the frugal store of profits on which he prided himself. Had he merely gone away on leave of absence, he would have received no presents whatever. But he never went back. The queen regent and her ministers were so glad to get rid of him, and so little disposed, in the straits in which they found themselves, to quarrel with the powerful Republic, as to be willing to write very complimentary public letters to the states concerning the character and conduct of the man whom they so much detested.

Pluming himself upon these, Aertsens made his appearance¹ in the assembly of the States-General, to give account by word of mouth of the condition of affairs, speaking as if he had only come by permission of their Mightinesses for temporary purposes. Two months later he was summoned before the assembly and ordered to return to his post.

Meantime a new French ambassador had arrived at The Hague, in the spring of 1613. Aubéry du Maurier, a son of an obscure country squire, a Protestant, of moderate opinions, of a sincere but rather obsequious character, painstaking, diligent, and honest, had been at an earlier day in the service of the turbulent and intriguing Duc de Bouillon. He had also been employed by Sully as an agent in financial affairs between Holland and France, and had long been known to Villeroy. He was living on his estate, in great retirement from all public business, when Secretary Vil-

¹ July 30, 1613, Register in the Hague Archives MS. October 2, 1613, *Ouvré*, 199.

leroy suddenly proposed him the embassy to The Hague. There was no more important diplomatic post at that time in Europe. Other countries were virtually at peace, but in Holland, notwithstanding the truce, there was really not much more than an armistice, and great armies lay in the Netherlands, as after a battle, sleeping face to face with arms in their hands. The politics of Christendom were at issue in the open, elegant, and picturesque village which was the social capital of the United Provinces. The gentry from Spain, Italy, the south of Europe, Catholic Germany, had clustered about Spinola at Brussels, to learn the art of war in his constant campaigning against Maurice. English and Scotch officers, Frenchmen, Bohemians, Austrians, youths from the Palatinate and all Protestant countries in Germany, swarmed to the banners of the prince who had taught the world how Alexander Farnese could be baffled and the great Spinola outmanœuvred. Especially there was a great number of Frenchmen of figure and quality who thronged to The Hague, besides the officers of the two French regiments which formed a regular portion of the states' army. That army was the best-appointed and most conspicuous standing force in Europe. Besides the French contingent there were always nearly thirty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry on a war footing, splendidly disciplined, experienced, and admirably armed. The navy, consisting of thirty war-ships, perfectly equipped and manned, was a match for the combined marine forces of all Europe, and almost as numerous.¹

When the ambassador went to solemn audience of

¹ See Duplessis-Mornay, xii. 524. Ouvré, 201.

the States-General, he was attended by a brilliant group of gentlemen and officers, often to the number of three hundred, who volunteered to march after him on foot to honor their sovereign in the person of his ambassador, the envoy's carriage following empty behind. Such were the splendid diplomatic processions often received by the stately advocate in his plain civic garb, when grave international questions were to be publicly discussed.¹

There was much murmuring in France when the appointment of a personage comparatively so humble to a position so important was known. It was considered as a blow aimed directly at the malcontent princes of the blood, who were at that moment plotting their first levy of arms against the queen. Du Maurier had been ill-treated by the Duc de Bouillon, who naturally therefore now denounced the man whom he had injured to the government to which he was accredited.² Being the agent of Mary de' Medici, he was, of course, described as a tool of the court and a secret pensioner of Spain. He was to plot with the arch-traitor Barneveldt as to the best means for distracting the provinces and bringing them back into Spanish subjection. Du Maurier, being especially but secretly charged to prevent the return of Francis Aertsens to Paris, incurred, of course, the enmity of that personage and of the French *grande*es who ostentatiously protected him. It was even pretended by Jeannin³ that the appointment of a man so slightly known to the world, so inexperienced in diplomacy, and of a parentage so little distinguished, would be considered an affront by the States-General.

¹ Du Maurier, *Mémoires*, 191-193.

² *Ouvré*, 203.

³ *Ibid.*

But, on the whole, Villeroy had made an excellent choice. No safer man could perhaps have been found in France for a post of such eminence, in circumstances so delicate, and at a crisis so grave. The man who had been able to make himself agreeable and useful, while preserving his integrity, to characters so dissimilar as the refining, self-torturing, intellectual Duplessis-Mornay, the rude, aggressive, and straightforward Sully, the deep-revolving, restlessly plotting Bouillon, and the smooth, silent, and tortuous Villeroy—men between whom there was no friendship, but, on the contrary, constant rancor—had material in him to render valuable services at this particular epoch. Everything depended on patience, tact, watchfulness in threading the distracting, almost inextricable, maze which had been created by personal rivalries, ambitions, and jealousies in the state he represented and the one to which he was accredited. “I ascribe it all to God,” he said ¹ in his testament to his children, “the impenetrable workman who in his goodness has enabled me to make myself all my life obsequious, respectful, and serviceable to all, avoiding as much as possible, in contenting some, not to discontent others.” He recommended his children accordingly to endeavor “to succeed in life by making themselves as humble, intelligent, and capable as possible.”

This is certainly not a very high type of character, but a safer one for business than that of the arch-intriguer Francis Aertsens. And he had arrived at The Hague under trying circumstances. Unknown to the foreign world he was now entering, save through the disparaging rumors concerning him, sent thither

¹ *Ouvré*, 170.

in advance by the powerful personages arrayed against his government, he might have sunk under such a storm at the outset, but for the incomparable kindness and friendly aid of the princess dowager, Louisa de Coligny. "I had need of her protection and recommendation as much as of life," said Du Maurier, "and she gave them in such excess as to annihilate an infinity of calumnies which envy had excited against me on every side."¹ He had also a most difficult and delicate matter to arrange at the very moment of his arrival.

For Aertsens had done his best not only to produce a dangerous division in the politics of the Republic, but to force a rupture between the French government and the states. He had carried matters before the assembly with so high a hand as to make it seem impossible to get rid of him without public scandal. He made a parade of the official letters from the queen regent and her ministers, in which he was spoken of in terms of conventional compliment. He did not know, and Barneveldt wished, if possible, to spare him the annoyance of knowing, that both queen and ministers, so soon as informed that there was a chance of coming back to them, had written letters breathing great repugnance to him and intimating that he would not be received. Other high personages of state had written to express their resentment at his duplicity, perpetual mischief-making, and machinations against the peace of the kingdom, and stating the impossibility of his resuming the embassy at Paris. And at last the queen²

¹ *Ouvré*, 204.

² November 2, 1613. *Stukken rakende den Twist*, etc., Hague Archives MS.

wrote to the States-General to say that, having heard their intention to send him back to a post "from which he had taken leave formally and officially," she wished to prevent such a step. "We should see M. Aertsens less willingly than comports with our friendship for you and good neighborhood. Any other you could send would be most welcome, as M. du Maurier will explain to you more amply."

And to Du Maurier himself she wrote distinctly:¹ "Rather than suffer the return of the said Aertsens, you will declare that for causes which regard the good of our affairs and our particular satisfaction we cannot and will not receive him in the functions which he has exercised here, and we rely too implicitly upon the good friendship of my lords the states to do anything in this that would so much displease us." ²

And on the same day Villeroy privately wrote to the ambassador: "If, in spite of all this, Aertsens should endeavor to return, he will not be received, after the knowledge we have of his factious spirit, most dangerous in a public personage in a state such as ours and in the minority of the king." ³

Meantime Aertsens had been going about flaunting letters in everybody's face from the Duc de Bouillon insisting on the necessity of his return.⁴ The fact in itself would have been sufficient to warrant his removal, for the duke was just taking up arms against his sovereign. Unless the states meant to interfere officially and directly in the civil war about to break out in France, they could hardly send a minister to

¹ November 2, 1613. Stukken rakende den Twist, etc., Hague Archives MS.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ouvré, 209.

the government on recommendation of the leader of the rebellion.

It had, however, become impossible to remove him without an explosion. Barneveldt, who, said Du Maurier, "knew the man to his finger-nails,"¹ had been reluctant to "break the ice," and wished for official notice in the matter from the queen. Maurice protected the troublesome diplomatist. "'T is incredible," said the French ambassador,² "how covertly Prince Maurice is carrying himself, contrary to his wont, in this whole affair. I don't know whether it is from simple jealousy to Barneveldt, or if there is some mystery concealed below the surface."

Du Maurier had accordingly been obliged to ask his government for distinct and official instructions. "He holds to his place," said he,³ "by so slight and fragile a root as not to require two hands to pluck him up, the little finger being enough. There is no doubt that he has been in concert with those who are making use of him to reëstablish their credit with the states and to embark Prince Maurice, contrary to his preceding custom, in a cabal with them."

Thus a question of removing an obnoxious diplomatist could hardly be graver, for it was believed that he was doing his best to involve the military chief of his own state in a game of treason and rebellion against the government to which he was accredited. It was not the first nor likely to be the last of Bouillon's deadly intrigues. But the man who had been privy to Biron's conspiracy against the crown and life of his sovereign was hardly a safe ally for his brother-in-law, the straightforward stadholder.

¹ *Ouvré*, 207.

² *Ibid.*, 208.

³ *Ibid.*

The instructions desired by Du Maurier and by Barneveldt had, as we have seen, at last arrived. The French ambassador, thus fortified, appeared before the assembly of the States-General,¹ and officially demanded the recall of Aertsens. In a letter addressed privately and confidentially to their Mightinesses, he said: "If in spite of us you throw him at our feet, we shall fling him back at your head."²

At last Maurice yielded to the representations of the French envoy, and Aertsens felt obliged to resign his claims to the post. The States-General passed a resolution that it would be proper to employ him in some other capacity in order to show that his services had been agreeable to them, he having now declared that he could no longer be useful in France.³ Maurice, seeing that it was impossible to save him, admitted to Du Maurier his unsteadiness and duplicity, and said that, if possessed of the confidence of a great king, he would be capable of destroying the state in less than a year.⁴

But this had not always been the prince's opinion, nor was it likely to remain unchanged. As for Villeroy, he denied flatly that the cause of his displeasure had been that Aertsens had penetrated into his most secret affairs. He protested, on the contrary, that his annoyance with him had partly proceeded from the slight acquaintance he had acquired of his policy, and that, while boasting to be better informed than any one, he was in the habit of inventing and imagining things in order to get credit for himself.⁵

¹ November 13, 1613. Ouvré, 210.

² Ibid., 211.

³ December 13, 1613; January 31, 1614. Resol. States-Gen., Hague Archives MS.

⁴ Ouvré, 213.

⁵ January 4, 1614. Stukken, etc., Hague Archives MS.

It was highly essential that the secret of this affair should be made clear, for its influence on subsequent events was to be deep and wide. For the moment Aertsens remained without employment, and there was no open rupture with Barneveldt. The only difference of opinion between the advocate and himself, he said, was whether he had or had not definitely resigned his post on leaving Paris.¹

Meantime it was necessary to fix upon a successor for this most important post. The war soon after the new year had broken out in France. Condé, Bouillon, and the other malcontent princes, with their followers, had taken possession of the fortress of Mézières, and issued a letter in the name of Condé to the queen regent demanding an assembly of the States-General of the kingdom and rupture of the Spanish marriages.² Both parties, that of the government and that of the rebellion, sought the sympathy and active succor of the states. Maurice, acting now in perfect accord with the advocate, sustained the queen and execrated the rebellion of his relatives with perfect frankness. Condé, he said, had got his head stuffed full of almanacs whose predictions he wished to see realized.³ He vowed he would have shortened by a head the commander of the garrison who betrayed Mézières, if he had been under his control. He forbade on pain of death the departure of any officer or private of the French regiments from serving the rebels, and placed the whole French force at the disposal of the queen, with as many Netherland regiments as could be spared. One soldier was hanged and three others branded with the mark of a

¹ Stukken, etc., Hague Archives MS.

² Ouvré, 219.

³ Ouvré, 215, from Du Maurier's MS. despatches.

gibbet on the face for attempting desertion. The legal government was loyally sustained by the authority of the states, notwithstanding all the intrigues of Aertsens with the agents of the princes to procure them assistance. The mutiny for the time was brief, and was settled on the 15th May, 1614, by the peace of Ste.-Menehould, as much a caricature of a treaty as the rising had been the parody of a war.¹ Van der Myle, son-in-law of Barneveldt, who had been charged with a special and temporary mission to France, brought back the terms of the convention to the States-General. On the other hand, Condé and his confederates sent a special agent to the Netherlands to give their account of the war and the negotiation, who refused to confer either with Du Maurier or Barneveldt, but who held much conference with Aertsens.²

It was obvious enough that the mutiny of the princes would become chronic. In truth, what other condition was possible with two characters like Mary de' Medici and the Prince of Condé respectively at the head of the government and the revolt? What had France to hope for but to remain the bloody playground for mischievous idiots, who threw about the firebrands and arrows of reckless civil war in pursuit of the paltriest of personal aims?

Van der Myle had pretensions to the vacant place of Aertsens. He had some experience in diplomacy. He had conducted skilfully enough the first mission of the states to Venice, and had subsequently been employed in matters of moment. But he was son-in-law to Barneveldt, and although the advocate was certainly not free from the charge of nepotism, he shrank from the

¹ *Ouvré*, 215.

² *Ibid.*, 215, 218 seq.

reproach of having apparently removed Aertsens to make a place for one of his own family.

Van der Myle remained to bear the brunt of the late ambassador's malice, and to engage at a little later period in hottest controversy with him, personal and political. "Why should Van der Myle strut about, with his arms akimbo, like a peacock?"¹ complained Aertsens one day in confused metaphor. A question not easy to answer satisfactorily.

The minister selected was a certain Baron Asperen de Langerac, wholly unversed in diplomacy or other public affairs, with abilities not above the average. A series of questions² addressed by him to the advocate, the answers to which, scrawled on the margin of the paper, were to serve for his general instructions, showed an ingenuousness as amusing as the replies of Barneveldt were experienced and substantial.

In general he was directed to be friendly and respectful to every one, to the queen regent and her councilors especially, and, within the limits of becoming reverence for her, to cultivate the good graces of the Prince of Condé and the other great nobles still malcontent and rebellious, but whose present movement, as Barneveldt foresaw, was drawing rapidly to a close. Langerac arrived in Paris on the 5th April, 1614.

Du Maurier thought the new ambassador likely to "fall a prey to the specious language and gentle attractions of the Duc de Bouillon."³ He also described him as very dependent upon Prince Maurice. On the

¹ ". . . ende daerinne met geboechde armen als een Paauw te pronken," etc.—Stukken rakende, etc., MS. before cited.

² Hague Archives MS.

³ Ouvre, 213.

other hand, Langerac professed unbounded and almost childlike reverence for Barneveldt,¹ was devoted to his person, and breathed as it were only through his inspiration. Time would show whether those sentiments would outlast every possible storm.

¹ Hague Archives MS.

CHAPTER X

Weakness of the rulers of France and England—The wisdom of Barneveldt inspires jealousy—Sir Dudley Carleton succeeds Winwood—Young Neuburg under the guidance of Maximilian—Barneveldt strives to have the treaty of Xanten enforced—Spain and the emperor wish to make the states abandon their position with regard to the duchies—The French government refuses to aid the states—Spain and the emperor resolve to hold Wesel—The great religious war begun—The Protestant Union and Catholic League both wish to secure the border provinces—Troubles in Turkey—Spanish fleet seizes La Roche—Spain places large armies on a war footing.

FEW things are stranger in history than the apathy with which the wide designs of the Catholic party were at that moment regarded. The preparations for the immense struggle which posterity learned to call the Thirty Years' War, and to shudder when speaking of it, were going forward on every side. In truth, the war had really begun, yet those most deeply menaced by it at the outset looked on with innocent calmness because their own roofs were not quite yet in a blaze. The passage of arms in the duchies, the outlines of which have just been indicated, and which was the natural sequel of the campaign carried out four years earlier on the same territory, had been ended by a mockery. In France, reduced almost to imbecility by the absence of a guiding brain during a long minority,

fallen under the distaff of a dowager both weak and wicked, distracted by the intrigues and quarrels of a swarm of self-seeking grandees, and with all its offices, from highest to lowest, of court, state, jurisprudence, and magistracy, sold as openly and as cynically as the commonest wares, there were few to comprehend or to grapple with the danger.¹ It should have seemed obvious to the meanest capacity in the kingdom that the great house of Austria, reigning supreme in Spain and in Germany, could not be allowed to crush the Duke of Savoy on the one side, and Bohemia, Moravia, and the Netherlands on the other, without danger of subjection for France. Yet the aim of the queen regent was to cultivate an impossible alliance with her inevitable foe.

And in England, ruled as it then was with no master mind to enforce against its sovereign the great lessons of policy, internal and external, on which its welfare and almost its imperial existence depended, the only ambition of those who could make their opinions felt was to pursue the same impossibility, intimate alliance with the universal foe.

Any man with slightest pretensions to statesmanship knew that the liberty for Protestant worship in imperial Germany, extorted by force, had been given reluc-

¹ "Tutti li officii e servigii," says Pietro Contarini, *Relazione di Francia*, 1613-1616, "della casa del re sino agli ultimi valletti, tutti li carichi militari per ogni magistrati di giustizia si vendono e col pagarsi per questo certa annua imposizione che chiamono la stolletta possono anco disporne dopo la vita; ciò causa che non le persone di merito non quelle che travagliano, ma solo chi può comprare ha posto nelli carichi e nelli primi servigii del regno, dove ben spesso li meno atti ed idonei sono li preferiti e da questo accidente avviene che il rè è mal visto rubato e la giustizia mal amministrata," etc. (Barozzi and Berchet.)

tantly, and would be valid only as long as that force could still be exerted or should remain obviously in reserve. The Majesty Letter and the Compromise of the two religions would prove as flimsy as the parchment on which they were engrossed, the Protestant churches built under that sanction would be shattered like glass, if once the Catholic rulers could feel their hands as clear as their consciences would be for violating their sworn faith to heretics. Men knew, even if the easy-going and uxorious emperor, into which character the once busy and turbulent Archduke Matthias had subsided, might be willing to keep his pledges, that Ferdinand of Styria, who would soon succeed him, and Maximilian of Bavaria were men who knew their own minds and had mentally never resigned one inch of the ground which Protestantism imagined itself to have conquered.

These things seem plain as daylight to all who look back upon them through the long vista of the past; but the sovereign of England did not see them or did not choose to see them. He saw only the Infanta and her two millions of dowry, and he knew that by calling Parliament together to ask subsidies for an anti-Catholic war he should ruin those golden matrimonial prospects for his son, while encouraging those "shoemakers," his subjects, to go beyond their "last," by consulting the representatives of his people on matters pertaining to the mysteries of government. He was slowly digging the grave of the monarchy and building the scaffold of his son; but he did his work with a laborious and pedantic trifling, when really engaged in state affairs, most amazing to contemplate. He had no penny to give to the cause in which his nearest rela-

tives were so deeply involved and for which his only possible allies were pledged; but he was ready to give advice to all parties, and with ludicrous gravity imagined himself playing the umpire between great contending hosts, when in reality he was only playing the fool at the beck of masters before whom he quaked.

"You are not to vilipend my counsel," said he one day to a foreign envoy. "I am neither a camel nor an ass to take up all this work on my shoulders. Where would you find another king as willing to do it as I am?"¹

The king had little time and no money to give to serve his own family and allies and the cause of Protestantism, but he could squander vast sums upon worthless favorites, and consume reams of paper on controverted points of divinity. The appointment of Vorstius to the chair of theology in Leyden aroused more indignation in his bosom, and occupied more of his time, than the conquests of Spinola in the duchies, and the menaces of Spain against Savoy and Bohemia. He perpetually preached moderation to the states in the matter of the debatable territory, although moderation at that moment meant submission to the house of Austria. He chose to affect confidence in the good faith of those who were playing a comedy by which no statesman could be deceived, but which had secured the approbation of the Solomon of the age.

But there was one man who was not deceived. The warnings and the lamentations of Barneveldt sound to us out of that far-distant time like the voice of an inspired prophet. It is possible that a portion of the

¹ G. W. Vreede, Extract from a MS. Report of F. Aertsens, Prov. Utrecht Archives.

wrath to come might have been averted had there been many men in high places to heed his voice. I do not wish to exaggerate the power and wisdom of the man, nor to set him forth as one of the greatest heroes of history. But posterity has done far less than justice to a statesman and sage who wielded a vast influence at a most critical period in the fate of Christendom, and uniformly wielded it to promote the cause of temperate human liberty, both political and religious. Viewed by the light of two centuries and a half of additional experience, he may appear to have made mistakes, but none that were necessarily disastrous or even mischievous. Compared with the prevailing idea of the age in which he lived, his schemes of polity seem to dilate into large dimensions, his sentiments of religious freedom, however limited to our modern ideas, mark an epoch in human progress, and in regard to the general commonwealth of Christendom, of which he was so leading a citizen, the part he played was a lofty one. No man certainly understood the tendency of his age more exactly, took a broader and more comprehensive view than he did of the policy necessary to preserve the largest portion of the results of the past three quarters of a century, or had pondered the relative value of great conflicting forces more skilfully. Had his counsels been always followed, had illustrious birth placed him virtually upon a throne, as was the case with William the Silent, and thus allowed him occasionally to carry out the designs of a great mind with almost despotic authority, it might have been better for the world. But in that age it was royal blood alone that could command unflinching obedience without exciting personal rivalry. Men quailed before his

majestic intellect, but hated him for the power which was its necessary result. They already felt a stupid delight in caviling at his pedigree. To dispute his claim to a place among the ancient nobility to which he was an honor was to revenge themselves for the rank he unquestionably possessed side by side in all but birth with the kings and rulers of the world. Whether envy and jealousy be vices more incident to the republican form of government than to other political systems may be an open question. But it is no question whatever that Barneveldt's every footstep from this period forward was dogged by envy as patient as it was devouring. Jealousy stuck to him like his shadow. We have examined the relations which existed between Winwood and himself; we have seen that ambassador, now secretary of state for James, never weary in denouncing the advocate's haughtiness and grim resolution to govern the country according to its laws rather than at the dictate of a foreign sovereign, and in flinging forth malicious insinuations in regard to his relations to Spain. The man whose every hour was devoted—in spite of a thousand obstacles strewn by stupidity, treachery, and apathy, as well as by envy, hatred, and bigotry—to the organizing of a grand and universal league of Protestantism against Spain, and to rolling up with strenuous and sometimes despairing arms a dead mountain weight, ever ready to fall back upon and crush him, was accused in dark and mysterious whispers, soon to grow louder and bolder, of a treacherous inclination for Spain.

There is nothing less surprising nor more sickening for those who observe public life and wish to retain

faith in the human species than the almost infinite power of the meanest of passions.

The advocate was obliged at the very outset of Langerac's mission to France to give him a warning on this subject.

"Should her Majesty make kindly mention of me," he said, "you will say nothing of it in your despatches as you did in your last, although I am sure with the best intentions. It profits me not, and many take umbrage at it; wherefore it is wise to forbear."

But this was a trifle. By and by there would be many to take umbrage at every whisper in his favor, whether from crowned heads or from the simplest in the social scale. Meantime he instructed the ambassador, without paying heed to personal compliments to his chief, to do his best to keep the French government out of the hands of Spain, and with that object in view to smooth over the differences between the two great parties in the kingdom, and to gain the confidence, if possible, of Condé and Nevers and Bouillon, while never failing in straightforward respect and loyal friendship to the queen regent and her ministers, as the legitimate heads of the government.

From England a new ambassador was soon to take the place of Winwood. Sir Dudley Carleton was a diplomatist of respectable abilities, and well trained to business and routine. Perhaps, on the whole, there was none other, in that epoch of official mediocrity, more competent than he to fill what was then certainly the most important of foreign posts. His course of life had in no wise familiarized him with the intricacies of the Dutch constitution, nor could the diplomatic profession, combined with a long residence at Venice,

be deemed especially favorable for deep studies of the mysteries of predestination. Yet he would be found ready at the bidding of his master to grapple with Grotius and Barneveldt on the field of history and law, and thread with Uytenbogart or Taurinus all the subtleties of Arminianism and Gomarism, as if he had been half his life both a regular practitioner at the Supreme Court of The Hague and professor of theology at the University of Leyden. Whether the triumphs achieved in such encounters were substantial and due entirely to his own genius might be doubtful. At all events, he had a sovereign behind him who was incapable of making a mistake on any subject.

“You shall not forget,” said James in his instructions to Sir Dudley, “that you are the minister of that master whom God hath made the sole protector of his religion, . . . and you may let fall how hateful the maintaining of erroneous opinions is to the majesty of God, and how displeasing to us.”¹

The warlike operations of 1614 had been ended by the abortive peace of Xanten. The two rival pretenders to the duchies were to halve the territory, drawing lots for the first choice, all foreign troops were to be withdrawn, and a pledge was to be given that no fortress should be placed in the hands of any power. But Spain at the last moment had refused to sanction the treaty, and everything was remitted to what might be exactly described as a state of sixes and sevens. Subsequently it was hoped that the states' troops might be induced to withdraw simultaneously with the Catholic forces on an undertaking by Spinola that there should be no reoccupation of the disputed territory

¹ Carleton's Letters (London, 1780), 6.

either by the Republic or by Spain. But Barneveldt accurately pointed out that, although the marquis was a splendid commander and, so long as he was at the head of the armies, a most powerful potentate, he might be superseded at any moment. Count Buequoy, for example, might suddenly appear in his place and refuse to be bound by any military arrangement of his predecessor. Then the archduke proposed to give a guaranty that in case of a mutual withdrawal there should be no return of the troops, no recapture of garisons. But Barneveldt, speaking for the states, liked not the security. The archduke was but the puppet of Spain, and Spain had no part in the guaranty. She held the strings, and might cause him at any moment to play what pranks she chose. It would be the easiest thing in the world for despotic Spain, so the advocate thought, to reappear suddenly in force again at a moment's notice after the states' troops had been withdrawn and partially disbanded, and it would be difficult for the many-headed and many-tongued Republic to act with similar promptness. To withdraw without a guaranty from Spain to the treaty of Xanten, which had once been signed, sealed, and all but ratified, would be to give up fifty points in the game. Nothing but disaster could ensue. The advocate as leader in all these negotiations and correspondence was ever actuated by the favorite quotation of William the Silent from Demosthenes, that the safest citadel against an invader and a tyrant is distrust. And he always distrusted in these dealings, for he was sure the Spanish cabinet was trying to make fools of the states, and there were many ready to assist it in the task. Now that one of the pretenders, temporary master of half

the duchies, the Prince of Neuburg, had espoused both Catholicism and the sister of the Archbishop of Cologne and the Duke of Bavaria, it would be more safe than ever for Spain to make a temporary withdrawal. Maximilian of Bavaria was beyond all question the ablest and most determined leader of the Catholic party in Germany, and the most straightforward and sincere. No man before or since his epoch had, like him, been destined to refuse, and more than once refuse, the imperial crown.¹

Through his apostasy the Prince of Neuburg was in danger of losing his hereditary estates, his brothers endeavoring to dispossess him on the ground of the late duke's will, disinheriting any one of his heirs who should become a convert to Catholicism. He had accordingly implored aid from the King of Spain. Archduke Albert had urged Philip to render such assistance as a matter of justice, and the emperor had naturally declared that the whole right as eldest son belonged, notwithstanding the will, to the prince.²

With the young Neuburg accordingly under the able guidance of Maximilian, it was not likely that the grasp of the Spanish party upon these all-important territories would be really loosened. The emperor still claimed the right to decide among the candidates and to hold the provinces under sequestration till the decision should be made—that was to say, until the Greek calends. The original attempt to do this through Archduke Leopold had been thwarted, as we have seen, by the prompt movements of Maurice sustained by the policy of Barneveldt. The advocate was resolved that

¹ Vide Gindely, *Gesch. des dreissigjährl. Kriegs*, vol. i., *passim*.

² Archduke Albert to Philip III., Archives of Belgium MS.

the emperor's name should not be mentioned either in the preamble or body of the treaty. And his course throughout the simulations, which were never negotiations, was perpetually baffled as much by the easiness and languor of his allies as the ingenuity of the enemy.

He was reproached with the loss of Wesel, that Geneva of the Rhine, which would never be abandoned by Spain if it was not done forthwith. Let Spain guarantee the treaty of Xanten, he said, and then she cannot come back. All else is illusion. Moreover, the emperor had given positive orders that Wesel should not be given up.¹ He was assured by Villeroy that France would never put on her harness for Aachen, that cradle of Protestantism. That was for the States-General to do, whom it so much more nearly concerned. The whole aim of Barneveldt was not to destroy the treaty of Xanten, but to enforce it in the only way in which it could be enforced, by the guaranty of Spain. So secured, it would be a barrier in the universal war of religion which he foresaw was soon to break out. But it was the resolve of Spain, instead of pledging herself to the treaty, to establish the legal control of the territory in the hand of the emperor. Neuburg complained that Philip in writing to him did not give him the title of Duke of Jülich and Cleves, although he had been placed in possession of those estates by the arms of Spain. Philip, referring to Archduke Albert for his opinion on this subject, was advised that, as the emperor had not given Neuburg the investiture of the

¹ “. . . que no se restituisse Wesel y assi se distrizo la Junta quedando cada una en su posesion.”—MS. Archives of Belgium, a paper entitled “Memoria para informar al M^{ro} de Campo D. Inigo de Borsa,” etc.

duchies, the king was quite right in refusing him the title. Even should the treaty of Xanten be executed, neither he nor the Elector of Brandenburg would be anything but administrators until the question of right was decided by the emperor.¹

Spain had sent Neuburg the Order of the Golden Fleece² as a reward for his conversion, but did not intend him to be anything but a man of straw in the territories which he claimed by sovereign right. They were to form a permanent bulwark to the empire, to Spain, and to Catholicism.

Barneveldt of course could never see the secret letters passing between Brussels and Madrid, but his insight into the purposes of the enemy was almost as acute as if the correspondence of Philip and Albert had been in the pigeonholes of his writing-desk in the Kneuterdyk.

The whole object of Spain and the emperor, acting through the archduke, was to force the states to abandon their positions in the duchies simultaneously with the withdrawal of the Spanish troops, and to be satisfied with a bare convention between themselves and Archduke Albert that there should be no renewed occupation by either party. Barneveldt, finding it impossible to get Spain upon the treaty, was resolved that at least the two mediating powers, their great allies, the sovereigns of Great Britain and France, should guarantee the convention, and that the promises of the archduke should be made to them. This was steadily refused by Spain; for the archduke never moved an

¹ Philip III. to Archduke Albert, April 17, 1615, Belg. Archives MS. Archduke Albert to Philip III., July, 1615, Belg. Archives MS.

² Same to same, February 1, 1615, Belg. Archives MS.

inch in the matter except according to the orders of Spain, and besides battling and buffeting with the archduke, Barneveldt was constantly deafened with the clamor of the English king, who always declared Spain to be in the right whatever she did, and forced to endure with what patience he might the goading of that king's envoy. France, on the other hand, supported the states as firmly as could have been reasonably expected.

"We proposed," said the archduke, instructing an envoy whom he was sending to Madrid with detailed accounts of these negotiations,¹ "that the promise should be made to each other as usual in treaties. But the Hollanders said the promise should be made to the Kings of France and England, at which the emperor would have been deeply offended,² as if in the affair he was of no account at all. At any moment by this arrangement in concert with France and England the Hollanders might walk in and do what they liked."

Certainly there could have been no succineter eulogy of the policy steadily recommended, as we shall have occasion to see, by Barneveldt. Had he on this critical occasion been backed by England and France combined, Spain would have been forced to beat a retreat, and Protestantism in the great general war just beginning would have had an enormous advantage in position. But the English Solomon could not see the wisdom of this policy. "The King of England says we are right," continued the archduke, "and has ordered his ambassador to insist on our view. The

¹ "Memoria para informar al M^{ro} de Campo D. Inigo de Borsa de la qu. ha pasado en el neg^o de Juliers," etc., Belg. Archives MS.

² "Offendidissimo."

French ambassador here says that his colleague at The Hague has similar instructions, but admits that he has not acted up to them. There is not much chance of the Hollanders changing. It would be well that the king should send a written ultimatum that the Hollanders should sign the convention which we propose. If they don't agree, the world at least will see that it is not we who are in fault."¹

The world would see, and would never have forgiven a statesman in the position of Barneveldt had he accepted a bald agreement from a subordinate like the archduke, a perfectly insignificant personage in the great drama then enacting, and given up guaranties both from the archduke's master and from the two great allies of the Republic. He stood out manfully against Spain and England at every hazard and under a pelting storm of obloquy, and this was the man whose designs the English secretary of state had dared to describe as "of no other nature than to cause the provinces to relapse into the hands of Spain."²

It appeared, too, a little later that Barneveldt's influence with the French government, owing to his judicious support of it so long as it was a government, had been decidedly successful. Drugged as France was by the Spanish marriage treaty, she was yet not so sluggish nor spellbound as the King of Great Britain.

"France will not urge upon the Hollanders to execute the proposal as we made it," wrote the archduke to the king, "so negotiations are at a standstill. The Hollanders say it is better that each party should re-

¹ "Memoria para informar al M^{ro} de Campo D. Inigo de Borsa," MS. before cited, Belg. Archives.

² Vide antea.

main with what each possesses. So that if it does not come to blows, and if these insolences go on as they have done, the Hollanders will be gaining and occupying more territory every day.”¹

Thus once more the ancient enemies and masters of the Republic were making the eulogy of the Dutch statesman. It was impossible at present for the states to regain Wesel, or that other early stronghold of the Reformation, the old imperial city of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle). The price to be paid was too exorbitant.

The French government had persistently refused to assist the states and possessory princes in the recovery of this stronghold. The queen regent was afraid of offending Spain, although her government had induced the citizens of the place to make the treaty now violated by that country. The Dutch ambassador had been instructed categorically to inquire whether their Majesties meant to assist Aachen and the princes if attacked by the archdukes. “No,” said Villeroy; “we are not interested in Aachen—’t is too far off. Let them look for assistance to those who advised their mutiny.”

To the ambassador’s remonstrance that France was both interested in and pledged to them, the secretary of state replied: “We made the treaty through compassion and love, but we shall not put on harness for Aachen. Don’t think it. You, the states and the United Provinces, may assist them if you like.”

The envoy then reminded the minister that the States-General had always agreed to go forward evenly in this business with the Kings of Great Britain and France and the united princes, the matter being of

¹ Albert to Philip III., December 29, 1615, Belg. Archives MS.

equal importance to all. They had given no further pledge than this to the Union.

It was plain, however, that France was determined not to lift a finger at that moment. The Duke of Bouillon and those acting with him had tried hard to induce their Majesties "to write seriously to the archduke in order at least to intimidate him by stiff talk,"¹ but it was hopeless. They thought it was not a time then to quarrel with their neighbor and give offense to Spain.

So the stiff talk was omitted, and the archduke was not intimidated. The man who had so often intimidated him was in his grave, and his widow was occupied in marrying her son to the Infanta. "These are the first-fruits," said Aertsens, "of the new negotiations with Spain."²

Both the Spanish king and the emperor were resolved to hold Wesel to the very last. Until the states should retire from all their positions on the bare word of the archduke that the Spanish forces once withdrawn would never return, the Protestants of those two cities must suffer. There was no help for it. To save them would be to abandon all. For no true statesman could be so ingenuous as thus to throw all the cards on the table for the Spanish and imperial cabinet to shuffle them at pleasure for a new deal. The Duke of Neuburg, now Catholic and especially protected by Spain, had become, instead of a pretender with more or less law on his side, a mere standard-

¹ Aertsens to States-General, February 13, 1612, Hague Archives MS. : "Serieuselyk aen den Ertshertog te schryven om ten minsten door het styf spreken hem t' intimideren," etc.

² Ibid.

bearer and agent of the Great Catholic League in the debatable land. He was to be supported at all hazard by the Spanish forces, according to the express command of Philip's government, especially now that his two brothers, with the countenance of the states, were disputing his right to his hereditary dominions in Germany.¹

The archduke was sullen enough at what he called the weak-mindedness of France. Notwithstanding that by express orders from Spain he had sent five thousand troops² under command of Juan de Rivas to the queen's assistance just before the peace of Ste.-Menehould, he could not induce her government to take the firm part which the English king did in browbeating the Hollanders.

"'T is certain," he complained, "that if, instead of this sluggishness on the part of France, they had done us there the same good services we have had from England, the Hollanders would have accepted the promise

¹ " . . . y siendo el Niewburg en esto neg^o de la calidad q. V. A. pondera justam^{te} obliga mucho a no dexallo caer, pues los herm^{os} de N. seran favorecidos de los de Olanda y Zel^a para sus intentos, y assi deve V. A. poner muy particular cuydado en q. en los conciertos q. se tratan con ocasion de lo de Juliers, quede asegur^{do} todo antes de resolver lo de Wesel; pues de otra manera, si se soltasse de la mano lo q. se tiene sin quedar resguardo, se entreria en nuevos cuydados y trabajos con mucha duda de salir, con lo q. agora se puede de teniendo los conciertos de Wesel, en que es bien de creer prevendra V. A. lo que convenga, pues podrian Olandeses con la gente q. han sacado en campaña ya tomando plazas, y assi siendo necessario, ordenara V. A. al marq. Spinola q. traga con esse ext^o los mismos movimientos q. hiziera el enemigo," etc.—Philip III. to Archduke Albert, September 20, 1615, Belg. Archives MS.

² Philip III. to Archduke Albert, April 17, 1615, Belg. Archives MS.

just as it was proposed by us.”¹ He implored the king, therefore, to use his strongest influence with the French government that it should strenuously intervene with the Hollanders and compel them to sign the proposal which they rejected. “There is no means of composition if France does not oblige them to sign,” said Albert, rather piteously.

But it was not without reason that Barneveldt had in many of his letters instructed the states’ ambassador, Langerac, “to caress the old gentleman” (meaning and never naming Villeroy), for he would prove to be, in spite of all obstacles, a good friend to the states, as he always had been. And Villeroy did hold firm. Whether the archduke was right or not in his conviction that, if France would only unite with England in exerting a strong pressure on the Hollanders, they would evacuate the duchies and so give up the game, the correspondence of Barneveldt shows very accurately. But the archduke, of course, had not seen that correspondence.

The advocate knew what was plotting, what was impending, what was actually accomplished, for he was accustomed to sweep the whole horizon with an anxious and comprehensive glance. He knew without requiring to read the secret letters of the enemy that vast preparations for an extensive war against the Reformation were already completed. The movements in the duchies were the first drops of a coming deluge. The great religious war which was to last a generation

¹“ . . . floxedad con q. se ha procedido de parte de Francia, teniendo por cierto q. si huvieran hecho los oficios q. de la parte d. Inglat^a, admitieran los Olandeses la promesa propuesta por nos.”—Instrucion por D. Inigo de Borsa, Belg. Archives MS.

of mankind had already begun, the immediate and apparent pretext being a little disputed succession to some petty sovereignties, the true cause being the necessity for each great party—the Protestant Union and the Catholic League—to secure these border provinces, the possession of which would be of such inestimable advantage to either. If nothing decisive occurred in the year 1614, the following year would still be more convenient for the League. There had been troubles in Turkey. The Grand Vizir had been murdered. The Sultan was engaged in a war with Persia. There was no eastern bulwark in Europe to the ever-menacing power of the Turk and of Mohammedanism in Europe save Hungary alone. Supported and ruled as that kingdom was by the house of Austria, the temper of the populations of Germany had become such as to make it doubtful in the present conflict of religious opinions between them and their rulers whether the Turk or the Spaniard would be most odious as an invader. But for the moment Spain and the emperor had their hands free. They were not in danger of an attack from below the Danube. Moreover, the Spanish fleet had been achieving considerable successes on the Barbary coast, having seized La Roche and one or two important citadels, useful both against the corsairs and against sudden attacks by sea from the Turk. There were at least one hundred thousand men on a war footing, ready to take the field at command of the two branches of the house of Austria, Spanish and German. In the little war about Montserrat, Savoy was on the point of being crushed, and Savoy was by position and policy the only possible ally, in the South, of the Netherlands and of Protestant Germany.

While professing the most pacific sentiments toward the states, and a profound anxiety to withdraw his troops from their borders, the King of Spain, besides daily increasing those forces, had just raised four million ducats, a large portion of which was lodged with his bankers in Brussels. Deeds like those were of more significance than sugared words.

CHAPTER XI

The advocate sounds the alarm in Germany—His instructions to Langerac and his forethought—The Prince Palatine and his forces take Aachen, Mülheim, and other towns—Supineness of the Protestants—Increased activity of Austria and the League—Barneveldt strives to obtain help from England—Neuburg departs for Germany—Barneveldt the prime minister of Protestantism—Ernest Mansfeld takes service under Charles Emmanuel—Count John of Nassau goes to Savoy—Slippery conduct of King James in regard to the new treaty proposed—Barneveldt's influence greater in France than in England—Sequestration feared—The Elector of Brandenburg cited to appear before the emperor at Prague—Murder of John van Wely—Uytenbogart incurs Maurice's displeasure—Marriage of the King of France with Anne of Austria—Conference between King James and Caron concerning piracy, cloth trade, and treaty of Xanten—Barneveldt's survey of the condition of Europe—His efforts to avert the impending general war.

I HAVE thus purposely sketched the leading features of a couple of momentous, although not eventful, years,—so far as the foreign policy of the Republic is concerned,—in order that the reader may better understand the bearings and the value of the advocate's actions and writings at that period. This work aims at being a political study. I would attempt to exemplify the influence of individual humors and passions—some of them among the highest and others certainly the basest that agitate humanity—upon the march of

great events, upon general historical results at certain epochs, and upon the destiny of eminent personages. It may also be not uninteresting to venture a glance into the internal structure and workings of a republican and federal system of government, then for the first time reproduced almost spontaneously upon an extended scale.

Perhaps the revelation of some of its defects, in spite of the faculty and vitality struggling against them, may not be without value for our own country and epoch. The system of Switzerland was too limited and homely, that of Venice too purely oligarchical, to have much moral for us now, or to render a study of their pathological phenomena especially instructive. The lessons taught us by the history of the Netherland confederacy may have more permanent meaning.

Moreover, the character of a very considerable statesman at an all-important epoch and in a position of vast responsibility is always an historical possession of value to mankind. That of him who furnishes the chief theme for these pages has been either overlooked and neglected or perhaps misunderstood by posterity. History has not too many really important and emblematic men on its records to dispense with the memory of Barneveldt, and the writer therefore makes no apology for dilating somewhat fully upon his life-work by means of much of his entirely unpublished and long-forgotten utterances.

The advocate had ceaselessly been sounding the alarm in Germany. For the Protestant Union, fascinated, as it were, by the threatening look of the Catholic League, seemed relapsing into a drowse.

"I believe," he said to one of his agents in that

country,¹ "that the Evangelical electors and princes and the other estates are not alive to the danger. I am sure that it is not apprehended in Great Britain. France is threatened with troubles. These are the means to subjugate the religion, the laws and liberties of Germany. Without an army the troops now on foot in Italy cannot be kept out of Germany. Yet we do not hear that the Evangelicals are making provision of troops, money, or any other necessities. In this country we have about one hundred places occupied with our troops, among whom are many who could destroy a whole army. But the maintenance of these places prevents our being very strong in the field, especially outside our frontiers. But if in all Germany there be many places held by the Evangelicals which would disperse a great army is very doubtful. Keep a watchful eye. Economy is a good thing, but the protection of a country and its inhabitants must be laid to heart. Watch well if against these provinces, and against Bohemia, Austria, and other (as it is pretended) rebellious states, these plans are not directed. Look out for the movements of the Italian and Bavarian troops against Germany. You see how they are nursing the troubles and misunderstandings in France, and turning them to account."

He instructed the new ambassador in Paris to urge upon the French government the absolute necessity of punctuality in furnishing the payment of their contingent in the Netherlands according to convention. The states of Holland themselves had advanced the money during three years² past, but this anticipation

¹ Barneveldt to Brederode, March 2, 1614, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to Langerac, April 14, 1614, Hague Archives MS.

was becoming very onerous. It was necessary to pay the troops every month regularly, but the funds from Paris were always in arrear. England contributed about one half as much in subsidy, but these moneys went in paying the garrisons of Brielle, Flushing, and Rammekens, fortresses pledged to that crown. The ambassador was shrewdly told not to enlarge on the special employment of the English funds while holding up to the queen's government that she was not the only potentate who helped bear burdens for the provinces and insisted on a continuation of this aid. "Remember and let them remember," said the advocate, "that the reforms which they are pretending to make there by relieving the subjects of contributions tend to enervate the royal authority and dignity both within and without, to diminish its luster and reputation, and in sum to make the king unable to gratify and assist his subjects, friends, and allies. Make them understand that the taxation in these provinces is ten times higher than there, and that my lords the states hitherto by the grace of God and good administration have contrived to maintain it in order to be useful to themselves and their friends. Take great pains to have it well understood that this is even more honorable and more necessary for a king of France, especially in his minority, than for a republic *hoc turbato seculo*. We all see clearly how some potentates in Europe are keeping at all time, under one pretext or another, strong forces well armed on a war footing. It therefore behooves his Majesty to be likewise provided with troops, and at least with a good exchequer and all the requirements of war, as well for the security of his own state as for the maintenance of the grandeur

and laudable reputation left to him by the deceased king."

Truly here was sound and substantial advice, never and nowhere more needed than in France. It was given, too, with such good effect as to bear fruit even upon stoniest ground, and it is a refreshing spectacle to see this plain advocate of a republic, so lately sprung into existence out of the depths of oppression and rebellion, calmly summoning great kings as it were before him and instructing them in those vital duties of government in discharge of which the country he administered already furnished a model. Had England and France each possessed a Barneveldt at that epoch, they might well have given in exchange for him a wilderness of Epergnons and Sillerys, Bouillons and Condés; of Winwoods, Lakes, Carrs, and Villierses. But Elizabeth, with her councilors, was gone, and Henry was gone, and Richelieu had not come; while in England James and his minions were diligently opening an abyss between government and people which in less than half a lifetime more should engulf the kingdom.

Two months later he informed the states' ambassador of the communications made by the Prince of Condé and the Dukes of Nevers and Bouillon to the government at The Hague now that they had effected a kind of reconciliation with the queen. Langerac was especially instructed to do his best to assist in bringing about cordial relations, if that were possible, between the crown and the rebels, and meantime he was especially directed to defend Du Maurier against the calumnious accusations brought against him, of which Aertsens had been the secret sower.

“You will do your best to manage,” he said,¹ “that no special ambassador be sent hither, and that M. du Maurier may remain with us, he being a very intelligent and moderate person now well instructed as to the state of our affairs, a professor of the Reformed religion, and having many other good qualities serviceable to their Majesties and to us.

“You will visit the prince,² and other princes and officers of the crown who are coming to court again, and do all good offices as well for the court as for M. du Maurier, in order that through evil plots and slanderous reports no harm may come to him.

“Take great pains to find out all you can there as to the designs of the King of Spain, the archdukes, and the emperor, in the affair of Jülich. You are also to let it be known that the change of religion on the part of the Prince Palatine of Neuburg will not change our good will and affection for him, so far as his legal claims are concerned.”

So long as it was possible for the states to retain their hold on both the claimants, the advocate, pursuant to his uniform policy of moderation, was not disposed to help throw the Palatine into the hands of the Spanish party. He was well aware, however, that Neuburg by his marriage and his conversion was inevitably to become the instrument of the League and to be made use of in the duchies at its pleasure, and that he especially would be the first to submit with docility to the decree of the emperor. The right to issue such

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, June 13, 1614, Hague Archives MS.

² The Prince of Condé, being first prince of the blood, was always designated simply “M. le Prince.”

decree the states, under guidance of Barneveldt, were resolved to resist at all hazards.

“Work diligently, nevertheless,” said he, “that they permit nothing there directly or indirectly that may tend to the furtherance of the League, as too prejudicial to us and to all our fellow-religionists. Tell them, too, that the late king, the King of Great Britain, the united electors and princes of Germany, and ourselves have always been resolutely opposed to making the dispute about the succession in the duchies depend on the will of the emperor and his court. All our movements in the year 1610 against the attempted sequestration under Leopold were to carry out that purpose. Hold it for certain that our present proceedings for strengthening and maintaining the city and fortress of Jülich are considered serviceable and indispensable by the British king and the German electors and princes. Use your best efforts to induce the French government to pursue the same policy—if it be not possible openly, then at least secretly. My conviction is that, unless the Prince Palatine is supported by, and his whole designs founded upon, the general League against all our brethren of the religion, affairs may be appeased.”

The envoy was likewise instructed to do his best to further the matrimonial alliance which had begun to be discussed between the Prince of Wales and the second daughter of France. Had it been possible at that moment to bring the insane dream of James for a Spanish alliance to naught, the states would have breathed more freely. He was also to urge payment of the money for the French regiments, always in arrears since Henry's death and Sully's dismissal, and always supplied by the exchequer of Holland. He was in-

formed that the Republic had been sending some warships to the Levant, to watch the armada recently sent thither by Spain, and other armed vessels into the Baltic, to pursue the corsairs with whom every sea was infested. In one year alone he estimated the loss to Dutch merchants by these pirates at eight hundred thousand florins. "We have just captured two of the rovers, but the rascally scum is increasing," he said.

Again alluding to the resistance to be made by the states to the imperial pretensions, he observed: "The emperor is about sending us a herald in the Jülich matter, but we know how to stand up to him."

And notwithstanding the bare possibility which he had admitted, that the Prince of Neuburg might not yet have wholly sold himself, body and soul, to the papists, he gave warning a day or two afterward in France that all should be prepared for the worst.

"The archdukes and the Prince of Neuburg appear to be taking the war earnestly in hand," he said. "We believe that the Papistical League is about to make a great effort against all the coreligionists. We are watching closely their movements. Aachen is first threatened, and the Elector Palatine likewise. France surely, for reasons of state, cannot permit that they should be attacked. She did, and helped us to do, too much in the Jülich campaign to suffer the Spaniards to make themselves masters there now."¹

It has been seen that the part played by France in the memorable campaign of 1610 was that of admiring auxiliary to the states' forces, Marshal de la Châtre having in all things admitted the superiority of their army and the magnificent generalship of Prince Mau-

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, June 13, 1614, Hague Archives MS.

rice. But the government of the dowager had been committed by that enterprise to carry out the lifelong policy of Henry and to maintain his firm alliance with the Republic. Whether any of the great king's acuteness and vigor in countermining and shattering the plans of the house of Austria was left in the French court, time was to show. Meantime Barneveldt was crying himself hoarse with warnings into the dull ears of England and France.

A few weeks later the Prince of Neuburg had thrown off the mask. Twelve thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse had been raised in great haste, so the advocate informed the French court,¹ by Spain and the archdukes, for the use of that pretender. Five or six thousand Spaniards were coming by sea to Flanders, and as many Italians were crossing the mountains, besides a great number mustering for the same purpose in Germany and Lorraine. Barneveldt was constantly receiving most important intelligence of military plans and movements from Prague, which he placed daily before the eyes of governments wilfully blind.

"I ponder well at this crisis," he said to his friend Caron,² "the intelligence I received some months back from Ratisbon, out of the cabinet of the Jesuits, that the design of the Catholic or Roman League is to bring this year a great army into the field, in order to make Neuburg, who was even then said to be of the Roman profession and League, master of Jülich and the duchies; to execute the imperial decree against Aachen and Mülheim, preventing any aid from being sent into Germany by these provinces or by Great Britain, and

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, July 13, 1614, Hague Archives MS.

² Ibid.

placing the archduke and Marquis Spinola in command of the forces; to put another army on the frontiers of Austria, in order to prevent any succor coming from Hungary, Bohemia, Austria, Moravia, and Silesia into Germany; to keep all these disputed territories in subjection and devotion to the emperor, and to place the general conduct of all these affairs in the hands of Archduke Leopold and other princes of the house of Austria. A third army is to be brought into the Upper Palatinate, under command of the Duke of Bavaria and others of the League, destined to thoroughly carry out its designs against the Elector Palatine and the other electors, princes, and estates belonging to the religion."

This intelligence, plucked by Barneveldt out of the cabinet of the Jesuits, had been duly communicated by him months before to those whom it most concerned, and, as usual, it seemed to deepen the lethargy of the destined victims and their friends. Not only the whole Spanish campaign of the present year had thus been duly mapped out by the advocate long before it occurred, but this long-buried and forgotten correspondence of the statesman seems rather like a chronicle of transactions already past, so closely did the actual record, which posterity came to know too well, resemble that which he saw, and was destined only to see, in prophetic vision.

Could this political seer have cast his horoscope of the Thirty Years' War at this hour of its nativity for the instruction of such men as Walsingham or Burghley, Henry of Navarre or Sully, Richelieu or Gustavus Adolphus, would the course of events have been modified? These very idlest of questions are

precisely those which inevitably occur as one ponders the seeming barrenness of an epoch in reality so pregnant.

“One would think,” said Barneveldt, comparing what was then the future with the real past, “that these plans in Prague against the Elector Palatine are too gross for belief; but when I reflect on the intense bitterness of these people, when I remember what was done within living men’s memory to the good elector Hans Frederick of Saxony for exactly the same reasons, to wit, hatred of our religion and determination to establish imperial authority, I have great apprehension. I believe that the Roman League will use the present occasion to carry out her great design, holding France incapable of opposition to her, Germany in too great division, and imagining to themselves that neither the King of Great Britain nor these states are willing or able to offer effectual and forcible resistance. Yet his Majesty of Great Britain ought to be able to imagine how greatly the religious matter in general concerns himself and the electoral house of the Palatine, as principal heads of the religion, and that these vast designs should be resisted betimes and with all possible means and might. My lords the states have good will, but not sufficient strength to oppose these great forces single-handed. One must not believe that without great and prompt assistance in force from his Majesty and other fellow-religionists my lords the states can undertake so vast an affair. Do your uttermost duty there, in order that, ere it be too late, this matter be taken to heart by his Majesty, and that his authority and credit be earnestly used with other kings, electors, princes, and republics, that they do likewise.

The promptest energy, good will, and affection may be reckoned on from us."

Alas! it was easy for his Majesty to take to heart the matter of Conrad Vorstius, to spend reams of diplomatic correspondence, to dictate whole volumes of orations brimming over with theological wrath, for the edification of the States-General, against that doctor of divinity. But what were the special interests of his son-in-law, what the danger to all the other Protestant electors and kings, princes and republics, what the imperiled condition of the United Provinces, and, by necessary consequence, the storm gathering over his own throne, what the whole fate of Protestantism, from Friesland to Hungary, threatened by the insatiable, all-devouring might of the double house of Austria, the ancient church, and the Papistical League, what were hundred thousands of men marching toward Bohemia, the Netherlands, and the duchies, with the drum beating for mercenary recruits in half the villages of Spain, Italy, and Catholic Germany, compared with the danger to Christendom from an Arminian clergyman being appointed to the theological professorship at Leyden?

The world was in a blaze, kings and princes were arming, and all the time that the monarch of the powerful, adventurous, and heroic people of Great Britain could spare from slobbering over his minions, and wasting the treasures of the realm to supply their insatiate greed, was devoted to polemical divinity, in which he displayed his learning, indeed, but changed his positions and contradicted himself day by day. The magnitude of this wonderful sovereign's littleness oppresses the imagination.

Moreover, should he listen to the adjurations of the states and his fellow-religionists, should he allow himself to be impressed by the eloquence of Barneveldt and take a manly and royal decision in the great emergency, it would be indispensable for him to come before that odious body, the Parliament of Great Britain, and ask for money. It would be perhaps necessary for him to take them into his confidence, to degrade himself by speaking to them of the national affairs. They might not be satisfied with the honor of voting the supplies at his demand, but were capable of asking questions as to their appropriation. On the whole, it was more kinglike and statesmanlike to remain quiet and give advice. Of that, although always a spendthrift, he had an inexhaustible supply.

Barneveldt had just hopes from the Commons of Great Britain, if the king could be brought to appeal to Parliament. Once more he sounded the bugle of alarm. "Day by day the archdukes are making greater and greater enrolments of riders and infantry in ever-increasing mass," he cried, "and therewith vast provision of artillery and all munitions of war. Within ten or twelve days they will be before Jülich in force. We are sending great convoys to reinforce our army there. The Prince of Neuburg is enrolling more and more troops every day. He will soon be master of Mülheim. If the King of Great Britain will lay this matter earnestly to heart for the preservation of the princes, electors, and estates of the religion, I cannot doubt that Parliament would coöperate well with his Majesty, and this occasion should be made use of to redress the whole state of affairs."¹

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, July 13, 1614, Hague Archives MS.

It was not the Parliament nor the people of Great Britain that would be in fault when the question arose of paying in money and in blood for the defense of civil and religious liberty. But if James should venture openly to oppose Spain, what would the Count of Gondemar say, and what would become of the Infanta and the two millions of dowry?

It was not for want of some glimmering consciousness in the mind of James of the impending dangers to northern Europe and to Protestantism from the insatiable ambition of Spain, and the unrelenting grasp of the papacy upon those portions of Christendom which were slipping from its control, that his apathy to those perils was so marked. We have seen his leading motives for inaction, and the world was long to feel its effects.

"His Majesty firmly believes," wrote Secretary Winwood,¹ "that the Papistical League is brewing great and dangerous plots. To obviate them in everything that may depend upon him, my lords the states will find him prompt. The source of all these entanglements comes from Spain. We do not think that the archduke will attack Jülich this year, but rather fear for Mülheim and Aix-la-Chapelle."

But the secretary of state, thus acknowledging the peril, chose to be blind to its extent, while at the same time undervaluing the powers by which it might be resisted. "To oppose the violence of the enemy," he said, "if he does resort to violence, is entirely impos-

¹ Winwood to Barneveltdt, August 19 (O. S.), 1614, Hague Archives MS. From a collection kindly furnished to me by M. van Deventer, the distinguished editor of the papers of Barneveltdt, which he has published up to the year 1609.

sible. It would be furious madness on our part to induce him to fall upon the Elector Palatine, for this would be attacking Great Britain and all her friends and allies. Germany is a delicate morsel, but too much for the throat of Spain to swallow all at once. Behold the evil which troubles the conscience of the Papistical League! The emperor and his brothers are all on the brink of their sepulcher, and the infantes of Spain are too young to succeed to the empire. The pope would more willingly permit its dissolution than its falling into the hands of a prince not of his profession. All that we have to do in this conjuncture is to attend the best we can to our own affairs, and afterward to strengthen the good alliance existing among us, and not to let ourselves be separated by the tricks and sleights of hand of our adversaries. The common cause can reckon firmly upon the King of Great Britain, and will not find itself deceived."

Excellent commonplaces, but not very safe ones. Unluckily for the allies, to attend each to his own affairs when the enemy was upon them, and to reckon firmly upon a king who thought it furious madness to resist the enemy, was hardly the way to avert the danger. A fortnight later, the man who thought it possible to resist, and time to resist, before the net was over every head, replied to the secretary by a picture of the Spaniards' progress.

"Since your letter," he said,¹ "you have seen the course of Spinola with the army of the king and the archdukes. You have seen the Prince Palatine of Neuburg with his forces maintained by the pope and other

¹ Barneveldt to Winwood, September 14, 1614, MS., Van Deventer.

members of the Papistical League. On the 29th August they forced Aachen, where the magistrates and those of the Reformed religion have been extremely maltreated. Twelve hundred soldiers are lodged in the houses there of those who profess our religion. Mülheim is taken and dismantled, and the very houses about to be torn down; Düren, Kaster, Grevenbroich, Orsoy, Duisburg, Ruhrort, and many other towns obliged to receive Spanish garrisons. On the 4th September they invested Wesel. On the 6th it was held certain that the cities of Cleves, Emmerich, Rees, and others in that quarter had consented to be occupied. The states have put one hundred and thirty-five companies of foot (about fourteen thousand men) and four thousand horse and a good train of artillery in the field, and sent out some ships of war. Prince Maurice left The Hague on the 4th September to assist Wesel, succor the Prince of Brandenburg, and oppose the hostile proceedings of Spinola and the Palatine of Neuburg. . . . Consider, I pray you, this state of things, and think how much heed they have paid to the demands of the Kings of Great Britain and France to abstain from hostilities. Be sure that without our strong garrison in Jülich they would have snapped up every city in Jülich, Cleves, and Berg. But they will now try to make use of their slippery tricks, their progress having been arrested by our army. The Prince of Neuburg is sending his chancellor here *cum mediis componende pacis*, in appearance good and reasonable, in reality deceptive. . . . If their Majesties, my lords the states, and the princes of the Union do not take an energetic resolution for making head against their designs, behold their League in full vigor

and ours without soul! Neither the strength nor the wealth of the states are sufficient of themselves to withstand their ambitious and dangerous designs. We see the possessory princes treated as enemies upon their own estates, and many thousand souls of the Reformed religion cruelly oppressed by the Papistical League. For myself, I am confirmed in my apprehensions and believe that neither our religion nor our Union can endure such indignities. The enemy is making use of the minority in France and the divisions among the princes of Germany to their great advantage. . . . I believe that the singular wisdom of his Majesty will enable him to apply promptly the suitable remedies, and that your Parliament will make no difficulty in acquitting itself well in repairing those disorders.”

The year dragged on to its close. The supineness of the Protestants deepened in direct proportion to the feverish increase of activity on the part of Austria and the League. The mockery of negotiation in which nothing could be negotiated, the parade of conciliation when war of extermination was intended, continued on the part of Spain and Austria. Barneveldt was doing his best to settle all minor differences between the states and Great Britain, that these two bulwarks of Protestantism might stand firmly together against the rising tide. He instructed the ambassador to exhaust every pacific means of arrangement in regard to the Greenland-fishery disputes, the dyed-cloth question, and like causes of ill feeling. He held it more than necessary, he said, that the inhabitants of the two countries should now be on the very best terms with each other. Above all, he implored the king through the ambassador to summon Parliament in order that the

kingdom might be placed in position to face the gathering danger.

“I am amazed and distressed,” he said,¹ “that the statesmen of England do not comprehend the perils with which their fellow-religionists are everywhere threatened, especially in Germany and in these states. To assist us with bare advice and sometimes with traducing our actions, while leaving us to bear alone the burdens, costs, and dangers, is not serviceable to us.” Referring to the information and advice which he had sent to England and to France fifteen months before, he now gave assurance that the Prince of Neuburg and Spinola were now in such force, both foot and cavalry, with all necessary munitions, as to hold these most important territories as a perpetual *sedem belli*, out of which to attack Germany at their pleasure and to cut off all possibility of aid from England and the states. He informed the court of St. James that besides the forces of the emperor and the house of Austria, the Duke of Bavaria and Spanish Italy, there were now several thousand horse and foot under the Bishop of Würzburg, eight or nine thousand under the Bishop-Elector of Mayence, and strong bodies of cavalry under Count Vaudemont in Lorraine, all mustering for the war. The pretext was merely to reduce Frankfort to obedience, even as Donauwörth had previously been used as a color for vast designs. The real purpose was to bring the Elector Palatine and the whole Protestant party in Germany to submission. “His Majesty,” said the advocate, “has now a very great and good subject upon which to convoke Parliament and ask for a large grant. This would be doubtless con-

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, November 21, 1614, Hague Archives MS.

sented to if Parliament receives the assurance that the money thus accorded shall be applied to so wholesome a purpose. You will do your best to further this great end. We are waiting daily to hear if the Xanten negotiation is broken off or not. I hope and I fear. Meantime we bear as heavy burdens as if we were actually at war."

He added once more the warning, which it would seem superfluous to repeat even to school-boys in diplomacy, that this Xanten treaty, as proposed by the enemy, was a mere trap.

Spinola and Neuburg, in case of the mutual disbanding, stood ready at an instant's warning to reënlist for the League not only all the troops that the Catholic army should nominally discharge, but those which would be let loose from the states' army and that of Brandenburg as well. They would hold Rheinberg, Grol, Lingen, Oldenzaal, Wachtendonk, Maestricht, Aachen, and Mülheim with a permanent force of more than twenty thousand men. And they could do all this in four days' time.

A week or two later all his prophecies had been fulfilled. "The Prince of Neuburg," he said, "and Marquis Spinola have made game of us most impudently in the matter of the treaty.¹ This is an indignity for us, their Majesties, and the electors and princes. We regard it as intolerable. A despatch came from Spain forbidding a further step in the negotiation without express order from the king. The prince and Spinola are gone to Brussels, the ambassadors have returned to The Hague, the armies are established in winter quar-

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, without date (late in 1614), Hague Archives MS.: ". . . hebben het tractaet spottelyk geilludeert."

ters. The cavalry are ravaging the debatable land and living upon the inhabitants at their discretion. M. de Refuge is gone to complain to the archdukes of the insult thus put upon his sovereign. Sir Henry Wotton is still here. We have been plunged into an immensity of extraordinary expense, and are amazed that at this very moment England should demand money from us, when we ought to be assisted by a large subsidy by her. We hope that now at least his Majesty will take a vigorous resolution and not suffer his grandeur and dignity to be vilipended longer. If the Spaniard is successful in this step, he is ready for greater ones, and will believe that mankind is ready to bear and submit to everything. His Majesty is the first king of the religion. He bears the title of Defender of the Faith. His religion, his only daughter, his son-in-law, his grandson, are all especially interested, besides his own dignity, besides the commonweal.”¹

He then adverted to the large subsidies from Queen Elizabeth many years before, guaranteed, it was true, by the cautionary towns, and to the gallant English regiments, sent by that great sovereign, which had been fighting so long and so splendidly in the Netherlands for the common cause of Protestantism and liberty. Yet England was far weaker then, for she had always her northern frontier to defend against Scotland, ever ready to strike her in the back. “But now his Majesty,” said Barneveldt, “is King of England and Scotland both. His frontier is free. Ireland is at peace. He possesses quietly twice as much as the queen ever did. He is a king. Her Majesty was a woman. The

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, without date (late in 1614), Hague Archives MS.

king has children and heirs. His nearest blood is engaged in this issue. His grandeur and dignity have been wronged. Each one of these considerations demands of itself a manly resolution. You will do your best to further it."

The almost ubiquitous power of Spain, gaining after its exhaustion new life through the strongly developed organization of the League, and the energy breathed into that mighty conspiracy against human liberty by the infinite genius of the "cabinet of Jesuits," was not content with overshadowing Germany, the Netherlands, and England, but was threatening Savoy with forty thousand men, determined to bring Charles Emmanuel either to perdition or submission.

Like England, France was spellbound by the prospect of Spanish marriages, which for her at least were not a chimera, and looked on composedly while Savoy was on point of being sacrificed by the common invader of independent nationality, whether Protestant or Catholic. Nothing ever showed more strikingly the force residing in singleness of purpose with breadth and unity of design than all these primary movements of the great war now beginning. The chances, superficially considered, were vastly in favor of the Protestant cause. In the chief lands under the scepter of the younger branch of Austria the Protestants outnumbered the Catholics by nearly ten to one. Bohemia, the Austrias, Moravia, Silesia, Hungary, were filled full of the spirit of Huss, of Luther, and even of Calvin. If Spain was a unit, now that the Moors and Jews had been expelled, and the heretics of Castile and Aragon burned into submission, she had a most lukewarm ally in Venice, whose policy was never controlled by the

church, and a dangerous neighbor in the warlike, restless, and adventurous house of Savoy, to whom geographical considerations were ever more vital than religious scruples. A sincere alliance of France, the very flower of whose nobility and people inclined to the Reformed religion, was impossible, even if there had been fifty infants to espouse fifty daughters of France. Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the united princes of Germany seemed a solid and serried phalanx of Protestantism, to break through which should be hopeless. Yet at that moment, so pregnant with a monstrous future, there was hardly a sound Protestant policy anywhere but in Holland. How long would that policy remain sound and united? How long would the Republic speak through the imperial voice of Barneveldt? Time was to show and to teach many lessons. The united princes of Germany were walking, talking, quarreling in their sleep. England and France distracted and bedrugged, while Maximilian of Bavaria and Ferdinand of Gratz, the cabinets of Madrid and the Vatican, were moving forward to their aims slowly, steadily, relentlessly as fate. And Spain was more powerful than she had been since the truce began. In five years she had become much more capable of aggression. She had strengthened her positions in the Mediterranean by the acquisition and enlargement of considerable fortresses in Barbary and along a large sweep of the African coast, so as to be almost supreme in Africa. It was necessary for the states, the only power save Turkey that could face her in those waters, to maintain a perpetual squadron of war-ships there to defend their commerce against attack from the Spaniard and from the corsairs, both Mohammedan

and Christian, who infested every sea. Spain was redoubtable everywhere, and the Turk, engaged in Persian campaigns, was offering no diversion against Hungary and Vienna.

"Reasons of state worthy of his Majesty's consideration and wisdom," said Barneveldt,¹ "forbid the King of Great Britain from permitting the Spaniard to give the law in Italy. He is about to extort obedience and humiliation from the Duke of Savoy, or else with forty thousand men to mortify and ruin him, while entirely assuring himself of France by the double marriages. Then comes the attack on these provinces, on Protestant Germany, and all other states and realms of the religion."

With the turn of the year, affairs were growing darker and darker. The League was rolling up its forces in all directions; its chiefs proposed absurd conditions of pacification, while war was already raging; and yet scarcely any government but that of the Netherlands paid heed to the rising storm. James, fatuous as ever, listened to Gondemar, and wrote admonitory letters to the archduke. It was still gravely proposed by the Catholic party that there should be mutual disbanding in the duchies, with a guaranty from Marquis Spinola that there should be no more invasion of those territories. But powers and pledges from the King of Spain were what he needed.

To suppose that the Republic and her allies would wait quietly, and not lift a finger until blows were actually struck against the Protestant electors or cities of Germany, was expecting too much ingenuousness on

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, without date (late in 1614), Hague Archives MS.

the part of statesmen who had the interests of Protestantism at heart. What they wanted was the signed, sealed, ratified treaty faithfully carried out. Then if the King of Spain and the archdukes were willing to contract with the states never to make an attempt against the Holy German Empire, but to leave everything to take its course according to the constitutions, liberties, and traditions and laws of that empire, under guidance of its electors, princes, estates, and cities, the United Provinces were ready, under mediation of the two kings, their allies and friends, to join in such an arrangement. Thus there might still be peace in Germany, and religious equality as guaranteed by the Majesty Letter, and the Compromise between the two great churches, Roman and Reformed, be maintained. To bring about this result was the sincere endeavor of Barneveldt, hoping against hope. For he knew that all was hollowness and sham on the part of the great enemy. Even as Walsingham almost alone had suspected and denounced the delusive negotiations by which Spain continued to deceive Elizabeth and her diplomatists until the Armada was upon her coasts, and denounced them to ears that were deafened and souls that were stupefied by the frauds practised upon them, so did Barneveldt, who had witnessed all that stupendous trickery of a generation before, now utter his cries of warning that Germany might escape in time from her impending doom.

“Nothing but deceit is lurking in the Spanish proposals,” he said.¹ “Every man here wonders that the English government does not comprehend these malversations. Truly the affair is not to be made straight

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, January 15, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

by new propositions, but by a vigorous resolution of his Majesty. It is in the highest degree necessary to the salvation of Christendom, to the conservation of his Majesty's dignity and greatness, to the service of the princes and provinces and of all Germany, nor can this vigorous resolution be longer delayed without enormous disaster to the commonweal. . . . I have the deepest affection for the cause of the Duke of Savoy, but I cannot further it so long as I cannot tell what his Majesty specifically is resolved to do, and what hope is held out from Venice, Germany, and other quarters. Our taxes are prodigious, the ordinary and extraordinary, and we have a Spanish army at our front door."

The armaments, already so great, had been enlarged during the last month of the year. Vaudemont was at the head of a further force of two thousand cavalry and eight thousand foot, paid for by Spain and the pope; twenty-four thousand additional soldiers, riders and infantry together, had been gathered by Maximilian of Bavaria at the expense of the League. Even if the reports were exaggerated, the advocate thought it better to be too credulous than as apathetic as the rest of the Protestants.

"We receive advices every day," he wrote to Caron,¹ "that the Spaniards and the Roman League are going forward with their design. They are trying to amuse the British king and to gain time, in order to be able to deal the heavier blows. Do all possible duty to procure a timely and vigorous resolution there. To wait again until we are anticipated will be fatal to the cause of the Evangelical electors and princes of Germany,

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, January 19, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

and especially of his Electoral Highness of Brandenburg. We likewise should almost certainly suffer irreparable damage, and should again bear our cross, as men said last year in regard to Aachen, Wesel, and so many other places. The Spaniard is sly, and has had a long time to contrive how he can throw the net over the heads of all our religious allies. Remember all the warnings sent from here last year, and how they were all tossed to the winds, to the ruin of so many of our coreligionists. If it is now intended over there to keep the Spaniards in check merely by speeches or letters, it would be better to say so clearly to our friends. So long as Parliament is not convoked in order to obtain consents and subsidies for this most necessary purpose, so long I fail to believe that this great common cause of Christendom, and especially of Germany, is taken to heart by England."

He adverted with respectfully subdued scorn to King James's proposition that Spinola should give a guaranty. "I doubt if he accepts the suggestion," said Barneveldt, "unless as a notorious trick, and if he did, what good would the promise of Spinola do us? We consider Spinola a great commander having the purses and forces of the Spaniards and the Leaguers in his control; but should they come into other hands, he would not be a very considerable personage for us. And that may happen any day. They don't seem in England to understand the difference between Prince Maurice in his relations to our state and that of Marquis Spinola to his superiors. Try to make them comprehend it. A promise from the emperor, King of Spain, and the princes of the League, such as his Majesty in his wisdom has proposed to Spinola, would be

most tranquillizing for all the Protestant princes and estates of the empire, especially for the Elector and Electress Palatine, and for ourselves. In such a case no difficulty would be made on our side."

After expressing his mind thus freely in regard to James and his policy, he then gave the ambassador a word of caution in characteristic fashion. "*Cogita*," he said, "but beware of censuring his Majesty's projects. I do not myself mean to censure them, nor are they publicly laughed at here, but look closely at everything that comes from Brussels, and let me know with diligence." ¹

And even as the advocate was endeavoring with every effort of his skill and reason to stir the sluggish James into vigorous resolution in behalf of his own children, as well as of the great cause of Protestantism and national liberty, so was he striving to bear up on his strenuous shoulders the youthful King of France, and save him from the swollen tides of court intrigue and jesuitical influence fast sweeping him to destruction.

He had denounced the recent and paltry proposition made on the part of the League, and originally suggested by James, as a most open and transparent trap, into which none but the blind would thrust themselves. The treaty of Xanten, carried out as it had been signed and guaranteed by the great Catholic powers, would have brought peace to Christendom. To accept in place of such guaranty the pledge of a simple soldier,

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, January 19, 1615, Hague Archives MS. : "*Cogita* maer wacht U van te censureeren S. M^{ts} projecten, gely klick cook niet verstaet te doen ende zyn oock alhier int publiek nyet bespot, maer let wel wat van Brussel komem," etc.

who to-morrow might be nothing, was almost too ridiculous a proposal to be answered gravely. Yet Barneveldt, through the machinations of the Catholic party, was denounced both at the English and French courts as an obstacle to peace, when in reality his powerful mind and his immense industry were steadily directed to the noblest possible end—to bring about a solemn engagement on the part of Spain, the emperor, and the princes of the League to attack none of the Protestant powers of Germany, especially the Elector Palatine, but to leave the laws, liberties, and privileges of the states within the empire in their original condition. And among those laws were the great statutes of 1609 and 1610, the Majesty Letter and the Compromise, granting full right of religious worship to the Protestants of the kingdom of Bohemia. If ever a policy deserved to be called truly liberal and truly conservative, it was the policy thus steadily maintained by Barneveldt.

Adverting to the subterfuge by which the Catholic party had sought to set aside the treaty of Xanten, he instructed Langerac, the states' ambassador in Paris, and his own pupil, to make it clear to the French government that it was impossible that in such arrangements the Spanish armies would not be back again in the duchies at a moment's notice. It could not be imagined even that they were acting sincerely.

"If their upright intention," he said,¹ "is that no actual, hostile, violent attack shall be made upon the duchies, or upon any of the princes, estates, or cities of the Holy Empire, as is required for the peace and tranquillity of Christendom, and if all the powers in-

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, January, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

terested therein will come into a good and solid convention to that effect, my lords the states will gladly join in such undertaking and bind themselves as firmly as the other powers. If no infractions of the laws and liberties of the Holy Empire be attempted, there will be peace for Germany and its neighbors. But the present extravagant proposition can only lead to chicanery and quarrels. To press such a measure is merely to inflict a disgrace¹ upon us. It is an attempt to prevent us from helping the Elector Palatine and the other Protestant princes of Germany and coreligionists everywhere against hostile violence. For the Elector Palatine can receive aid from us and from Great Britain through the duchies only. It is plainly the object of the enemy to seclude us from the Palatine and the rest of Protestant Germany. It is very suspicious that the proposition of Prince Maurice, supported by the two kings and the united princes of Germany, has been rejected."

The advocate knew well enough that the religious franchises granted by the house of Hapsburg at the very moment in which Spain signed her peace with the Netherlands, and exactly as the mad Duke of Cleves was expiring,—with a dozen princes, Catholic and Protestant, to dispute his inheritance,—would be valuable just so long as they could be maintained by the united forces of Protestantism and of national independence, and no longer. What had been extorted from the Catholic powers by force would be retracted by force whenever that force could be concentrated. It had been necessary for the Republic to accept a twelve years' truce with Spain in default of a peace,

¹ "Schanvdelek."

while the death of John of Cleves, and subsequently of Henry IV., had made the acquisition of a permanent pacification between Catholicism and Protestantism, between the League and the Union, more difficult than ever. The so-called Thirty Years' War—rather to be called the concluding portion of the Eighty Years' War—had opened in the debatable duchies exactly at the moment when its forerunner, the forty years' war of the Netherlands, had been temporarily and nominally suspended. Barneveldt was perpetually baffled in his efforts to obtain a favorable peace for Protestant Europe less by the open diplomacy and military force of the avowed enemies of Protestantism than by the secret intrigues and faint-heartedness of its nominal friends. He was unwearied in his efforts simultaneously to arouse the courts of England and France to the danger to Europe from the overshadowing power of the house of Austria and the League, and he had less difficulty in dealing with the Catholic Louis and his mother than with Protestant James. At the present moment his great designs were not yet openly traversed by a strong Protestant party within the very republic which he administered.

“Look to it with earnestness and grave deliberation,” he said to Langerac,¹ “that they do not pursue us there with vain importunity to accept something so notoriously inadmissible and detrimental to the commonweal. We know that from the enemy's side every kind of unseemly trick is employed, with the single object of bringing about misunderstanding between us and the King of France. A prompt and vigorous resolution on the part of his Majesty to see the treaty

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, January, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

which we made duly executed would be to help the cause. Otherwise, not. We cannot here believe that his Majesty, in this first year of his majority, will submit to such a notorious and flagrant affront, or that he will tolerate the oppression of the Duke of Savoy. Such an affair in the beginning of his Majesty's reign cannot but have very great and prejudicial consequences, nor can it be left to linger on in uncertainty and delay. Let him be prompt in this. Let him also take a most Christian-kingly, vigorous resolution against the great affront put upon him in the failure to carry out the treaty. Such a resolve on the part of the two kings would restore all things to tranquillity and bring the Spaniard and his adherents *in terminos modestiæ*. But so long as France is keeping a suspicious eye upon England, and England upon France, everything will run to combustion, detrimental to their Majesties and to us, and ruinous to all the good inhabitants."

To the treaty of Xanten faithfully executed he held as to an anchor in the tempest until it was torn away, not by violence from without, but by insidious mutiny within. At last the government of James proposed that the pledges on leaving the territory should be made to the two allied kings as mediators and umpires. This was better than the naked promises originally suggested, but even in this there was neither heartiness nor sincerity. Meantime the Prince of Neuburg, negotiations being broken off, departed for Germany, a step which the advocate considered ¹ ominous. Soon

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, February 9, 1615; same to Langerac, February 10, 1615; same to same, February 26, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

afterward that prince received a yearly pension of twenty-four thousand crowns from Spain, and for this stipend his claims on the sovereignty of the duchies were supposed to be surrendered.

“If this be true,” said Barneveldt, “we have been served with covered dishes.”¹

The King of England wrote spirited and learned letters to the Elector Palatine, assuring him of his father-in-law’s assistance in case he should be attacked by the League. Sir Henry Wotton, then on special mission at The Hague, showed these epistles to Barneveldt.

“When I hear that Parliament has been assembled and has granted great subsidies,” was the advocate’s comment, “I shall believe that effects may possibly follow from all these assurances.”

It was wearisome for the advocate thus ever to be foiled, by the pettinesses and jealousies of those occupying the highest earthly places, in his efforts to stem the rising tide of Spanish and Catholic aggression and to avert the outbreak of a devastating war to which he saw Europe doomed. It may be wearisome to read the record. Yet it is the chronicle of Christendom during one of the most important and fateful epochs of modern history. No man can thoroughly understand the complication and precession of phenomena attending the disastrous dawn of the renewed war, on an even more awful scale than the original conflict in the Netherlands, without studying the correspondence of Barneveldt. The history of Europe is there. The fate of Christendom is there. The conflict of elements, the crash of contending forms of religion and of nationali-

¹ “Indien dit waer is worden wy mit gedeekte plateelen gediend.”—Barneveldt to Caron, May 9, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

ties, is pictured there in vivid if homely colors. The advocate, while acting only in the name of a slender confederacy, was in truth, so long as he held his place, the prime minister of European Protestantism. There was none other to rival him, few to comprehend him, fewer still to sustain him. As Prince Maurice was at that moment the great soldier of Protestantism, without clearly scanning the grandeur of the field in which he was a chief actor, or foreseeing the vastness of its future, so the advocate was its statesman and its prophet. Could the two have worked together as harmoniously as they had done at an earlier day, it would have been a blessing for the commonweal of Europe. But alas! the evil genius of jealousy, which so often forbids cordial relations between soldier and statesman, already stood shrouded in the distance, darkly menacing the strenuous patriot, who was wearing his life out in exertions for what he deemed the true cause of progress and humanity.

Nor can the fate of the man himself, his genuine character, and the extraordinary personal events toward which he was slowly advancing, be accurately unfolded without an attempt by means of his letters to lay bare his inmost thoughts. Especially it will be seen at a later moment how much value was attached to this secret correspondence with the ambassadors in London and Paris.

The advocate trusted to the support of France, papal and Medicean as the court of the young king was, because the Protestant party throughout the kingdom was too powerful, warlike, and numerous to be trifled with, and because geographical considerations alone rendered a cordial alliance between Spain and France

very difficult. Notwithstanding the Spanish marriages, which he opposed so long as opposition was possible, he knew that so long as a statesman remained in the kingdom, or a hope for one existed, the international policy of Henry, of Sully, and of Jeannin could not be wholly abandoned.

He relied much on Villeroy, a political hack certainly, an ancient Leaguer, and a papist, but a man too cool, experienced, and wily to be ignorant of the very hornbook of diplomacy, or open to the shallow stratagems by which Spain found it so easy to purchase or to deceive. So long as he had a voice in the council, it was certain that the Netherland alliance would not be abandoned, nor the Duke of Savoy crushed. The old secretary of state was not especially in favor at that moment, but Barneveldt could not doubt his permanent place in French affairs until some man of real power should arise there. It was a dreary period of barrenness and disintegration in that kingdom while France was mourning Henry and waiting for Richelieu.

The Dutch ambassador at Paris was instructed accordingly to maintain good relations with Villeroy, who in Barneveldt's opinion had been a constant and sincere friend to the Netherlands. "Don't forget to caress the old gentleman you wot of," said the advocate, frequently, but suppressing his name, "without troubling yourself with the reasons mentioned in your letter. I am firmly convinced that he will overcome all difficulties. Don't believe either that France will let the Duke of Savoy be ruined. It is against every reason of state."¹ Yet there were few to help Charles

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, February 10, 1615; same to same, November 21, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

Emmanuel in this Montferrat war, which was destined to drag feebly on, with certain interludes of negotiations, for two years longer. The already notorious condottiere Ernest Mansfeld, natural son of old Prince Peter Ernest, who played so long and so high a part in command of the Spanish armies in the Netherlands, had, to be sure, taken service under the duke. Thenceforth he was to be a leader and a master in that wild business of plunder, burning, blackmailing, and murder, which was opening upon Europe, and was to afford occupation for many thousands of adventurers of high and low degree.

Mansfeld, reckless and profligate, had already changed his banner more than once. Commanding a company under Leopold in the duchies, he had been captured by the forces of the Union, and, after waiting in vain to be ransomed by the archduke, had gone secretly over to the enemy.¹ Thus recovering his liberty, he had enlisted a regiment under Leopold's name to fight the Union, and had then, according to contract, transferred himself and most of his adventurers to the flag of the Union. The military operations fading away in the duchies without being succeeded by permanent peace, the count, as he was called, with no particular claim to such title, had accepted a thousand florins a year as retainer from the Union, and had found occupation under Charles Emmanuel. Here the Spanish soldier of a year or two before found much satisfaction and some profit in fighting Spanish soldiers. He was destined to reappear in the Netherlands, in France, in

¹ Gindely, *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Kriegs*, i. 387 seq. This eminent historian calls Mansfeld "the remarkable forerunner of Waldstein."

Bohemia, in many places where there were villages to be burned, churches to be plundered, cities to be sacked, nuns and other women to be outraged, dangerous political intrigues to be managed. A man in the prime of his age, fair-haired, prematurely wrinkled, battered, and hideous of visage, with a harelip and a humpback; slovenly of dress, and always wearing an old gray hat without a band to it;¹ audacious, cruel, crafty, and licentious—such was Ernest Mansfeld, whom some of his contemporaries spoke of as Ulysses Germanicus, others as the new Attila, all as a scourge to the human race. The cockneys of Paris called him “Mâchefer,” and nurses long kept children quiet by threatening them with that word. He was now enrolled on the Protestant side, although at the moment serving Savoy against Spain in a question purely personal. His armies, whether in Italy or in Germany, were a miscellaneous collection of adventurers of high and low degree, of all religions, of all countries, unfrocked priests and students, ruined nobles, bankrupt citizens, street vagabonds—earliest type, perhaps, of the horrible military vermin which were destined to feed so many years long on the unfortunate dismembered carcass of Germany.²

Many demands had been made upon the states for assistance to Savoy, as if they, and they alone, were to bear the brunt and pay the expense of all the initiatory campaigns against Spain.

“We are much importuned,” said the advocate, “to do something for the help of Savoy. . . . We wish

¹ Du Maurier, 234.

² See *Acta Mansfeldica* (1623), quoted by the historian Wolfgang Menzel, iii. 224.

and we implore that France, Great Britain, the German princes, the Venetians, and the Swiss would join us in some scheme of effective assistance. But we have enough on our shoulders at this moment.”¹

They had hardly money enough in their exchequer, admirably ordered as it was, for enterprises so far from home when great Spanish armies were permanently encamped on their border.

Partly to humor King James and partly from love of adventure, Count John of Nassau had gone to Savoy at the head of a small, well-disciplined body of troops furnished by the states.

“Make use of this piece of news,” said Barneveldt, communicating the fact to Langerac,² “opportunistically and with discretion. Besides the wish to give some contentment to the King of Great Britain, we consider it inconsistent with good conscience and reasons of state to refuse help to a great prince against oppression by those who mean to give the law to everybody, especially as we have been so earnestly and frequently importuned to do so.”

And still the Spaniards and the League kept their

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, April 29, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

In a later letter the advocate informed the ambassador that Count John had gone to the duke with excuses from the states for not complying with the request in his letters, on account of their actual and nearer dangers and heavy burdens, but with their hopes that, if the Spaniard could not be brought to reasonable conditions, a common plan of assistance would be made with the kings, princes, and republics, their friends, to help him against violence and oppression. Count John took with him twenty or thirty adventurers, and meant to raise a couple of companies of riders in Germany for the service of Savoy. (Same to same, May 17, 1615, Hague Archives MS.)

² Ibid.

hold on the duchies, while their forces, their munitions, their accumulation of funds waxed hourly. The war of chicane was even more deadly than an actual campaign, for when there was no positive fighting the whole world seemed against the Republic. And the chicane was colossal.

“We cannot understand,” said Barneveldt,¹ “why M. de Prevaux is coming here on special mission. When a treaty is signed and sealed, it only remains to execute it. The archduke says he is himself not known in the treaty, and that nothing can be demanded of him in relation to it. This he says in his letters to the King of Great Britain. M. de Refuge knows best whether or not Marquis Spinola, Ottavio Visconti, Chancellor Pecquius, and others were employed in the negotiation by the archduke. We know very well here that the whole business was conducted by them. The archduke is willing to give a clean and sincere promise not to reoccupy, and asks the same from the states. If he were empowered by the emperor, the King of Spain, and the League, and acted in such quality, something might be done for the tranquillity of Germany. But he promises for himself only, and emperor, king, or league may send any general to do what they like to-morrow. What is to prevent it?

“And so my lords the states, the Elector of Brandenburg, and others interested are cheated and made fools of. And we are as much troubled by these tricks as by armed force. Yes, more; for we know that great enterprises are preparing this year against Germany and ourselves, that all Neuburg’s troops have been dis-

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, February 26, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

banded and reënlisted under the Spanish commanders, and that forces are levying not only in Italy and Spain, but in Germany, Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Upper Burgundy, and that Wesel has been stuffed full of gunpowder and other munitions, and very strongly fortified.”

For the states to agree to a treaty by which the disputed duchies should be held jointly by the Princes of Neuburg and of Brandenburg, and the territory be evacuated by all foreign troops; to look quietly on while Neuburg converted himself to Catholicism, espoused the sister of Maximilian of Bavaria, took a pension from Spain, resigned his claims in favor of Spain, and transferred his army to Spain; and to expect that Brandenburg and all interested in Brandenburg, that is to say, every Protestant in Europe, should feel perfectly easy under such arrangement and perfectly protected by the simple promise of a soldier of fortune against Catholic aggression, was a fantastic folly hardly worthy of a child. Yet the states were asked to accept this position, Brandenburg and all Protestant Germany were asked to accept it, and Barneveldt was howled at by his allies as a marplot and mischief-maker, and denounced and insulted by diplomatists daily, because he mercilessly tore away the sophistries of the League and of the League's secret friend, James Stuart.

The King of Spain had more than one hundred thousand men under arms, and was enlisting more soldiers everywhere and every day, had just deposited four million crowns with his Antwerp bankers for a secret purpose,¹ and all the time was exuberant in his assur-

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, February 26, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

ances of peace. One would have thought that there had never been negotiations in Oudenbourg, that the Spanish Armada had never sailed from Coruña.

“You are wise and prudent in France,” said the advocate,¹ “but we are used to Spanish proceedings, and from much disaster sustained are filled with distrust. The King of England seems now to wish that the archduke should draw up a document according to his good pleasure, and that the states should make an explanatory deed, which the king should sign also and ask the King of France to do the same. But this is very hazardous.

“We do not mean to receive laws from the King of Spain, nor the archduke. . . . The Spanish proceedings do not indicate peace, but war. One must not take it ill of us that we think these matters of grave importance to our friends and ourselves. Affairs have changed very much in the last four months. The murder of the first vizir of the Turkish emperor and his designs against Persia leave the Spanish king and the emperor free from attack in that quarter, and their armaments are far greater than last year. . . . I cannot understand why the treaty of Xanten, formerly so highly applauded, should now be so much disapproved. . . . The King of Spain and the emperor, with their party, have a vast design to give the law to all Christendom, to choose a Roman king according to their will, to reduce the Evangelical electors, princes, and estates of Germany to obedience, to subject all Italy, and, having accomplished this, to proceed to triumph over us and our allies, and by necessary con-

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, February 26, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

sequence over France and England. They say they have established the emperor's authority by means of Aachen and Mülheim, will soon have driven us out of Jülich, and have thus arranged matters entirely to their heart's content. They can then, in name of the emperor, the League, the Prince of Neuburg, or any one else, make themselves in eight days masters of the places which they are now imaginarily to leave, as well as of those which we are actually to surrender, and by possession of which we could hold out a long time against all their power."¹

Those very places held by the states—Jülich, Emmerich, and others—had recently been fortified² at much expense, under the superintendence of Prince Maurice, and by advice of the advocate. It would certainly be an act of madness to surrender them on the terms proposed. These warnings and forebodings of Barneveldt sound in our ears like recorded history, yet they were far earlier than the actual facts. And now to please the English king, the states had listened to his suggestion that his name and that of the King of France should be signed as mediators to a new arrangement proposed in lieu of the Xanten treaty. James had suggested this, Louis had agreed to it. Yet before the ink had dried in James's pen he was proposing that the names of the mediating sovereigns should be omitted from the document! And why? Because Gondemar was again whispering in his ear. "They are renewing the negotiations in England," said the advocate, "about the alliance between the Prince of

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, February 27, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to same, April 29, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

Wales and the second daughter of Spain; and the King of Great Britain is seriously importuning us that the archdukes and my lords the states should make their pledges *impersonaliter* and not to the kings.”¹ James was also willing that the name of the emperor should appear upon it. To prevent this, Barneveldt would have had himself burned at the stake. It would be an ignominious and unconditional surrender of the whole cause.

“The archduke will never be contented,”² said the advocate, “unless his Majesty of Great Britain takes a royal resolution to bring him to reason. That he tries to lay the fault on us is pure malice. We have been ready and are still ready to execute the treaty of Xanten. The archduke is the cause of the dispute concerning the act. We approved the formularies of their Majesties, and have changed them three times to suit the King of Great Britain.³ Our Provincial States have been notified in the matter, so that we can no longer digest the Spanish impudence, and are amazed that his Majesty can listen any more to the Spanish ministers. We fear that those ministers are working through many hands, in order by one means or another to excite quarrels between his Majesty, us, and the respective inhabitants of the two countries. . . . Take every precaution that no attempt be made there to bring the name of the emperor into the act. This

¹ Barneveldt to Gillis van Ledenberg, June 29, 1615, Hague Archives MS.: “. . . dat den Conineck aldaer serieuse instantien doet dat die Eertshertogen ende M. H. die Staten haere acten van beloften impersonaliter ende nyet aen de Coninghen soudon doen,” etc.

² Barneveldt to Caron, May 16, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

³ “. . . tot syne M^{ts} contemplatie nu driemael verandert.”

would be contrary to their Majesties' first resolution, very prejudicial to the Elector of Brandenburg, to the duchies, and to ourselves. And it is indispensable that the promise be made to the two kings as mediators, as much for their reputation and dignity as for the interests of the elector, the territories, and ourselves. Otherwise, too, the Spaniards will triumph over us as if they had driven us by force of arms into this promise."

The seat of war, at the opening of the apparently inevitable conflict between the Catholic League and the Protestant Union, would be those debatable duchies, those border provinces, the possession of which was of such vital importance to each of the great contending parties, and the populations of which, although much divided, were on the whole more inclined to the League than to the Union. It was natural enough that the Dutch statesman should chafe at the possibility of their being lost to the Union through the adroitness of the Catholic managers and the supineness of the great allies of the Republic.

Three weeks later than these last utterances of the advocate, he was given to understand that King James was preparing to slide away from the position which had been three times changed to make it suitable for him. His indignation was hot.

"Sir Henry Wotton," he said, "has communicated to me his last despatches from Newmarket.¹ I am in the highest degree amazed that after all our efforts at accommodation, with so much sacrifice to the electors, the provinces, and ourselves, they are trying to urge us there to consent that the promise be not made to

¹ Barneveldt to Carou, June 6, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

the Kings of France and Great Britain as mediators, although the proposition came from the Spanish side. After we had renounced, by desire of his Majesty, the right to refer the promise to the treaty of Xanten, it was judged by both kings to be needful and substantial that the promise be made to their Majesties. To change this now would be prejudicial to the kings, to the electors, the duchies, and to our commonwealth; to do us a wrong and to leave us naked. France maintains her position as becoming and necessary. That Great Britain should swerve from it is not to be digested here. You will do your utmost, according to my previous instructions, to prevent any pressure to this end. You will also see that the name of the emperor is mentioned neither in the preamble nor the articles of the treaty. It would be contrary to all our policy since 1610. You may be firmly convinced that malice is lurking under the emperor's name, and that he and the King of Spain and their adherents, now as before, are attempting a sequestration. This is simply a pretext to bring those principalities and provinces into the hands of the Spaniards, for which they have been laboring these thirty years. We are constantly cheated by these Spanish tricks. Their intention is to hold Wesel and all the other places until the conclusion of the Italian affair, and then to strike a great blow."

Certainly were never words more full of sound statesmanship, and of prophecy too soon to be fulfilled, than these simple but pregnant warnings. They awakened but little response from the English government save cavils and teasing reminders that Wesel had been the cradle of German Calvinism, the Rhenish Geneva, and that it was sinful to leave it longer in the hands

of Spain.¹ As if the advocate had not proved to demonstration that to stock hands for a new deal at that moment was to give up the game altogether!

His influence in France was always greater than in England, and this had likewise been the case with William the Silent. And even now that the Spanish matrimonial alliance was almost a settled matter at the French court, while with the English king it was but a perpetual will-o'-the-wisp conducting to quagmires ineffable, the government at Paris sustained the policy of the advocate with tolerable fidelity, while it was constantly and most capriciously traversed by James.

Barneveldt sighed over these approaching nuptials, but did not yet despair. "We hope that the Spanish-French marriages," he said,² "may be broken up of themselves; but we fear that if we should attempt to delay or prevent them authoritatively, or in conjunction with others, the effort would have the contrary effect.

In this certainly he was doomed to disappointment.

He had already notified the French court of the absolute necessity of the great points to be insisted upon in the treaty, and there he found more docility than in London or Newmarket.³

¹ Dudley Carleton's Letters, *passim* et ad nauseam.

² Barneveldt to Caron, June 6, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

³ Same to Langerac, May 17, 1615, Hague Archives MS.: "We hope no more changes will be desired, and, above all, the name of the emperor must be omitted from the act, for the whole affair of Jülich was originally undertaken against the emperor by his late Majesty, the united electors and princes, and ourselves. The pledges must be of necessity given to the two kings as mediators. Otherwise we have no security whatever, and they will triumph over us."

All summer he was occupied with this most important matter, uttering Cassandra-like warnings into ears wilfully deaf. The states had gone as far as possible in concession. To go further would be to wreck the great cause upon the very quicksands which he had so ceaselessly pointed out. "We hope that nothing further will be asked of us, no scruples be felt as to our good intentions," he said,¹ "and that if Spain and the archdukes are not ready now to fulfil the treaty, their Majesties will know how to resent this trifling with their authority and dignity, and how to set matters to rights with their own hands in the duchies. A new treaty, still less a sequestration, is not to be thought of for a moment."

Yet the month of August came, and still the names of the mediating kings were not on the treaty, and still the specter of sequestration had not been laid. On the contrary, the peace of Asti, huddled up between Spain and Savoy, to be soon broken again,² had caused new and painful apprehensions of an attempt at sequestration, for it was established by several articles in that treaty that all question between Savoy and Mantua should be referred to the emperor's decision.³ This precedent was sure to be followed in the duchies if not resisted by force, as it had been so successfully resisted five years before by the armies of the states associated with those of France. Moreover, the first step at sequestration had been actually taken. The emperor had peremptorily summoned the Elector of Brandenburg and all other parties interested to appear

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, June, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

² Gindely, i. 387.

³ Barneveldt to Caron, July 18, 1615, Hague Archives MS.



ELECTOR OF BRANDENBURG

before him on the 1st August in Prague.¹ There could be but one object in this citation, to drive Brandenburg and the states out of the duchies until the imperial decision as to the legitimate sovereignty should be given. Neuburg being already disposed of and his claims ceded to the emperor, what possibility was there in such circumstances of saving one scrap of the territory from the clutch of the League? None certainly if the Republic faltered in its determination and yielded to the cowardly advice of James. "To comply with the summons," said Barneveldt, "and submit to its consequences will be an irreparable injury to the electoral house of Brandenburg, to the duchies, and to our coreligionists everywhere, and a very great disgrace to both their Majesties and to us."²

He continued, through the ambassador in London, to hold up to the king, in respectful but plain language, the shamelessness of his conduct in dispensing the enemy from his pledge to the mediators, when the Republic expressly, in deference to James, had given up the ampler guaranties of the treaty. The arrangement had been solemnly made, and consented to by all the provinces,³ acting in their separate and sovereign capacity. Such a radical change, even if it were otherwise permissible, could not be made without long debates, consultations, and votes by the several states. What could be more fatal at such a crisis than this childish and causeless delay? There could be no doubt in any statesman's eyes that the Spanish party meant war and a preparatory hoodwinking. And it was even worse for the government of the Repub-

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, July 18, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

lie to be outwitted in diplomacy than beaten in the field.

“Every man here,” said the advocate, “has more apprehension of fraud than of force. According to the constitution of our state, to be overcome by superior power must be endured, but to be overreached by trickery is a reproach to the government.”¹

The summer passed away. The states maintained their positions in the duchies, notwithstanding the oburgations of James, and Barneveldt remained on his watch-tower, observing every movement of the fast-approaching war, and refusing at the price of the whole territory in dispute to rescue Wesel and Aix-la-Chapelle from the grasp of the League.

Caron came to The Hague to have personal consultations with the States-General, the advocate, and Prince Maurice, and returned before the close of the year. He had an audience of the king at the palace of Whitehall early in November, and found him as immovable as ever in his apathetic attitude in regard to the affairs of Germany. The murder of Sir Thomas Overbury and the obscene scandals concerning the king's beloved Carr and his notorious bride were then occupying the whole attention of the monarch, so that he had not even time for theological lucubrations, still less for affairs of state on which the peace of Christendom and the fate of his own children were hanging.

The ambassador found him sulky and dictatorial, but insisted on expressing once more to him the apprehensions felt by the States-General in regard to the trickery of the Spanish party in the matter of Cleves and Jülich. He assured his Majesty that they had no

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, August 2, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

intention of maintaining the treaty of Xanten, and respectfully requested that the king would no longer urge the states to surrender the places held by them. It was a matter of vital importance to retain them, he said.¹

“Sir Henry Wotton told me,” replied James, “that the states at his arrival were assembled to deliberate on this matter, and he had no doubt that they would take a resolution in conformity with my intention. Now I see very well that you don’t mean to give up the places. If I had known that before, I should not have warned the archdukes so many times, which I did at the desire of the states themselves. And now that the archdukes are ready to restore their cities, you insist on holding yours. That is the dish you set before me.”

And upon this James swore a mighty oath and beat himself upon the breast.²

“Now and nevermore will I trouble myself about the states’ affairs, come what come will,” he continued. “I have always been upright in my words and my deeds, and I am not going to embark myself in a wicked war because the states have plunged themselves into one so entirely unjust. Next summer the Spaniard means to divide himself into two or three armies in order to begin his enterprises in Germany.”

Caron respectfully intimated that these enterprises would be most conveniently carried on from the very advantageous positions which he occupied in the

¹ Caron to the States-General, November 7, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

² “. . . dat is het plat in effecte voor my, seyde syne Ma’t; tselve bevestigende met grooten eede et op haer borst slaende.” —Ibid.

duchies. "No," said the king; "he must restore them on the same day on which you make your surrender, and he will hardly come back in a hurry."

"Quite the contrary," said the ambassador; "they will be back again in a twinkling, and before we have the slightest warning of their intention."

But it signified not the least what Caron said. The king continued to vociferate that the states had never had any intention of restoring the cities.

"You mean to keep them for yourselves," he cried, "which is the greatest injustice that could be perpetrated. You have no right to them, and they belong to other people."

The ambassador reminded him that the Elector of Brandenburg was well satisfied that they should be occupied by the states for his greater security and until the dispute should be concluded.

"And that will never be," said James—"never, never. The states are powerful enough to carry on the war all alone and against all the world."¹

And so he went on, furiously reiterating the words with which he had begun the conversation, "without accepting any reasons whatever in payment," as poor Caron observed.

"It makes me very sad," said the ambassador, "to find your Majesty so impatient and so resolved. If the names of the kings are to be omitted from the document, the treaty of Xanten should at least be modified accordingly."

"Nothing of the kind," said James; "I don't under-

¹ ". . . de Staten machtich ende sterk genoech waren omme allene d' oirloge tegen alle de werelt te doenc."—Caron to the States-General, November 7, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

stand it so at all. I speak plainly and without equivocation. It must be enough for the states that I promise them, in case the enemy is cheating or is trying to play any trick whatever, or is seeking to break the treaty of Xanten in a single point, to come to their assistance in person.”

And again the warlike James swore a big oath and smote his breast, affirming that he meant everything sincerely; that he cheated no one, but always spoke his thoughts right on, clearly and uprightly.

It was certainly not a cheerful prospect for the states. Their chief ally was determined that they should disarm, should strip themselves naked, when the mightiest conspiracy against the religious freedom and international independence of Europe ever imagined was perfecting itself before their eyes, and when hostile armies, more numerous than ever before known, were at their very door. To wait until the enemy was at their throat, and then to rely upon a king who trembled at the sight of a drawn sword, was hardly the highest statesmanship. Even if it had been the chivalrous Henry instead of the pacific James that had held out the promise of help, they would have been mad to follow such counsel.

The conversation lasted more than an hour. It was in vain that Caron painted in dark colors the cruel deeds done by the Spaniards in Mülheim and Aachen, and the proceedings of the Archbishop of Cologne in Rees. The king was besotted, and no impression could be made upon him.¹

¹ “. . . maer beyondt datter niet met allen Sy. M^t en beweechde soo verre was hy transporteert in dese saecke.”—Caron to the States-General, November 7, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

“At any rate,” said the envoy, “the arrangement cannot be concluded without the King of France.”

“What excuse is that?” said James. “Now that the king is entirely Spanish, you are trying to excuse your delays by referring to him. You have deferred rescuing the poor city of Wesel from the hands of the Spaniard long enough. I am amazed to have heard never a word from you on that subject since your departure. I had expressed my wish to you clearly enough that you should inform the states of my intention to give them any assurance they chose to demand.”

Caron was much disappointed at the humor of his Majesty. Coming freshly as he did from the council of the states, and almost from the seat of war, he had hoped to convince and content him. But the king was very angry with the states for putting him so completely in the wrong. He had also been much annoyed at their having failed to notify him of their military demonstration in the electorate of Cologne to avenge the cruelties practised upon the Protestants there. He asked Caron if he was instructed to give him information regarding it. Being answered in the negative, he said he had thought himself of sufficient importance to the states and enough in their confidence to be apprised of their military movements. It was for this, he said, that his ambassador sat in their council. Caron expressed the opinion that warlike enterprises of the kind should be kept as secret as possible in order to be successful. This the king disputed, and loudly declared his vexation at being left in ignorance of the matter. The ambassador excused himself as well as he could, on the ground that he had been in Zealand when the troops were marching, but told the king his impres-

sion that they had been sent to chastise the people of Cologne for their cruelty in burning and utterly destroying the city of Mülheim.

"That is none of your affair," said the king.

"Pardon me, your Majesty," replied Caron; "they are our fellow-religionists, and some one at least ought to resent the cruelty practised upon them."

The king admitted that the destruction of the city had been an unheard-of cruelty,¹ and then passed on to speak of the quarrel between the duke and city of Brunswick, and other matters. The interview ended, and the ambassador, very downhearted, went to confer with the secretary of state, Sir Ralph Winwood, and Sir Henry Wotton.

He assured these gentlemen that without fully consulting the French government these radical changes in the negotiations would never be consented to by the states. Winwood promised to confer at once with the French ambassador, admitting it to be impossible for the king to take up this matter alone. He would also talk with the archduke's ambassador next day noon at dinner, who was about leaving for Brussels, and "he would put something into his hand that he might take home with him."

"When he is fairly gone," said Caron, "it is to be hoped that the king's head will no longer be so muddled about these things. I wish it with all my heart."²

It was a dismal prospect for the states. The one

¹ ". . . een ongehoorde Wreetheit."—Caron to the States-General, November 7, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

² ". . . soo verhoope ick hy wech synde dat het hooft van den Coninck daermede soo veele niet gebrooecken en sal worden, twelck ick wensche dat alzoo mach geschieden."

ally on whom they had a right to depend, the ex-Calvinist and royal Defender of the Faith, in this mortal combat of Protestantism with the League, was slipping out of their grasp with distracting lubricity. On the other hand, the Most Christian King, a boy of fourteen years, was still in the control of a mother heart and soul with the League,—so far as she had heart or soul,—was betrothed to the daughter of Spain, and saw his kingdom torn to pieces and almost literally divided among themselves by rebellious princes, who made use of the Spanish marriages as a pretext for unceasing civil war.

The queen mother was at that moment at Bordeaux, and an emissary from the princes was in London. James had sent to offer his mediation between them and the queen. He was fond of mediation. He considered it his special mission in the world to mediate. He imagined himself as looked up to by the nations as the great arbitrator of Christendom, and was wont to issue his decrees as if binding in force and infallible by nature. He had protested vigorously against the Spanish-French marriages, and declared that the princes were justified in formalizing an opposition to them, at least until affairs in France were restored to something like order. He warned the queen against throwing the kingdom “into the combustion of war without necessity,” and declared that, if she would trust to his guidance, she might make use of him as if her affairs were his own. An indispensable condition for such assistance, however, would be that the marriages should be put off.¹

¹ Caron to the States-General, November 7, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

As James was himself pursuing a Spanish marriage for his son as the chief end and aim of his existence, there was something almost humorous in this protest to the queen dowager and in his encouragement of mutiny in France in order to prevent a catastrophe there which he desired at home.

The same agent of the princes, De Monbaran by name, was also privately accredited by them to the states with instructions to borrow two hundred thousand crowns of them if he could. But so long as the policy of the Republic was directed by Barneveldt, it was not very probable that, while maintaining friendly and even intimate relations with the legitimate government, she would enter into negotiations with rebels against it, whether princes or plebeians, and oblige them with loans. "He will call on me soon, no doubt," said Caron, "but being so well instructed as to your Mightinesses' intentions in this matter, I hope I shall keep him away from you."¹ Monbaran was accordingly kept away, but a few weeks later another emissary² of Condé and Bouillon made his appearance at The Hague, De Valigny by name. He asked for money and for soldiers to reinforce Bouillon's city of Sedan, but he was refused an audience of the States-General. Even the martial ardor of Maurice and his sympathy for his relatives were cooled by this direct assault on his pocket. "The prince," wrote the French ambassador, Du Maurier, "will not furnish him or his adherents a thousand crowns, not if they had death be-

¹ Caron to the States-General, November 7, 1615, Hague Archives MS.

² Barneveldt to Caron, January 21, 1616, Hague Archives MS.

tween their teeth. Those who think it do not know how he loves his money.”¹

In the very last days of the year (1615) Caron had another interview with the king, in which James was very benignant. He told the ambassador that he should wish the states to send him some special commissioners to make a new treaty with him, and to treat of all unsettled affairs which were daily arising between the inhabitants of the respective countries. He wished to make a firmer union and accord between Great Britain and the Netherlands. He was very desirous of this, “because,” said he, “if we can unite with and understand each other, we have, under God, no one whatever to fear, however mighty they may be.”

Caron duly notified Barneveldt of these enthusiastic expressions of his Majesty. The advocate, too, was most desirous of settling the troublesome questions about the cloth trade, the piracies, and other matters, and was in favor of the special commission. In regard to a new treaty of alliance thus loosely and vaguely suggested, he was not so sanguine, however. He had too much difficulty in enforcing the interests of Protestantism in the duchies against the infatuation of James in regard to Spain, and he was too well aware of the Spanish marriage delusion, which was the key to the king’s whole policy, to put much faith in these casual outbursts of eternal friendship with the states. He contented himself, therefore, with cautioning Caron to pause before committing himself to any such projects.²

¹ Despatch, February 17, 1616, in *Ouvré*, 245.

² “*Waerop hy [Barneveldt] my ontboed ende vermaende dat die saengaende wel soude wachten my in sulcx ofte diergelyke engageren.*” This is all.

He had frequently instructed him, however, to bring the disputed questions to his Majesty's notice as often as possible, with a view to amicable arrangement.¹

This preventive policy in regard to France was highly approved by Barneveldt, who was willing to share in the blame profusely heaped upon such sincere patriots and devoted Protestants as Duplessis-Mornay and others, who saw small advantage to the great cause from a mutiny against established government, bad as it was, led by such intriguers as Condé and Bouillon. Men who had recently been in the pay of Spain, and one of whom had been cognizant of Biron's plot against the throne and life of Henry IV., to whom sedition was native atmosphere and daily bread, were not likely to establish a much more wholesome administration than that of Mary de' Medici. Prince Maurice sympathized with his relatives by marriage, who were leading the civil commotions in France and endeavoring to obtain funds in the Netherlands. It is needless to say that Francis Aertsens was deep in their intrigues, and feeding full the grudge which the stadholder already bore the advocate for his policy on this occasion.

The advocate thought it best to wait until the young king should himself rise in mutiny against his mother and her minions. Perhaps the downfall of the Concinis and their dowager and the escape of Louis from thralldom might not be so distant as it seemed. Meantime this was the legal government, bound to the states

¹ I have found neither the letter of Caron nor Barneveldt's reply in the archives. But in a very important memorandum of the ambassador, dated April 15, 1619, for the use of the states, I find the brief characterization given in the text of the two documents. On a later page will be seen the important use to which they were put.

by treaties of friendship and alliance, and it would be a poor return for the many favors and the constant aid bestowed by Henry IV. on the Republic, and an imbecile mode of avenging his murder, to help throw his kingdom into bloodshed and confusion before his son was able to act for himself. At the same time he did his best to cultivate amicable relations with the princes, while scrupulously abstaining from any sympathy with their movements. "If the prince and the other gentlemen come to court," he wrote to Langerac, "you will treat them with all possible caresses, so far as can be done without disrespect to the government."¹

While the British court was occupied with the foul details of the Overbury murder and its consequences, a crime of a more commonplace nature, but perhaps not entirely without influence on great political events, had startled the citizens of The Hague. It was committed in the apartments of the stadholder and almost under his very eyes. A jeweler of Amsterdam, one John van Wely, had come to the court of Maurice to lay before him a choice collection of rare jewelry. In his caskets were rubies and diamonds to the value of more than one hundred thousand florins, which would be the equivalent of perhaps ten times as much to-day. In the prince's absence the merchant was received by a confidential groom of the chambers, John of Paris by name, and by him, with the aid of a third John, a soldier of his Excellency's guard, called Jean de la Vigne, murdered on the spot.² The deed was done in

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, May 12, 1616, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to same, gives the fact. Compare Brandt, *Regtspleging*, 314, 315. The source of the details of the murder I cannot at this moment recall, but they are contemporaneous and authentic.

the prince's private study. The unfortunate jeweler was shot, and to make sure was strangled with the blue ribbon of the Order of the Garter recently conferred upon Maurice, and which happened to be lying conspicuously in the room.

The ruffians had barely time to take possession of the booty, to thrust the body behind the tapestry of the chamber, and to remove the more startling evidences of the crime, when the prince arrived. He supped soon afterward in the same room, the murdered jeweler still lying behind the arras. In the night the valet and soldier carried the corpse away from the room, down the stairs, and through the great courtyard, where, strange to say, no sentinels were on duty, and threw it into an ash-pit.

A deed so bloody, audacious, and stupid was of course soon discovered and the murderers arrested and executed. Nothing would remove the incident from the catalogue of vulgar crimes, or even entitle it to a place in history, save a single circumstance. The celebrated divine John Uytenbogart, leader among the Arminians, devoted friend of Barneveldt, and up to that moment the favorite preacher of Maurice, stigmatized indeed, as we have seen, by the orthodox as "Court Trumpeter," was requested by the prince to prepare the chief criminal for death. He did so, and from that day forth the stadholder ceased to be his friend, although regularly listening to his preaching in the French chapel of the court for more than a year longer. Some time afterward the advocate informed Uytenbogart that the prince was very much embittered against him.¹ "I knew it well," says the clergyman in his

¹ Joh. Uytenbogarts Leven, etc., c. ix. 140 (second edition, 1646).

memoirs, “but not the reasons for it, nor do I exactly comprehend them to this day. Truly I have some ideas relating to certain things which I was obliged to do in discharge of my official duty, but I will not insist upon them, nor will I reveal them to any man.”¹

These were mysterious words, and the mystery is said to have been explained; for it would seem that the eminent preacher was not so entirely reticent among his confidential friends as before the public. Uytenbogart,—so ran the tale,—in the course of his conversation with the condemned murderer, John of Paris, expressed a natural surprise that there should have been no soldiers on guard in the court on the evening when the crime was committed and the body subsequently removed. The valet informed him that he had for a long time been empowered by the prince to withdraw the sentinels from that station, and that they had been instructed to obey his orders, Maurice not caring that they should be witnesses to the equivocal kind of female society that John of Paris was in the habit of introducing of an evening to his master’s apartments. The valet had made use of this privilege on the night in question to rid himself of the soldiers who would have been otherwise on guard.

The preacher felt it his duty to communicate these statements to the prince and to make perhaps a somewhat severe comment upon them. Maurice received the information sullenly, and, as soon as Uytenbogart was gone, fell into a violent passion, throwing his hat upon the floor, stamping upon it, refusing to eat his

¹ Joh. Uytenbogarts Leven, etc., c. ix. 140 (second edition, 1646).

supper, and allowing no one to speak to him. Next day some courtiers asked the clergyman what in the world he had been saying to the stadholder.

From that time forth his former partiality for the divine, on whose preaching he had been a regular attendant, was changed to hatred, a sentiment which lent a lurid color to subsequent events.¹

The attempts of the Spanish party by chicane or by force to get possession of the coveted territories continued year after year, and were steadily thwarted by the watchfulness of the states under guidance of Barneveldt. The martial stadholder was more than ever for open war, in which he was opposed by the advocate, whose object was to postpone and, if possible, to avert altogether the dread catastrophe which he foresaw impending over Europe. The Xanten arrangement seemed hopelessly thrown to the winds, nor was it destined to be carried out, the whole question of sovereignty and of mastership in those territories being swept subsequently into the general whirlpool of the Thirty Years' War. So long as there was a possibility of settlement upon that basis, the advocate was in favor of settlement, but to give up the guaranties and play into the hands of the Catholic League was in his mind

¹ The authority for the story is the annotator to the second edition of G. Brandt's *Hist. v. d. Rechtspleging*, 315 seq., note R (Rotterdam, 1610). Of course it may be easily disputed, and is only given in the text as a tale which was generally believed. Those who think it an impeachment upon the private character of the prince had better consult the professed eulogist of Maurice and of the Nassau family, De la Pise, especially p. 809. Nor can the anecdote be considered beneath the dignity of history when one remembers the great influence of pettiest passions on the fate of personages, and consequently on the march of events.

to make the Republic one of the conspirators against the liberties of Christendom.

"Spain, the emperor, and the rest of them," said he, "make all three modes of pacification—the treaty, the guaranty by the mediating kings, the administration divided between the possessory princes—alike impossible. They mean, under pretext of sequestration, to make themselves absolute masters there. I have no doubt that Villeroy means sincerely and understands the matter, but meantime we sit by the fire and burn. If the conflagration is neglected, all the world will throw the blame on us."¹

Thus the Spaniards continued to amuse the British king with assurances of their frank desire to leave those fortresses and territories which they really meant to hold till the crack of doom. And while Gondemar was making these ingenuous assertions in London, his colleagues at Paris and at Brussels distinctly and openly declared that there was no authority whatever for them, that the ambassador had received no such instructions, and that there was no thought of giving up Wesel or any other of the Protestant strongholds captured, whether in the duchies or out of them.² And

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, June 12, 1616, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to Caron, June 15, 1616, Hague Archives MS. Indeed, these flat contradictions of Gondemar's promises to James by the Spanish ambassador at the French court, as well as by the agent at Brussels, were as regular as they were audacious. Noël de Caron called the king's attention to them more than once, in order to arouse him from his dream to a sense of the common danger. Nine months later than this period the Dutch ambassador bluntly warned James of the effrontery of the deception. "I reminded the king," said Caron, "that the Spanish ambassador in France and his resident near the archdukes deny the statements



LOUIS XIII OF FRANCE

Gondemar, still more to keep that monarch in subjection, had been unusually flattering in regard to the Spanish marriage. "We are in great alarm here,"¹ said the advocate, "at the tidings that the projected alliance of the Prince of Wales with the daughter of Spain is to be renewed, from which nothing good for his Majesty's person, his kingdom, nor for our state can be presaged. We live in hope that it will never be."

But the other marriage was made. Despite the protest of James, the forebodings of Barneveldt, and the mutiny of the princes, the youthful King of France had espoused Anne of Austria early in the year 1616. The British king did his best to keep on terms with France and Spain, and by no means renounced his own hopes. At the same time, while fixed as ever in his approbation of the policy pursued by the emperor and the League, and as deeply convinced of their artlessness in regard to the duchies, the Protestant princes of Germany, and the Republic, he manifested more cordiality than usual in his relations with the states. Minor questions between the countries he was desirous of arranging,—so far as matters of state could be arranged by orations,—and among the most pressing of these affairs were the systematic piracy existing and

made here about the surrender of Wesel and the other cities, in case my lords the states could be induced to give up Jülich and the rest, and say expressly that they know very well that he has had no commission to that effect. To this the king answered that this was true, and that he had mentioned it to the ambassador, who replied that his Majesty might be assured of his statements. Let his Majesty only procure from the states the surrender of their places, he said, and he would see the archdukes at once deliver Wesel and the rest."

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, January 15, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

encouraged in English ports, to the great damage of all seafaring nations and of the Hollanders most of all, and the quarrel about the exportation of undyed cloths, which had almost caused a total cessation of the woollen trade between the two countries. The English, to encourage their own artisans, had forbidden the export of undyed cloths, and the Dutch had retorted by prohibiting the import of dyed ones.

The king had good sense enough to see the absurdity of this condition of things, and it will be remembered that Barneveldt had frequently urged upon the Dutch ambassador to bring his Majesty's attention to these dangerous disputes. Now that the recovery of the cautionary towns had been so dexterously and amicably accomplished, and at so cheap a rate, it seemed a propitious moment to proceed to a general extinction of what would now be called "burning questions."

James was desirous that new high commissioners might be sent from the states to confer with himself and his ministers upon the subjects just indicated, as well as upon the fishery questions as regarded both Greenland and Scotland, and upon the general affairs of India.¹

He was convinced, he said to Caron, that the sea had become more and more unsafe and so full of freebooters that the like was never seen or heard of before. It will be remembered that the advocate had recently called his attention to the fact that the Dutch merchants had lost in two months eight hundred thousand florins' worth of goods by English pirates.

The king now assured the ambassador of his intention of equipping a fleet out of hand and to send it

¹ Caron to States-General, July 13, 1616, Hague Archives MS.

forth as speedily as possible under command of a distinguished nobleman, who would put his honor and credit in a successful expedition, without any connivance or dissimulation whatever.¹ In order thoroughly to scour these pirates from the seas, he expressed the hope that their Mightinesses the states would do the same either jointly or separately, as they thought most advisable. Caron bluntly replied that the states had already ten or twelve war-ships at sea for this purpose, but that unfortunately, instead of finding any help from the English in this regard, they had always found the pirates favored in his Majesty's ports, especially in Ireland and Wales.

"Thus they have so increased in numbers," continued the ambassador, "that I quite believe what your Majesty says, that not a ship can pass with safety over the seas. Moreover, your Majesty has been graciously pleased to pardon several of these corsairs, in consequence of which they have become so impudent as to swarm everywhere, even in the river Thames, where they are perpetually pillaging honest merchantmen."

"I confess," said the king, "to having pardoned a certain Manning,² but this was for the sake of his old father, and I never did anything so unwillingly in my life. But I swear that, if it were the best nobleman in England, I would never grant one of them a pardon again."

Caron expressed his joy at hearing such good intentions on the part of his Majesty, and assured him that the States-General would be equally delighted.³

In the course of the summer the Dutch ambassador

¹ Caron, ubi sup.

² Or Mannevinck?

³ Caron, ubi sup.

had many opportunities of seeing the king very confidentially, James having given him the use of the royal park at Bayscot,¹ so that during the royal visits to that place Caron was lodged under his roof.

On the whole, James had much regard and respect for Noël de Caron. He knew him to be able, although he thought him tiresome. It is amusing to observe the king and ambassador in their utterances to confidential friends each frequently making the charge of tediousness against the other. "Caron's general education," said James on one occasion to Cecil, "cannot amend his native German prolixity, for had I not interrupted him, it had been to-morrow morning before I had begun to speak. God preserve me from hearing a cause debated between Don Diego and him! . . . But in truth it is good dealing with so wise and honest a man, although he be somewhat longsome."²

¹ Caron to the States-General, September 13, 1616, Hague Archives MS.

² King James to Cecil, MS. in the Cecil Archives at Hatfield House, the seat of Robert Cecil's descendant, the distinguished statesman and man of letters, the present Marquis of Salisbury. Both Lord and Lady Salisbury will permit me to express, in this note, my deep sense of their kindness in permitting me to use these invaluable papers with perfect freedom. The collection is rich in confidential correspondence during the reign of Elizabeth and the first seven years of James, and it is most agreeable to all lovers of historical science to see such treasures in hands so appreciative to guard and so bountiful to dispense them.

The letter above cited begins, as all the confidential letters of James to Cecil, of which there is a large collection in these archives, begin, "My little Beagle."

I give a very few specimens of these letters in the Appendix, with the original spelling, as illustrative of the king's manner of dealing privately with his great minister.

Subsequently James came to Whitehall for a time, and then stopped at Theobalds for a few days on his way to Newmarket, where he stayed until Christmas. At Theobalds he sent again for the ambassador, saying that at Whitehall he was so broken down with affairs that it would be impossible to live if he stayed there.¹

He asked if the states were soon to send the commissioners, according to his request, to confer in regard to the cloth trade. Without interference of the two governments, he said, the matter would never be settled. The merchants of the two countries would never agree except under higher authority.

“I have heard both parties,” he said, “the new and the old companies, two or three times in full council, and tried to bring them to an agreement, but it won’t do. I have heard that my lords the states have been hearing both sides, English and the Hollanders, over and over again, and that the states have passed a provisional resolution, which, however, does not suit us. Now, it is not reasonable, as we are allies, that our merchants should be obliged to send their cloths round about, not being allowed either to sell them in the United Provinces or to pass them through your territories. I wish I could talk with them myself, for I am certain, if they would send some one here, we could make an agreement. It is not necessary that one should take everything from them, or that one should refuse everything to us. I am sure there are people of sense in your assembly who will justify me in favoring my own people so far as I reasonably can, and I know very well that my lords the states must stand up for

¹ Caron to the States-General, November 14 (O. S.), 1616, Hague Archives MS.

their own citizens. If we have been driving this matter to an extreme and see that we are ruining each other, we must take it up again in other fashion, for Yesterday is the preceptor of To-morrow. Let the commissioners come as soon as possible. I know they have complaints to make, and I have my complaints also. Therefore we must listen to each other, for I protest before God that I consider the community of your state with mine to be so entire that, if one goes to perdition, the other must quickly follow it.”¹

Thus spoke James, like a wise and thoughtful sovereign interested in the welfare of his subjects and allies, with enlightened ideas for the time upon public economy. It is difficult, in the man conversing thus amiably and sensibly with the Dutch ambassador, to realize the shrill pedant shrieking against Vorstius, the crapulous comrade of Carrs and Steenies, the fawning solicitor of Spanish marriages, the “pepperer” and hangman of Puritans, the butt and dupe of Gondemar and Spinola.

“I protest,” he said further, “that I seek nothing in your state but all possible friendship and good fellowship. My own subjects complain sometimes that your people follow too closely on their heels, and confess that your industry goes far above their own. If this be so, it is a lean kind of reproach, for the English should rather study to follow you. Nevertheless, when industry is directed by malice, each may easily be attempting to snap an advantage from the other. I have sometimes complained of many other things in which my subjects suffered great injustice from you, but all

¹ I take these passages literally from Caron's report to the States-General, written the day after the interview, MS. last cited.

that is excusable. I will willingly listen to your people and grant them to be in the right when they are so. But I will never allow them to be in the right when they mistrust me. If I had been like many other princes, I should never have let the advantage of the cautionary towns slip out of my fingers, but rather by means of them attempted to get even a stronger hold on your country. I have had plenty of warnings from great statesmen in France, Germany, and other nations that I ought to give them up nevermore. Yet you know how frankly and sincerely I acquitted myself in that matter, without ever making pretensions upon your state than the pretensions I still make to your friendship and coöperation."

James, after this allusion to an important transaction to be explained in the next chapter, then made an observation or two on a subject which was rapidly overtopping all others in importance to the states, and his expressions were singularly at variance with his last utterances in that regard. "I tell you," he said, "that you have no right to mistrust me in anything, not even in the matter of religion. I grieve indeed to hear that your religious troubles continue. You know that in the beginning I occupied myself with this affair, but fearing that my course might be misunderstood, and that it might be supposed that I was seeking to exercise authority in your republic, I gave it up, and I will never interfere with the matter again, but will ever pray God that he may give you a happy issue out of these troubles."¹

¹ ". . . ic segge dat sy van my nyet te diffideren en hebben ende ick mede int stuck van de religie daer ic wel droeve om sy dat tselve soo ic verstaen als noch duert ; ghy weet dat icker my in den

Alas! if the king had always kept himself on that height of amiable neutrality, if he had been able to govern himself in the future by these simplest principles of reason and justice, there might have been perhaps a happier issue from the troubles than time was like to reveal.

Once more James referred to the crisis pending in German affairs, and, as usual, spoke of the Cleves and Jülich question as if it were a simple matter to be settled by a few strokes of the pen and a pennyworth of sealing-wax, instead of being the opening act in a vast tragedy, of which neither he, nor Caron, nor Barneveldt, nor Prince Maurice, nor the youthful King of France, nor Philip, nor Matthias, nor any of the men now foremost in the conduct of affairs, was destined to see the end.

The king informed Caron that he had just received most satisfactory assurances from the Spanish ambassador in his last audience at Whitehall.

“He has announced to me, on the part of the king

beginne hebbe mede gemoeyt doch vreesende dat het anders verstaen conde werden al of ic eenige autoriteyt in eene andere Republique sochte, ic hebbet daer gelaten sonder dat ic my daermede meer wil moeyen, maer wil Godt bidden dat hy hemlyden een goet uytende daerin wil geven.”

It is a pity that the words of this remarkable conversation, in which James appears at his very best, have to be filtered through two or three languages. The states' ambassadors always, of course, wrote their confidential as well as their public despatches to their government in Dutch. This conversation was probably held in English, as Caron had lived so long in the country as to make that language like his mother-tongue. He does not say whether James spoke French on this occasion, but Queen Elizabeth always used that language in conversing with him or with any foreign ambassador.

his master, with great compliments, that his Majesty seeks to please me and satisfy me in everything that I could possibly desire of him," said James, rolling over with satisfaction these unctuous phrases as if they really had any meaning whatever.

"His Majesty says further," added the king, "that as he has been at various times admonished by me, and is daily admonished by other princes, that he ought to execute the treaty of Xanten by surrendering the city of Wesel and all other places occupied by Spinola, he now declares himself ready to carry out that treaty in every point. He will accordingly instruct the archduke to do this, provided the Margrave of Brandenburg and the states will do the same in regard to their captured places. As he understands, however, that the states have been fortifying Jülich even as he might fortify Wesel, he would be glad that no innovation be made before the end of the coming month of March. When this term shall have expired, he will no longer be bound by these offers, but will proceed to fortify Wesel and the other places, and to hold them as he best may for himself. Respect for me has alone induced his Majesty to make this resolution."

We have already seen that the Spanish ambassador in Paris was at this very time loudly declaring that his colleague in London had no commission whatever to make these propositions. Nor when they were in the slightest degree analyzed did they appear, after all, to be much better than threats. Not a word was said of guaranties. The names of the two kings were not mentioned. It was nothing but Albert and Spinola then, as always, and a recommendation that Brandenburg and the states and all the Protestant princes of

Germany should trust to the candor of the Catholic League. Caron pointed out to the king that in these proposals there were no guaranties nor even promises that the fortresses would not be reoccupied at convenience of the Spaniards. He engaged, however, to report the whole statement to his masters. A few weeks afterward the advocate replied in his usual vein, reminding the king through the ambassador that the Republic feared fraud on the part of the League much more than force. He also laid stress on the affairs of Italy, considering the fate of Savoy and the conflicts in which Venice was engaged as components of a general scheme. The states had been much solicited, as we have seen, to render assistance to the Duke of Savoy, the temporary peace of Asti being already broken, and Barneveldt had been unceasing in his efforts to arouse France as well as England to the danger to themselves and to all Christendom should Savoy be crushed. We shall have occasion to see the prominent part reserved to Savoy in the fast-ripening debate in Germany. Meantime the states had sent one Count of Nassau with a couple of companies to Charles Emmanuel, while another (Ernest) had just gone to Venice at the head of more than three thousand adventurers. With so many powerful armies at their throats, as Barneveldt had more than once observed, it was not easy for them to despatch large forces to the other end of Europe, but he justly reminded his allies that the states were now rendering more effective help to the common cause by holding great Spanish armies in check on their own frontier than if they assumed a more aggressive line in the South. The advocate, like every statesman worthy of the name, was accustomed to sweep the whole hori-

zon in his consideration of public policy, and it will be observed that he always regarded various and apparently distinct and isolated movements in different parts of Europe as parts of one great whole. It is easy enough for us, centuries after the record has been made up, to observe the gradual and, as it were, harmonious manner in which the great Catholic conspiracy against the liberties of Europe was unfolded in an ever-widening sphere. But to the eyes of contemporaries all was then misty and chaotic, and it required the keen vision of a sage and a prophet to discern the awful shape which the future might assume. Absorbed in the contemplation of these portentous phenomena, it was not unnatural that the advocate should attach less significance to perturbations nearer home. Devoted as was his life to save the great European cause of Protestantism, in which he considered political and religious liberty bound up, from the absolute extinction with which it was menaced, he neglected too much the furious hatreds growing up among Protestants within the narrow limits of his own province. He was destined one day to be rudely awakened. Meantime he was occupied with organizing a general defense of Italy, Germany, France, and England, as well as the Netherlands, against the designs of Spain and the League.

“We wish to know,” he said,¹ in answer to the affectionate messages and fine promises of the King of Spain to James as reported by Caron, “what his Majesty of Great Britain has done, is doing, and is resolved to do for the Duke of Savoy and the republic of Venice. If they ask you what we are doing, answer that we with

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, December 29, 1616, Hague Archives MS,

our forces and vigor are keeping off from the throats of Savoy and Venice two thousand riders and ten thousand infantry, with which forces, let alone their experience, more would be accomplished than with four times the number of new troops brought to the field in Italy. This is our succor, a great one and a very costly one, for the expense of maintaining our armies to hold the enemy in check here is very great."

He alluded with his usual respectful and quiet scorn to the arrangements by which James so wilfully allowed himself to be deceived.

"If the Spaniard really leaves the duchies," he said, "it is a grave matter to decide whether on the one side he is not resolved by that means to win more over us and the Elector of Brandenburg in the debatable land in a few days than he could gain by force in many years, or on the other whether by it he does not intend despatching twelve or fifteen hundred cavalry and five or six thousand foot, all his most experienced soldiers, from the Netherlands to Italy, in order to give the law at his pleasure to the Duke of Savoy and the republic of Venice, reserving his attack upon Germany and ourselves to the last. The Spaniards, standing under a monarchical government, can in one hour resolve to seize to-morrow all that they and we may abandon to-day. And they can carry such a resolution into effect at once. Our form of government does not permit this, so that our republic must be conserved by distrust and good garrisons."¹

Thus during this long period of half hostilities Barneveldt, while sincerely seeking to preserve the peace

¹ "Onse regeeringhe en laet zulex nyet toe, zodat onsen staet mit diffidentie ende goede besettinghe moet worden geconserveert."

in Europe, was determined, if possible, that the Republic should maintain the strongest defensive position when the war which he foreboded should actually begin. Maurice and the war party had blamed him for the obstacles which he interposed to the outbreak of hostilities, while the British court, as we have seen, was perpetually urging him to abate from his demands and abandon both the well-strengthened fortresses in the duchies and that strong citadel of distrust which, in his often-repeated language, he was determined never to surrender. Spinola and the military party of Spain, while preaching peace, had been in truth most anxious for fighting. "The only honor I desire henceforth," said that great commander, "is to give battle to Prince Maurice."¹ The generals were more anxious than the governments to make use of the splendid armies arrayed against each other in such proximity that, the signal for conflict not having been given, it was not uncommon for the soldiers of the respective camps to aid each other in unloading munition-wagons, exchanging provisions and other articles of necessity, and performing other small acts of mutual service.

But heavy thunder-clouds hanging over the earth so long and so closely might burst into explosion at any moment. Had it not been for the distracted condition of France, the infatuation of the English king, and the astounding inertness of the princes of the German Union, great advantages might have been gained by the Protestant party before the storm should break. But, as the French ambassador at The Hague well observed, "the Great Protestant Union of Germany sat

¹ *Ouvré*, 227.

with folded arms while Hannibal was at their gate, the princes of which it was composed amusing themselves with staring at each other. It was verifying," he continued bitterly, "the saying of the Duke of Alva, 'Germany is an old dog which still can bark, but has lost its teeth to bite with.'"¹

To such imbecility had that noble and gifted people—which had never been organized into a nation since it crushed the Roman Empire and established a new civilization on its ruins, and was to wait centuries longer until it should reconstruct itself into a whole—been reduced by subdivision, disintegration, the perpetual dissolvent of religious dispute, and the selfish policy of infinitesimal dynasties.

¹ Ouvré, 228.

CHAPTER XII

James still presses for the payment of the Dutch Republic's debt to him—A compromise effected, with restitution of the cautionary towns—Treaty of Loudun—James's dream of a Spanish marriage revives—James visits Scotland—The States-General agree to furnish money and troops in fulfilment of the treaty of 1609—Death of Concini—Villeroy returns to power.

BESIDES matters of predestination there were other subjects, political and personal, which increased the king's jealousy and hatred. The debt of the Republic to the British crown, secured by mortgage of the important seaports and fortified towns of Flushing, Brielle, Rammekens, and other strong places, still existed. The possession of those places by England was a constant danger and irritation to the states. It was an ax perpetually held over their heads. It threatened their sovereignty, their very existence. On more than one occasion, in foreign courts, the representatives of the Netherlands had been exposed to the taunt that the Republic was, after all, not an independent power, but a British province. The gibe had always been repelled in a manner becoming the envoys of a proud commonwealth; yet it was sufficiently galling that English garrisons should continue to hold Dutch towns, one of them among the most valuable seaports of the Republic,

the other the very cradle of its independence, the seizure of which in Alva's days had always been reckoned a splendid achievement. Moreover, by the fifth article of the treaty of peace between James and Philip III.,¹ although the king had declared himself bound by the treaties made by Elizabeth to deliver up the cautionary towns to no one but the United States, he promised Spain to allow those states a reasonable time to make peace with the archdukes on satisfactory conditions. Should they refuse to do so, he held himself bound by no obligations to them, and would deal with the cities as he thought proper, and as the archdukes themselves might deem just.

The king had always been furious at "the huge sum of money to be advanced, nay, given, to the states," as he phrased it. "It is so far out of all square," he had said, "as on my conscience I cannot think that ever they craved it *animo obtinendi*, but only by that objection to discourage me from any thought of getting any repayment of my debts from them when they shall be in peace. . . . Should I ruin myself for maintaining them? Should I bestow as much on them as cometh to the value of my whole yearly rent?" He had proceeded to say very plainly that, if the states did not make great speed to pay him all his debt so soon as peace was established, he should treat their pretense at independence with contempt, and propose dividing their territory between himself and the King of France.

"If they be so weak as they cannot subsist either in peace or war," he said, "without I ruin myself for upholding them, in that case surely *minus malum est eligendum*, the nearest harm is first to be eschewed, a

¹ Wagenaer, ix. 175. August 29, 1604.

man will leap out of a burning ship and drown himself in the sea; and it is doubtless a farther-off harm for me to suffer them to fall again in the hands of Spain, and let God provide for the danger that may with time fall upon me or my posterity, than presently to starve myself and mine with putting the meat in their mouth. Nay, rather, if they be so weak as they can neither sustain themselves in peace nor war, let them leave this vainglorious thirsting for the title of a free state (which no people are worthy or able to enjoy that cannot stand by themselves like substantives), and *dividantur inter nos*; I mean, let their countries be divided between France and me, otherwise the King of Spain shall be sure to consume us.”¹

Such were the eyes with which James had always regarded the great commonwealth of which he affected to be the ally, while secretly aspiring to be its sovereign, and such was his capacity to calculate political forces and comprehend coming events.

Certainly the sword was hanging by a thread. The states had made no peace either with the archdukes or with Spain. They had made a truce, half the term of which had already run by. At any moment the keys of their very house door might be placed in the hands of their arch-enemy. Treacherous and base as the deed would be, it might be defended by the letter of a treaty in which the Republic had no part; and was there anything too treacherous or too base to be dreaded from James Stuart?

But the states owed the crown of England eight millions of florins, equivalent to about seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds. Where was this vast sum

¹ King to Cecil, Hatfield Archives MS. See Appendix.

to be found? It was clearly impossible for the states to beg or to borrow it, although they were nearly as rich as any of the leading powers at that day.

It was the merit of Barneveldt not only that he saw the chance for a good bargain, but that he fully comprehended a great danger. Years long James had pursued the phantom of a Spanish marriage for his son. To achieve this mighty object he had perverted the whole policy of the realm; he had groveled to those who despised him, had repaid attempts at wholesale assassination with boundless sycophancy. It is difficult to imagine anything more abject than the attitude of James toward Philip. Prince Henry was dead, but Charles had now become Prince of Wales in his turn, and there was a younger infanta whose hand was not yet disposed of.

So long as the possible prize of a Most Catholic princess was dangling before the eyes of the royal champion of Protestantism, so long there was danger that the Netherlanders might wake up some fine morning and see the flag of Spain waving over the walls of Flushing, Brielle, and Rammekens.

It was in the interest of Spain, too, that the envoys of James at The Hague were perpetually goading Barneveldt to cause the states' troops to be withdrawn from the duchies and the illusory treaty of Xanten to be executed. Instead of an eighth province added to the free Netherlands, the result of such a procedure would have been to place that territory enveloping them in the hands of the enemy; to strengthen and sharpen the claws, as the advocate had called them, by which Spain was seeking to clutch and to destroy the Republic.

The advocate steadily refused to countenance such policy in the duchies, and he resolved on a sudden stroke to relieve the commonwealth from the incubus of the English mortgage.¹

James was desperately pushed for money. His minions, as insatiable in their demands on English wealth as the parasites who fed on the queen regent were exhaustive of the French exchequer, were greedier than ever now that James, who feared to face a Parliament disgusted with the meanness of his policy and depravity of his life, could not be relied upon to minister to their wants.

The advocate judiciously contrived that the proposal of a compromise should come from the English government. Noël de Caron, the veteran ambassador of the states in London, after receiving certain proposals, offered, under instructions from Barneveldt, to pay two hundred and fifty thousand pounds in full of all demands. It was made to appear that the additional fifty thousand pounds was in reality in advance of his instructions. The mouths of the minions watered at the mention of so magnificent a sum of money in one lump.

The bargain was struck. On the 11th June, 1616, Sir Robert Sydney, who had become Lord Lisle, gave over the city of Flushing to the states, represented by the Seigneur van Maldere, while Sir Horace Vere placed the important town of Brielle in the hands of the Seigneur van Mathenesse. According to the terms of the bargain, the English garrisons were converted into two regiments, respectively to be commanded by Lord Lisle's son, now Sir Robert Sydney, and by Sir Horace

¹ Rapin, vii. 108 seq. Wagenaer, x. 93-105.

Vere, and were to serve the states. Lisle, who had been in the Netherlands since the days of his uncle Leicester and his brother Sir Philip Sydney, now took his final departure for England.¹

Thus this ancient burden had been taken off the Republic by the masterly policy of the advocate. A great source of dread for foreign complication was closed forever.²

The French-Spanish marriages had been made. Henry IV. had not been murdered in vain. Condé and his confederates had issued their manifesto. A crisis came to the states, for Maurice, always inclined to take part for the princes, and urged on by Aertsens, who was inspired by a deadly hatred for the French government ever since they had insisted on his dismissal from his post, and who fed the stadholder's growing jealousy of the advocate to the full, was at times al-

¹ Wagenaer, x. 93-105.

² "We understand," said Barneveldt to Caron, "your arrangement to be that the transfer of the cities and places (Brielle, Flushing, and Rammekens) is promised, on condition that, a month or six weeks after the transfer, £100,000 sterling shall be paid, and every six months, three times, shall £50,000 be paid, making in all £250,000."—Barneveldt to Caron, February 20, 1610, Hague Archives MS.

After the departure of the English troops from the cautionary towns, a friendly farewell banquet was given, with many compliments, toasts, and expressions of good feeling between the two nations. The officers and magistrates were relieved of their oaths of fidelity to the English government, and the first instalment of the debt was ordered to be paid. The States-General presented each English governor with a gold chain and medal worth three thousand florins, and the lieutenant-governors with presents each of half that value. (Barneveldt to Caron, June 21, 1616, Hague Archives MS.)

most ready for joining in the conflict. It was most difficult for the States-General, led by Barneveldt, to maintain relations of amity with a government controlled by Spain, governed by the Concinis, and wafted to and fro by every wind that blew. Still it was the government, and the states might soon be called upon, in virtue of their treaties with Henry, confirmed by Mary de' Medici, not only to prevent the daily desertion of officers and soldiers of the French regiments to the rebellious party, but to send the regiments themselves to the assistance of the king and queen.

There could be no doubt that the alliance of the French Huguenots at Grenoble with the princes made the position of the states very critical. Bouillon was loud in his demands upon Maurice and the states for money and reinforcements, but the prince fortunately understood the character of the duke and of Condé, and comprehended the nature of French politics too clearly to be led into extremities by passion or by pique. He said loudly to any one that chose to listen: "It is not necessary to ruin the son in order to avenge the death of the father. That should be left to the son, who alone has legitimate authority to do it."¹ Nothing could be more sensible, and the remark almost indicated a belief on the prince's part in Mary's complicity in the murder of her husband. Duplessis-Mornay was in despair, and, like all true patriots and men of earnest character, felt it almost an impossibility to choose between the two ignoble parties contending for the possession of France, and both secretly encouraged by France's deadly enemy.

¹ Despatches of Du Maurier, September and October, 1616, in *Ouvré*, 240.

The treaty of Loudun followed, a treaty which, said Du Maurier, had about as many negotiators as there were individuals interested in the arrangements. The rebels were forgiven. Condé sold himself out for a million and a half livres and the presidency of the council, came to court, and paraded himself in greater pomp and appearance of power than ever. Four months afterward he was arrested and imprisoned. He submitted like a lamb, and offered to betray his confederates.¹

King James, faithful to his self-imposed part of mediator-general, which he thought so well became him, had been busy in bringing about this pacification,² and had considered it eminently successful. He was now angry at this unexpected result. He admitted that Condé had indulged in certain follies and extravagancies, but these, in his opinion, all came out of the quiver of the Spaniard, "who was the head of the whole intrigue." He determined to recall Lord Hayes from Madrid and even Sir Thomas Edmonds from Paris, so great was his indignation. But his wrath was likely to cool under the soothing communications of Gondemar, and the rumor of the marriage of the second infanta with the Prince of Wales soon afterward started into new life. "We hope," wrote Barneveldt, "that the alliance of his Highness the Prince of Wales with the daughter of the Spanish king will make no further progress, as it will place us in the deepest embarrassment and pain."³

¹ Michelet, *Henri IV. et Richelieu*, 250.

² Caron to States-General, September 12 and 13, 1616, Hague Archives MS.

³ Barneveldt to Caron, May 17, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

For the reports had been so rife at the English court in regard to this dangerous scheme that Caron had stoutly gone to the king and asked him what he was to think about it. "The king told me," said the ambassador, "that there was nothing at all in it, nor any appearance that anything ever would come of it. It was true, he said, that on the overtures made to him by the Spanish ambassador he had ordered his minister in Spain to listen to what they had to say, and not to bear himself as if the overtures would be rejected."¹

The coyness thus affected by James could hardly impose on so astute a diplomatist as Noël de Caron, and the effect produced upon the policy of one of the Republic's chief allies by the Spanish marriages naturally made her statesmen shudder at the prospect of their other powerful friend coming thus under the malign influence of Spain.

"He assured me, however," said the envoy, "that the Spaniard is not sincere in the matter, and that he has himself become so far alienated from the scheme that we may sleep quietly upon it." And James appeared at that moment so vexed at the turn affairs were taking in France, so wounded in his self-love, and so bewildered by the ubiquitous nature of nets and pitfalls spreading over Europe by Spain, that he really seemed waking from his delusion. Even Caron was staggered.² "In all his talk he appears so far estranged from the Spaniard," said he, "that it would seem impossible that he should consider this marriage as good for his state. I have also had other advices on the subject which in the highest degree comfort

¹ Caron to the States-General, January 30, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Ibid.

me. Now your Mightinesses may think whatever you like about it."

The mood of the king was not likely to last long in so comfortable a state. Meantime he took the part of Condé and the other princes, justified their proceedings to the special envoy sent over by Mary de' Medici, and wished the states to join with him in appealing to that queen to let the affair, for his sake, pass over once more.¹

"And now I will tell your Mightinesses," said Caron,² reverting once more to the dreaded marriage which occupies so conspicuous a place in the strangely mingled and party-colored tissue of the history of those days, "what the king has again been telling me about the alliance between his son and the Infanta. He hears from Carleton that you are in very great alarm lest this event may take place. He understands that the special French envoy at The Hague, M. de la Noue, has been representing to you that the King of Great Britain is following after and begging for the daughter of Spain for his son. He says it is untrue. But it is true that he has been sought and solicited thereto, and that in consequence there have been talks and propositions and rejoinders, but nothing of any moment. As he had already told me not to be alarmed until he should himself give me cause for it, he expressed his amazement that I had not informed your Mightinesses accordingly. He assured me again that he should not proceed further in the business without communicating it to his good friends and neighbors, that he considered my lords the states as his best

¹ Caron to the States-General, March 10, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Ibid.

friends and allies, who ought therefore to conceive no jealousy in the matter."

This certainly was cold comfort. Caron knew well enough, not a clerk in his office but knew well enough, that James had been pursuing this prize for years. For the king to represent himself as persecuted by Spain to give his son to the Infanta was about as ridiculous as it would have been to pretend that Emperor Matthias was persuading him to let his son-in-law accept the crown of Bohemia. It was admitted that negotiations for the marriage were going on, and the assertion that the Spanish court was more eager for it than the English government was not especially calculated to allay the necessary alarm of the states at such a disaster. Nor was it much more tranquillizing for them to be assured, not that the marriage was off, but that, when it was settled, they, as the king's good friends and neighbors, should have early information of it.

"I told him," said the ambassador, "that undoubtedly this matter was of the highest importance to your Mightinesses, for it was not good for us to sit between two kingdoms both so nearly allied with the Spanish monarch, considering the pretensions he still maintained to sovereignty over us. Although his Majesty might not now be willing to treat to our prejudice, yet the affair itself in the sequence of time must of necessity injure our commonwealth. We hoped, therefore, that it would never come to pass."

Caron added that Ambassador Digby was just going to Spain on extraordinary mission in regard to this affair, and that eight or ten gentlemen of the council had been deputed to confer with his Majesty about it.

He was still inclined to believe that the whole negotiation would blow over, the king continuing to exhort him not to be alarmed, and assuring him that there were many occasions moving princes to treat of great affairs, although often without any effective issue.

At that moment, too, the king was in a state of vehement wrath with the Spanish Netherlands on account of a stinging libel against himself, "an infamous and wonderfully scandalous pamphlet," as he termed it, called "*Corona Regis*," recently published at Louvain. He had sent Sir John Bennet as special ambassador to the archdukes to demand from them justice and condign and public chastisement on the author of the work—a Rector Putianus, as he believed, successor of Justus Lipsius in his professorship at Louvain—and upon the printer, one Flaminius. Delays and excuses having followed instead of the punishment originally demanded, James had now instructed his special envoy in case of further delay or evasion to repudiate all further friendship or intercourse with the archduke, to ratify the recall of his minister resident, Trumbull, and in effect to announce formal hostilities.¹

"The king takes the thing wonderfully to heart," said Caron.

James in effect hated to be made ridiculous, and we shall have occasion to see how important a part other publications which he deemed detrimental to the divinity of his person were to play in these affairs.

Meantime it was characteristic of this sovereign that, while ready to talk of war with Philip's brother-in-law for a pamphlet, while seeking the hand of Philip's

¹ ". . . ende in effecte alle viantschap te bieden."—Caron to the States-General, March 10, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

daughter for his son, he was determined at the very moment when the world was on fire to take himself, the heaven-born extinguisher of all political conflagrations, away from affairs and to seek the solace of a long holiday in Scotland. His councilors persistently and vehemently implored him to defer that journey until the following year at least, all the neighboring nations being now in a state of war and civil commotion. But it was in vain. He refused to listen to them for a moment, and started for Scotland before the middle of March.

Condé, who had kept France in a turmoil, had sought aid alternately from the Calvinists at Grenoble and the Jesuits in Rome, from Spain and from the Netherlands, from the pope and from Maurice of Nassau, had thus been caged at last. But there was little gained. There was one troublesome but incompetent rebel the less, but there was no king in the land. He who doubts the influence of the individual upon the fate of a country and upon his times through long passages of history may explain the difference between France of 1609, with a martial king aided by great statesmen at its head, with an exchequer overflowing with revenue hoarded for a great cause,—and that cause an attempt at least to pacificate Christendom and avert a universal and almost infinite conflict now already opening,—and the France of 1617, with its treasures already squandered among ignoble and ruffianly favorites, with every office in state, church, court, and magistracy sold to the highest bidder, with a queen governed by an Italian adventurer who was governed by Spain, and with a little king who had but lately expressed triumph at his confirmation because now he should no longer be

whipped,¹ and who was just married to a daughter of the hereditary and inevitable foe of France.

To contemplate this dreary interlude in the history of a powerful state is to shiver at the depths of inanity and crime to which mankind can at once descend. What need to pursue the barren, vulgar, and often-repeated chronicle? France pulled at by scarcely concealed strings and made to perform fantastic tricks according as its various puppets were swerved this way or that by supple hands at Madrid and Rome is not a refreshing spectacle. The States-General at last, after an agitated discussion, agreed, in fulfilment of the treaty of 1609, to send four thousand men, two thousand being French, to help the king against the princes still in rebellion. But the contest was a most bitter one, and the advocate had a difficult part to play between a government and a rebellion, each more despicable than the other. Still, Louis XIII. and his mother were the legitimate government, even if ruled by Concini. The words of the treaty made with Henry IV. were plain, and the ambassadors of his son had summoned the states to fulfil it. But many impediments were placed in the path of obvious duty by the party led by Francis Aertsens.

“I know very well,” said the advocate to ex-Burgomaster Hoofd of Amsterdam, father of the great historian, sending him confidentially a copy of the proposals made by the French ambassadors, “that many

¹ “ . . . qu'il y avoit ouy que lors de son sacre il dit que de la envant il estait bien aise d'estre affranchi du fouet.”—Degroote to Archduke Albert, February 4, 1611, Archives du Roy, Bruxelles MS., relating a conversation of King James with the French ambassador in London.

in this country are striving hard to make us refuse to the king the aid demanded, notwithstanding that we are bound to do it by the pledges given not only by the States-General, but by each province in particular. By this no one will profit but the Spaniard, who unquestionably will offer much, aye, very much, to bring about dissensions between France and us, from which I foresee great damage, inconvenience, and difficulties for the whole commonwealth and for Holland especially. This province has already advanced one million florins to the general government on the money still due from France, which will all be lost in case the subsidy should be withheld, besides other evils which cannot be trusted to the pen.”¹

On the same day on which it had been decided at The Hague to send the troops, a captain of guards came to the aid of the poor little king, and shot Concini dead one fine spring morning on the bridge of the Louvre. “By order of the king,” said Vitry. His body was burned before the statue of Henry IV. by the people, delirious with joy.² “*L’ hanno ammazzato*,” was shouted to his wife, Eleanora Galigai, the supposed sorceress. They were the words in which Concini had communicated to the queen the murder of her husband seven years before.³ Eleanora, too, was burned after having been beheaded. Thus the Marshal d’Ancre and wife ceased to reign in France.

The officers of the French regiments at The Hague danced for joy on the Vyverberg when the news ar-

¹ Barneveldt to Cornelis Pietersz. Hoofd, April 5, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Ouvré, 249. Michelet, 255.

³ Ibid., 256.

rived there. The states were relieved from an immense embarrassment, and the advocate was rewarded for having pursued what was, after all, the only practicable policy. "Do your best," said he to Langerac, "to accommodate differences so far as consistent with the conservation of the king's authority. We hope the princes will submit themselves now that the *lapis offensionis*, according to their pretense, is got rid of. We received a letter from them to-day sealed with the king's arms, with the circumscription, 'Periclitante Regno, Regis vita et Regia familia.'"¹

The shooting of Concini seemed almost to convert the little king into a hero. Every one in the Netherlands, without distinction of party, was delighted with the achievement. "I cannot represent to the king," wrote Du Maurier to Villeroy, "one thousandth part of the joy of all these people who are exalting him to heaven for having delivered the earth from this miserable burden. I can't tell you in what execration this public pest was held. His Majesty has not less won the hearts of this state than if he had gained a great victory over the Spaniards. You would not believe it, and yet it is true, that never were the name and reputation of the late king in greater reverence than those of our reigning king at this moment."²

Truly here was glory cheaply earned. The fame of Henry the Great, after a long career of brilliant deeds of arms, high statesmanship, and twenty years of bountiful friendship for the states, was already equaled by that of Louis XIII., who had tremblingly acquiesced in the summary execution of an odious adventurer,—his

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, May 1, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Despatch, May 4, 1617, in Ouvré, 249.

own possible father,—and who never had done anything else but feed his canary-birds.

As for Villeroy himself, the ambassador wrote that he could not find portraits enough of him to furnish those who were asking for them since his return to power.¹

Barneveldt had been right in so often instructing Langerac to “caress the old gentleman.”

¹ Despatch, May, 4, 1617, in *Ouvré*, 249.

CHAPTER XIII

Ferdinand of Gratz crowned King of Bohemia—His enmity to Protestants—Slawata and Martinitz thrown from the window of the Hradschin—Real beginning of the Thirty Years' War—The Elector Palatine's intrigues in opposition to the house of Austria—He supports the Duke of Savoy—The Emperor Matthias visits Dresden—Jubilee for the hundredth anniversary of the Reformation.

WHEN the forlorn Emperor Rudolph had signed the permission for his brother Matthias to take the last crown but one from his head, he bit the pen in a paroxysm of helpless rage. Then rushing to the window of his apartment, he looked down on one of the most stately prospects that the palaces of the earth can offer. From the long, monotonous architectural lines of the Hradschin, imposing from its massiveness and its imperial situation, and with the dome and minarets of the cathedral clustering behind them, the eye swept across the fertile valley through which the rapid yellow Moldau courses, to the opposite line of cliffs crested with the half-imaginary fortress-palaces of the Wyscherad. There, in the mythical, legendary past of Bohemia, had dwelt the shadowy Libuscha, daughter of Krok, wife of King Premysl, foundress of Prague, who, when wearied of her lovers, was accustomed to toss them from those heights into the river. Between these picturesque precipices lay the two Pragues, twin-born and quarrelsome, fighting each other for centuries, and

growing up side by side into a double, bellicose, stormy, and most splendid city, bristling with steeples and spires, and united by the ancient many-statued bridge with its blackened medieval entrance-towers.

But it was not to enjoy the prospect that the aged, discrowned, solitary emperor, almost as dim a figure among sovereigns as the mystic Libuscha herself, was gazing from the window upon the imperial city.

"Ungrateful Prague!" he cried; "through me thou hast become thus magnificent, and now thou hast turned upon and driven away thy benefactor. May the vengeance of God descend upon thee; may my curse come upon thee and upon all Bohemia."¹

History has failed to record the special benefits of the emperor through which the city had derived its magnificence and deserved this malediction. But surely if ever an old man's curse was destined to be literally fulfilled, it seemed to be this solemn imprecation of Rudolph. Meantime the coronation of Matthias had gone on with pomp and popular gratulations, while Rudolph had withdrawn into his apartments to pass the little that was left to him of life in solitude and in a state of hopeless pique with Matthias, with the rest of his brethren, with all the world.

And now that five years had passed since his death, Matthias, who had usurped so much power prematurely, found himself almost in the same condition as that to which he had reduced Rudolph.

Ferdinand of Styria, his cousin, trod closely upon his heels. He was the presumptive successor to all his crowns, had not approved of the movements of Matthias in the lifetime of his brother, and hated the

¹ W. Menzel, iii. 213.

Vienna Protestant baker's son, Cardinal Khlesl, by whom all those movements had been directed. Professor Taubmann of Wittenberg, ponderously quibbling on the name of that prelate, had said that he was of "one hundred and fifty ass-power."¹ Whether that was a fair measure of his capacity may be doubted, but it certainly was not destined to be sufficient to elude the vengeance of Ferdinand, and Ferdinand would soon have him in his power.

Matthias, weary of ambitious intrigue, infirm of purpose, and shattered in health, had withdrawn from affairs to devote himself to his gout and to his fair young wife, Archduchess Anna of Tyrol, whom at the age of fifty-four he had espoused.

On the 29th June, 1617, Ferdinand of Gratz was crowned King of Bohemia. The event was a shock and a menace to the Protestant cause all over the world. The somber figure of the archduke had for years appeared in the background, foreshadowing as it were the wrath to come, while throughout Bohemia and the neighboring countries of Moravia, Silesia, and the Austrias the cause of Protestantism had been making such rapid progress. The Emperor Maximilian II. had left five stalwart sons, so that there had seemed little probability that the younger line, the sons of his brother, would succeed. But all the five were childless, and now the son of Archduke Charles, who had died in 1590, had become the natural heir after the death of Matthias to the immense family honors, his cousins Maximilian and Albert having resigned their claims in his favor.

¹ To wit, "C L Esel" (W. Menzel, iii. 189); but the name is more properly spelled "Khlesl."



FERDINAND, KING OF BOHEMIA

Ferdinand, twelve years old at his father's death, had been placed under the care of his maternal uncle, Duke William of Bavaria. By him the boy was placed at the high school of Ingolstadt, to be brought up by the Jesuits, in company with Duke William's own son Maximilian, five years his senior. Between these youths, besides the tie of cousinship, there grew up the most intimate union founded on perfect sympathy in religion and politics.

When Ferdinand entered upon the government of his paternal estates of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, he found that the new religion, at which the Jesuits had taught him to shudder as at a curse and a crime, had been widely spreading. His father had fought against heresy with all his might, and had died disappointed and broken-hearted at its progress. His uncle of Bavaria, in letters to his son and nephew, had stamped into their minds with the enthusiasm of perfect conviction that all happiness and blessing for governments depended on the restoration and maintenance of the unity of the Catholic faith. All the evils in times past and present resulting from religious differences had been held up to the two youths by the Jesuits in the most glaring colors. The first duty of a prince, they had inculcated, was to extirpate all false religions, to give the opponents of the true church no quarter, and to think no sacrifice too great by which the salvation of human society, brought almost to perdition by the new doctrines, could be effected.

Never had Jesuits an apter scholar than Ferdinand. After leaving school he made a pilgrimage to Loreto to make his vows to the Virgin Mary of extirpation of

heresy, and went to Rome to obtain the blessing of Pope Clement VIII.

Then, returning to the government of his inheritance, he seized that terrible two-edged weapon of which the Protestants of Germany had taught him the use.

“*Cujus regio ejus religio*”—to the prince the choice of religion, to the subject conformity with the prince, as if that formula of shallow and selfish princelings, that insult to the dignity of mankind, were the grand result of a movement which was to go on centuries after they had all been forgotten in their tombs. For the time, however, it was a valid and mischievous maxim. In Saxony Catholics and Calvinists were proscribed; in Heidelberg Catholics and Lutherans. Why should either Calvinists or Lutherans be tolerated in Styria? Why, indeed? No logic could be more inexorable, and the pupil of the Ingolstadt Jesuits hesitated not an instant to carry out their teaching with the very instrument forged for him by the Reformation. Gallows were erected in the streets of all his cities, but there was no hanging. The sight of them proved enough to extort obedience to his edict that every man, woman, and child not belonging to the ancient church should leave his dominions. They were driven out in hordes in broad daylight from Gratz and other cities. Rather reign over a wilderness than over heretics, was the device of the archduke, in imitation of his great relative, Philip II. of Spain. In short space of time his duchies were as empty of Protestants as the Palatinate of Lutherans, or Saxony of Calvinists, or both of papists. Even the churchyards were rifled of dead Lutherans and Utraquists, their carcasses thrown where

they could no longer pollute the true believers moldering by their side.¹

It was not strange that the coronation as King of Bohemia of a man of such decided purposes—a country numbering ten Protestants to one Catholic—should cause a thrill and a flutter. Could it be doubted that the great elemental conflict so steadily prophesied by Barneveldt and instinctively dreaded by all capable of feeling the signs of the time would now begin? It had begun. Of what avail would be Majesty Letters and Compromises extorted by force from trembling or indolent emperors, now that a man who knew his own mind, and felt it to be a crime not to extirpate all religions but the one orthodox religion, had mounted the throne? It is true that he had sworn at his coronation to maintain the laws of Bohemia, and that the Majesty Letter and the Compromise were part of the laws. But when were doctors ever wanting to prove the unlawfulness of law which interferes with the purposes of a despot and the convictions of the bigot?

“*Novus rex, nova lex*,” muttered the Catholics, lifting up their heads and hearts once more out of the oppression and insults which they had unquestionably suffered at the hands of the triumphant Reformers. “There are many empty poppy-heads now flaunting high that shall be snipped off,” said others. “That accursed German Count Thurn and his fellows, whom the devil has sent from hell to Bohemia for his own purposes, shall be disposed of now,” was the general cry.²

It was plain that heresy could no longer be maintained except by the sword. That which had been ex-

¹ W. Menzel, iii.

² Gindely, 236.

torted by force would be plucked back by force. The succession of Ferdinand was, in brief, a war-shout to be echoed by all the Catholics of Europe. Before the end of the year the Protestant churches of Brünn were sealed up. Those at Klostergrab were demolished in three days by command of the Archbishop of Prague.¹ These dumb walls preached in their destruction more stirring sermons than perhaps would ever have been heard within them had they stood. This tearing in pieces of the imperial patent granting liberty of Protestant worship, this summary execution done upon senseless bricks and mortar, was an act of defiance to the Reformed religion everywhere. Protestantism was struck in the face, spat upon, defied.

The effect was instantaneous. Thurn and the other defenders of the Protestant faith were as prompt in action as the Catholics had been in words. A few months passed away. The emperor was in Vienna, but his ten stadholders were in Prague. The fateful 23d May, 1618, arrived. Slawata, a Bohemian Protestant, who had converted himself to the Roman Church in order to marry a rich widow, and who converted his peasants by hunting them to mass with his hounds, and Martinitz, the two stadholders who at Ferdinand's coronation had endeavored to prevent him from including the Majesty Letter among the privileges he was swearing to support, and who were considered the real authors of the royal letters revoking all religious rights of Protestants, were the most obnoxious of all. They were hurled from the council-chamber window of the Hradschin. The unfortunate secretary Fabricius was

¹ December 12 and 13, 1617. K. A. Menzel, iii. 292. Gindely, 249.

tossed out after them. Twenty-eight ells deep they fell, and all escaped unhurt by the fall, Fabricius being subsequently ennobled by a grateful emperor with the well-won title of Baron Somerset.¹

The Thirty Years' War, which in reality had been going on for several years already, is dated from that day. A provisional government was established in Prague by the estates under Protestant guidance, a college of thirty directors managing affairs.

The Window-Tumble,² as the event has always been called in history, excited a sensation in Europe. Especially the young King of France, whose political position should bring him rather into alliance with the rebels than the emperor, was disgusted and appalled. He was used to rebellion. Since he was ten years old there had been a rebellion against himself every year. There was rebellion now. But his ministers had never been thrown out of window. Perhaps one might take some day to tossing out kings as well. He disapproved the process entirely.

Thus the great conflict of Christendom, so long impending, seemed at last to have broken forth in full fury on a comparatively insignificant incident. Thus reasoned the superficial public, as if the throwing out of window of twenty stadholders could have created a general war in Europe had not the causes of war lain deep and deadly in the whole framework of society.

The succession of Ferdinand to the throne of the holy Wenzel, in which his election to the German imperial crown was meant to be involved, was a matter which concerned almost every household in Christen-

¹ Freiherr von Hohenfall. W. Menzel, iii. 315. Gindely, 284, 285.

² "Fenstersturz."

dom. Liberty of religion, civil franchise, political charters, contract between government and subject, right to think, speak, or act, these were the human rights everywhere in peril. A compromise between the two religious parties had existed for half a dozen years in Germany, a feeble compromise by which men had hardly been kept from each other's throats. That compromise had now been thrown to the winds. The vast conspiracy of Spain, Rome, the house of Austria, against human liberty had found a chief in the docile, gloomy pupil of the Jesuits now enthroned in Bohemia, and soon perhaps to wield the scepter of the Holy Roman Empire. There was no state in Europe that had not cause to put hand on sword-hilt. "Distrust and good garrisons," in the prophetic words of Barneveldt, would now be the necessary resource for all intending to hold what had been gained through long years of toil, martyrdom, and hard fighting.

The succession of Ferdinand excited especial dismay and indignation in the Palatinate. The young elector had looked upon the prize as his own. The marked advance of Protestant sentiment throughout the kingdom and its neighbor provinces had seemed to render the succession of an extreme papist impossible. When Frederick had sued for and won the hand of the fair Elizabeth, daughter of the King of Great Britain, it was understood that the alliance would be more brilliant for her than it seemed. James, with his usual vanity, spoke of his son-in-law as a future king.

It was a golden dream for the elector and for the general cause of the Reformed religion. Heidelberg enthroned in the ancient capital of the Wenzels, Maximilians, and Rudolphins, the Catechism and Confession

enrolled among the great statutes of the land, this was progress far beyond flimsy Majesty Letters and Compromises, made only to be torn to pieces.

Through the dim vista of futurity and in ecstatic vision no doubt even the imperial crown might seem suspended over the Palatine's head. But this would be merely a midsummer's dream. Events did not whirl so rapidly as they might learn to do centuries later, and the time for a Protestant to grasp at the crown of Germany could then hardly be imagined as ripening.

But what the Calvinist branch of the house of Wittelsbach had indeed long been pursuing was to interrupt the succession of the house of Austria to the German throne. That a Catholic prince must for the immediate future continue to occupy it was conceded even by Frederick, but the electoral votes might surely be now so manipulated as to prevent a slave of Spain and a tool of the Jesuits from wielding any longer the scepter of Charlemagne.

On the other hand, the purpose of the house of Austria was to do away with the elective principle and the prescriptive rights of the estates in Bohemia first, and afterward perhaps to send the Golden Bull itself to the limbo of worn-out constitutional devices. At present, however, their object was to secure their hereditary sovereignty in Prague first, and then to make sure of the next imperial election at Frankfort. Time afterward might fight still more in their favor, and fix them in hereditary possession of the German throne.

The Elector Palatine had lost no time. His counselors even before the coronation of Ferdinand at Prague had done their best to excite alarm throughout

Germany at the document by which Archdukes Maximilian and Albert had resigned all their hereditary claims in favor of Ferdinand and his male children. Should there be no such issue, the King of Spain claimed the succession for his own sons as great-grandchildren of Emperor Maximilian, considering himself nearer in the line than the Styrian branch, but being willing to waive his own rights in favor of so ardent a Catholic as Ferdinand. There was even a secret negotiation going on a long time between the new King of Bohemia and Philip to arrange for the precedence of the Spanish males over the Styrian females to the hereditary Austrian states, and to cede the province of Alsace to Spain.¹

It was not wonderful that Protestant Germany should be alarmed. After a century of Protestantism, that Spain should by any possibility come to be enthroned again over Germany was enough to raise both Luther and Calvin from their graves. It was certainly enough to set the lively young Palatine in motion. So soon as the election of Frederick was proclaimed, he had taken up the business in person. Fond of amusement, young, married to a beautiful bride of the royal house of England, he had hitherto left politics to his councilors.

Finding himself frustrated in his ambition by the election of another to the seat he had fondly deemed his own, he resolved to unseat him if he could, and, at any rate, to prevent the ulterior consequences of his elevation. He made a pilgrimage to Sedan, to confer with that irrepressible intriguer and Huguenot chieftain, the Duc de Bouillon. He felt sure of the counte-

¹ Hurter, iii. 5, 6. K. A. Menzel, iii. 270. Gindely, 52 seq.

nance of the States-General, and, of course, of his near relative the great stadholder. He was resolved to invite the Duke of Lorraine to head the anti-Austrian party, and to stand for the kingship of the Romans and the empire in opposition to Ferdinand. An emissary sent to Nancy came back with a discouraging reply. The duke not only flatly refused the candidacy, but warned the Palatine that if it really came to a struggle he could reckon on small support anywhere, not even from those who now seemed warmest for the scheme. Then Frederick resolved to try his cousin, the great Maximilian of Bavaria, to whom all Catholics looked with veneration and whom all German Protestants respected. Had the two branches of the illustrious house of Wittelsbach been combined in one purpose, the opposition to the house of Austria might indeed have been formidable. But what were ties of blood compared to the iron bands of religious love and hatred? How could Maximilian, sternest of papists, and Frederick V., flightiest of Calvinists, act harmoniously in an imperial election? Moreover, Maximilian was united by ties of youthful and tender friendship, as well as by kindred and perfect religious sympathy, to his other cousin, King Ferdinand himself. The case seemed hopeless, but the elector went to Munich,¹ and held conferences with his cousin. Not willing to take no for an answer so long as it was veiled under evasive or ornamental phraseology, he continued to negotiate with Maximilian through his envoys Camerarius and Secretary Neu, who held long debates with the duke's chief councilor, Dr. Jocher. Camerarius assured Jocher that his master was the

¹ February, 1618. Hurter, 7, 8. Gindely, 193.

Hercules to untie the Gordian knot, and the lion of the tribe of Judah.¹ How either the lion of Judah or Hercules was to untie the knot which was popularly supposed to have been cut by the sword of Alexander did not appear, but Maximilian, at any rate, was moved neither by entreaties nor tropes. Being entirely averse from entering himself for the German crown, he grew weary at last of the importunity with which the scheme was urged. So he wrote a short billet to his councilor, to be shown to Secretary Neu.

“DEAR JOCHER,” he said: “I am convinced one must let these people understand the matter in a little plainer German. I am once for all determined not to let myself into any misunderstanding or even amplifications with the house of Austria in regard to the succession. I think also that it would rather be harmful than useful to my house to take upon myself so heavy a burden as the German crown.”²

This time the German was plain enough and produced its effect. Maximilian was too able a statesman and too conscientious a friend to wish to exchange his own proud position as chief of the League, acknowledged head of the great Catholic party, for the slippery, comfortless, and unmeaning throne of the Holy Empire, which he considered Ferdinand’s right.

The chiefs of the anti-Austrian party, especially the Prince of Anhalt and the Margrave of Anspach, in unison with the Heidelberg cabinet, were forced to look for another candidate.³ Accordingly, the mar-

¹ But the observation seems to have been made at a later interview. (Hurter, i. 25.)

² Hurter, i. 8 seq.

³ Hurter, i. 9, 10, who says that the document drawn up in French for the two princes, as was usually the case with the func-

grave and the Elector Palatine solemnly agreed that it was indispensable to choose an emperor who should not be of the house of Austria nor a slave of Spain. It was, to be sure, not possible to think of a Protestant prince. Bavaria would not oppose Austria, would also allow too much influence to the Jesuits. So there remained no one but the Duke of Savoy. He was a prince of the empire. He was of German descent, of Saxon race, a great general, father of his soldiers, who would protect Europe against a Turkish invasion better than the bastions of Vienna could do. He would be agreeable to the Catholics, while the Protestants would live under him without anxiety because the Jesuits would be powerless with him. It would be a master-stroke if the princes would unite upon him. The King of France would necessarily be pleased with it, the King of Great Britain delighted.

At last the model candidate had been found. The Duke of Savoy, having just finished for a second time his chronic war with Spain, in which the United Provinces, notwithstanding the heavy drain on their resources, had allowed him fifty thousand florins a month besides the soldiers under Count Ernest of Nassau,¹ had sent Mansfeld with four thousand men to aid the revolted estates in Bohemia. Geographically, hereditarily, necessarily the deadly enemy of the house of Austria, he listened favorably to the overtures made to him by the princes of the Union, expressed undying hatred for the imperial race, and thought the Bohe-

tionaries of the Palatinate, was among those which set the fashion for Germans to use a foreign tongue instead of their own for court and state affairs.

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, July 31, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

mian revolt a priceless occasion for expelling them from power. He was informed by the first envoy sent to him, Christopher von Dohna, that the object of the great movement now contemplated was to raise him to the imperial throne at the next election, to assist the Bohemian estates, to secure the crown of Bohemia for the Elector Palatine, to protect the Protestants of Germany, and to break down the overweening power of the Austrian house.

The duke displayed no eagerness for the crown of Germany, while approving the election of Frederick, but expressed entire sympathy with the enterprise. It was indispensable, however, to form a general federation in Europe of England, the Netherlands, Venice, together with Protestant Germany and himself, before undertaking so mighty a task. While the negotiations were going on, both Anspach and Anhalt were in great spirits. The margrave cried out exultingly: "In a short time the means will be in our hands for turning the world upside down." He urged the Prince of Anhalt to be expeditious in his decisions and actions. "He who wishes to trade," he said, "must come to market early."¹

There was some disappointment at Heidelberg when the first news from Turin arrived, the materials for this vast scheme for an overwhelming and universal European war not seeming to be at their disposition. By and by the duke's plans seem to deepen and broaden. He told Mansfeld, who, accompanied by Secretary Neu, was glad at a pause in his fighting and brandsehatzung in Bohemia to be employed on diplomatic business, that on the whole he should require the

¹ Gindely, 391 seq. Hurter, i. 9-11.

crown of Bohemia for himself. He also proposed to accept the imperial crown, and as for Frederick, he would leave him the crown of Hungary, and would recommend him to round himself out by adding to his hereditary dominions the province of Alsace, besides Upper Austria and other territories in convenient proximity to the Palatinate.

Venice, it had been hoped, would aid in the great scheme and might in her turn round herself out with Friuli and Istria and other tempting possessions of Ferdinand, in reward for the men and money she was expected to furnish. That republic had, however, just concluded a war with Ferdinand, caused mainly by the depredations of the piratical Uscoques, in which, as we have seen, she had received the assistance of four thousand Hollanders under command of Count John of Nassau. The Venetians had achieved many successes, had taken the city of Görz and almost reduced the city of Gradiska. A certain Colonel Albert Waldstein, however, of whom more might one day be heard in the history of the war now begun, had beaten the Venetians and opened a pathway through their ranks for succor to the beleaguered city. Soon afterward peace was made on an undertaking that the Uscoques should be driven from their haunts, their castles dismantled, and their ships destroyed.

Venice declined an engagement to begin a fresh war. She hated Ferdinand and Matthias and the whole imperial brood, but, as old Barbarigo declared in the Senate, the republic could not afford to set her house on fire in order to give Austria the inconvenience of the smoke.

Meantime, although the Elector Palatine had mag-

nanimously agreed to use his influence in Bohemia in favor of Charles Emmanuel, the duke seems at last to have declined proposing himself for that throne. He knew, he said, that King James wished that station for his son-in-law. The imperial crown belonged to no one as yet after the death of Matthias, and was open, therefore, to his competition. Anhalt demanded of Savoy fifteen thousand men for the maintenance of the good cause, asserting that "it would be better to have the Turk or the devil himself on the German throne than leave it to Ferdinand."¹

The triumvirate ruling at Prague—Thurn, Ruppa, and Hohenlohe—were anxious for a decision from Frederick. That simple-hearted and ingenuous young elector had long been troubled both with fears lest, after all, he might lose the crown of Bohemia and with qualms of conscience as to the propriety of taking it even if he could get it. He wrestled much in prayer and devout meditation whether as anointed prince himself he were justified in meddling with the anointment of other princes.² Ferdinand had been accepted, proclaimed, crowned. He artlessly sent to Prague to consult the estates whether they possessed the right to rebel, to set aside the reigning dynasty, and to choose a new king. At the same time, with an eye to business, he stipulated that on account of the great expense and trouble devolving upon him the crown must be made hereditary in his family. The impression made upon the grim Thurn and his colleagues by the simplicity of these questions may be imagined. The splendor and

¹ Gindely, 446, 447, 450. Mailáth, ii. 356. Hurter, i. 12.

² Gindely, *ubi sup.* The great historian well remarks that the question was an evidence of the naïveté of the elector.

width of the Savoyard's conceptions fascinated the leaders of the Union. It seemed to Anspach and Anhalt that it was as well that Frederick should reign in Hungary as in Bohemia, and the elector was docile. All had relied, however, on the powerful assistance of the great defender of the Protestant faith, the father-in-law of the elector, the King of Great Britain. But James had nothing but cold water and Virgilian quotations for his son's ardor.¹ He was more under the influence of Gondemar than ever before, more eagerly hankering for the Infanta, more completely the slave of Spain. He pledged himself to that government that if the Protestants in Bohemia continued rebellious he would do his best to frustrate their designs and would induce his son-in-law to have no further connection with them. And Spain delighted his heart not by immediately sending over the Infanta, but by proposing that he should mediate between the contending parties. It would be difficult to imagine a greater farce. All central Europe was now in arms. The deepest and gravest questions about which men can fight, the right to worship God according to their conscience and to maintain civil franchises which have been earned by the people with the blood and treasure of centuries, were now to be solved by the sword, and the pupil of Buchanan and the friend of Buckingham was to step between hundreds of thousands of men in arms with a classical oration. But James was very proud of the proposal and accepted it with alacrity.

¹ "O præstans animi juvenis quantum ipse feroci
Virtute exsuperat, tanto me impensius æquum est
Prospicere atque omnes volventem expendere casus,"

he said to him on one occasion. (Gindely, 455.)

“You know, my dear son,” he wrote to Frederick,¹ “that we are the only king in Europe that is sought for by friend and foe for his mediation. It would be for this our lofty part very unbecoming if we were capable of favoring one of the parties. Your suggestion that we might secretly support the Bohemians we must totally reject, as it is not our way to do anything that we would not willingly confess to the whole world.”²

And to do James justice, he had never fed Frederick with false hopes, never given a penny for his great enterprise, nor promised him a penny. He had contented himself with suggesting from time to time that he might borrow money of the States-General. His daughter Elizabeth must take care of herself, else what would become of her brother’s marriage to the daughter of Spain?

And now it was war to the knife, in which it was impossible that Holland, as well as all the other great powers, should not soon be involved. It was disheartening to the cause of freedom and progress not only that the great kingdom on which the world had learned to rely in all movements upward and onward should be neutralized by the sycophancy of its monarch to the general oppressor, but that the great Republic which so long had taken the lead in maintaining the liberties of Europe should now be torn by religious discord within itself, and be turning against the great statesman who had so wisely guided her councils and so accurately foretold the catastrophe which was now upon the world.

¹ Gindely, 482.

² Ibid., 454. December 12, 1618. From the Archives at Munich.

Meantime the Emperor Matthias, not less forlorn than through his intrigues and rebellions his brother Rudolph had been made, passed his days in almost as utter retirement as if he had formally abdicated. Ferdinand treated him as if in his dotage. His fair young wife, too, had died of hard eating in the beginning of the winter, to his inexpressible grief,¹ so that there was nothing left to solace him now but the Rudolphian Museum.

He had made but one public appearance since the coronation of Ferdinand in Prague. Attended by his brother Maximilian, by King Ferdinand, and by Cardinal Khlesl, he had toward the end of the year 1617 paid a visit to the Elector John George at Dresden. The imperial party had been received with much enthusiasm by the great leader of Lutheranism. The cardinal had seriously objected to accompanying the emperor on this occasion. Since the Reformation no cardinal had been seen at the court of Saxony. He cared not personally for the pomps and glories of his rank, but still as prince of the church he had settled right of precedence over electors. To waive it would be disrespectful to the pope, to claim it would lead to squabbles. But Ferdinand had need of his skill to secure the vote of Saxony at the next imperial election.² The cardinal was afraid of Ferdinand with good reason, and complied. By an agreeable fiction he was received at court, not as cardinal, but as minister, and accommodated with a humble place at table. Many,

¹ December 14, 1618. Gindely, 485. In consequence of her uncontrollable appetite for food she had become enormously fat, and died in great suffering.

² K. A. Menzel, iii. 271 seq.

looking on with astonishment, thought he would have preferred to dine by himself in retirement. But this was not the bitterest of the mortifications that the pastor and guide of Matthias was to suffer at the hands of Ferdinand before his career should be closed. The visit at Dresden was successful, however. John George, being a claimant, as we have seen, for the duchies of Cleves and Jülich, had need of the emperor. The king had need of John George's vote. There was a series of splendid balls, hunting-parties, carousings.

The emperor was an invalid, the king was abstemious, but the elector was a mighty drinker. It was not his custom nor that of his councilors to go to bed. They were usually carried there. But it was the wish of Ferdinand to be conciliatory, and he bore himself as well as he could at the banquet. The elector was also a mighty hunter. Neither of his imperial guests cared for field-sports, but they looked out contentedly from the window of a hunting-lodge, before which, for their entertainment, the elector and his courtiers slaughtered eight bears, ten stags, ten pigs, and eleven badgers, besides a goodly number of other game, John George shooting also three martens from a pole erected for that purpose in the courtyard. It seemed proper for him thus to exhibit a specimen of the skill for which he was justly famed. The elector, before his life closed, so says the chronicle, had killed 28,000 wild boars, 208 bears, 3543 wolves, 200 badgers, 18,967 foxes, besides stage and roe-deer in still greater number, making a grand total of 113,629 beasts. The leader of the Lutheran party in Germany had not lived in vain.¹

¹ K. A. Menzel, iii. 271. Khevenhüller, viii. s. 47. W. Menzel, iii. 218.

Thus the great chiefs of Catholicism and of Protestantism amicably disported themselves in the last days of the year, while their respective forces were marshaling for mortal combat all over Christendom. The elector certainly loved neither Matthias nor Ferdinand, but he hated the Palatine. The chief of the German Calvinists disputed that Protestant hegemony which John George claimed by right. Indeed, the immense advantage enjoyed by the Catholics at the outbreak of the religious war from the mutual animosities between the two great divisions of the Reformed Church was already terribly manifest. What an additional power would it derive from the increased weakness of the foe, should there be still other and deeper and more deadly schisms within one great division itself!

“The Calvinists and Lutherans,”¹ cried the Jesuit Scioppius, “are so furiously attacking each other with calumnies and cursings, and are persecuting each other to such extent, as to give good hope that the devilish weight and burden of them will go to perdition and shame of itself, and the heretics all do bloody execution upon each other. Certainly, if ever a golden time existed for exterminating the heretics, it is the present time.”

The imperial party took their leave of Dresden, believing themselves to have secured the electoral vote of Saxony, the elector hoping for protection to his interests in the duchies through that sequestration to which Barneveldt had opposed such vigorous resistance. There had been much slavish cringing before these Catholic potentates by the courtiers of Dresden, somewhat amazing to the ruder churls of Saxony, the com-

¹ Anno 1614. W. Menzel, iii. 214.

mon people, who really believed in the religion which their prince had selected for them and himself.

And to complete the glaring contrast, Ferdinand and Matthias had scarcely turned their backs before tremendous fulminations upon the ancient church came from the elector and from all the doctors of theology in Saxony.

For the jubilee of the hundredth anniversary of the Reformation was celebrated all over Germany in the autumn of this very year, and nearly at the exact moment of all this dancing and fuddling and pig-shooting at Dresden in honor of emperors and cardinals. And Pope Paul V. had likewise ordained a jubilee for true believers at almost the same time.¹

The elector did not mince matters in his proclamation from any regard to the feelings of his late guests. He called on all Protestants to rejoice, "because the light of the holy gospel had now shone brightly in the electoral dominions for a hundred years, the Omnipotent keeping it burning notwithstanding the raging and roaring of the hellish enemy and all his sealy servants."

The doctors of divinity were still more emphatic in their phraseology. They called on all professors and teachers of the true Evangelical churches, not only in Germany but throughout Christendom, to keep the great jubilee. They did this in terms not calculated, certainly, to smother the flames of religious and party hatred, even if it had been possible at that moment to suppress the fire. "The great God of heaven,"² they said, "had caused the undertaking of his holy instru-

¹ K. A. Menzel, iii. 272. W. Menzel, iii. 214.

² The documents are given at length in the Continuation of Em. v. Meteren, ii. 672 seq. K. A. Menzel, iii. 272.

ment Mr. Dr. Martin Luther to prosper. Through his unspeakable mercy he has driven away the papal darkness and caused the sun of righteousness once more to beam upon the world. The old idolatries, blasphemies, errors, and horrors of the benighted popedom have been exterminated in many kingdoms and countries. Innumerable sheep of the Lord Christ have been fed on the wholesome pasture of the Divine Word in spite of those monstrous, tearing, ravenous wolves, the pope and his followers. The enemy of God and man, the ancient serpent, may hiss and rage. Yes, the Roman Antichrist, in his frantic blusterings, may bite off his own tongue, may fulminate all kinds of evils, bans, excommunications, wars, desolations, and burnings, as long and as much as he likes. But if we take refuge with the Lord God, what can this inane, worn-out man and water-bubble do to us?" With more in the same taste.

The pope's bull for the Catholic jubilee was far more decorous and lofty in tone, for it bewailed the general sin in Christendom, and called on all believers to flee from the wrath about to descend upon the earth, in terms that were almost prophetic. He ordered all to pray that the Lord might lift up his church, protect it from the wiles of the enemy, extirpate heresies, grant peace and true unity among Christian princes, and mercifully avert disasters already coming near.¹

But if the language of Paul V. was measured and decent, the swarm of Jesuit pamphleteers that forthwith began to buzz and to sting all over Christendom were sufficiently venomous. Scioppius, in his "Alarm Trumpet to the Holy War," and a hundred others declared that all heresies and heretics were now to be

¹ K. A. Menzel, iii. 273.

extirpated, the one true church to be united and reëstablished, and that the only road to such a consummation was a path of blood.¹

The Lutheran preachers, on the other hand, obedient to the summons from Dresden, vied with each other in every town and village in heaping denunciations, foul names, and odious imputations on the Catholics; while the Calvinists, not to be behindhand with their fellow-Reformers, celebrated the jubilee, especially at Heidelberg, by excluding papists from hope of salvation, and bewailing the fate of all churches sighing under the yoke of Rome.

And not only were the papists and the Reformers exchanging these blasts and counterblasts of hatred, not less deadly in their effects than the artillery of many armies, but as if to make a thorough exhibition of human fatuity when drunk with religious passion, the Lutherans were making fierce paper and pulpit war upon the Calvinists. Especially Hoë, court preacher of John George, ceaselessly hurled savage libels against them. In the name of the theological faculty of Wittenberg, he addressed a "true-hearted warning to all Lutheran Christians in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and other provinces, to beware of the erroneous Calvinistic religion." He wrote a letter to Count Schlick, foremost leader in the Bohemian movement, asking whether "the unquiet Calvinist spirit, should it gain ascendancy, would be any more endurable than the papists. Oh, what woe, what infinite woe," he cried, "for those noble countries if they should all be thrust into the jaws of Calvinism!"²

Did not Preacher Hoë's master aspire to the crown

¹ W. Menzel, iii. 214, 215.

² Ibid., 219.

of Bohemia himself? Was he not furious at the start which Heidelberg had got of him in the race for that golden prize? Was he not mad with jealousy of the Palatine, of the Palatine's religion, and of the Palatine's claim to "hegemony" in Germany?

Thus embittered and bloodthirsty toward each other were the two great sections of the Reformed religion on the first centennial jubilee of the Reformation. Such was the divided front which the anti-Catholic party presented at the outbreak of the war with Catholicism.

Ferdinand, on the other hand, was at the head of a comparatively united party. He could hardly hope for more than benevolent neutrality from the French government, which, in spite of the Spanish marriages, dared not wholly desert the Netherlands and throw itself into the hands of Spain; but Spanish diplomacy had enslaved the British king and converted what should have been an active and most powerful enemy into an efficient if concealed ally. The Spanish and archducal armies were enveloping the Dutch Republic, from whence the most powerful support could be expected for the Protestant cause. Had it not been for the steadiness of Barneveldt, Spain would have been at that moment established in full panoply over the whole surface of those inestimable positions, the disputed duchies. Venice was lukewarm, if not frigid; and Savoy, although deeply pledged by passion and interest to the downfall of the house of Austria, was too dangerously situated herself, too distant, too poor, and too Catholic to be very formidable.

Ferdinand was safe from the Turkish side. A twenty years' peace, renewable by agreement, between the Holy Empire and the Sultan had been negotiated

by those two sons of bakers, Cardinal Khlesl and the Vizir Etmekdschifade. It was destined to endure through all the horrors of the great war, a stronger protection to Vienna than all the fortifications which the engineering art could invent. He was safe, too, from Poland, King Sigismund being not only a devoted Catholic, but doubly his brother-in-law.¹

Spain, therefore, the Spanish Netherlands, the pope, and the German League headed by Maximilian of Bavaria, the ablest prince on the continent of Europe, presented a square, magnificent phalanx on which Ferdinand might rely. The States-General, on the other hand, were a most dangerous foe. With a centennial hatred of Spain, splendidly disciplined armies and foremost navy of the world; with an admirable financial system and vast commercial resources; with a great stadholder, first captain of the age, thirsting for war, and allied in blood as well as religion to the standard-bearer of the Bohemian revolt; with councils directed by the wisest and most experienced of living statesmen, and with the very life-blood of her being derived from the fountain of civil and religious liberty, the great Republic of the United Netherlands, her truce with the hereditary foe just expiring, was, if indeed united, strong enough at the head of the Protestant forces of Europe to dictate to a world in arms.

Alas! was it united?

As regarded internal affairs of most pressing interest, the electoral vote at the next election at Frankfort had been calculated as being likely to yield a majority of one for the opposition candidate, should the Savoyard or any other opposition candidate be found. But

¹ May 12, 1615. K. A. Mensel, iii. 269.

the calculation was a close one and might easily be fallacious. Supposing the Palatine elected King of Bohemia by the rebellious estates, as was probable, he could of course give the vote of that electorate and his own against Ferdinand, and the vote of Brandenburg at that time seemed safe. But Ferdinand by his visit to Dresden had secured the vote of Saxony, while, of the three ecclesiastical electors, Cologne and Mayence were sure for him. Thus it would be three and three, and the seventh and decisive vote would be that of the Elector-Bishop of Treves. The sanguine Frederick thought that with French influence and a round sum of money this ecclesiastic might be got to vote for the opposition candidate. The ingenious combination was not destined to be successful, and as there has been no intention in the present volume¹ to do more than slightly indicate the most prominent movements and mainsprings of the great struggle so far as Germany is concerned, without entering into detail, it may be as well to remind the reader that it proved wonderfully wrong. Matthias died on the 20th March, 1619, the election of the new emperor took place at Frankfort on the 28th of the following August, and not only did Saxony and all three ecclesiastical electors vote for Ferdinand, but Brandenburg likewise, as well as the

¹ I would express my deep obligations in this chapter to many of the great modern German historians: F. von Hurter, *Geschichte Kaiser Ferdinands II.*; Count Mailáth, *Geschichte des österr. Kaiserstaats*; Wolfgang Menzel, *Geschichte der Deutschen*; Karl Adolf Menzel, *Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen seit der Reformation*, and others; and most especially to the Bohemian historian Anton Gindely, *Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Kriegs*, and Rudolf II. und seine Zeit, whose learned and powerful works leave little to be desired.

Elector Palatine himself, while Ferdinand, personally present in the assembly as Elector of Bohemia, might, according to the Golden Bull, have given the seventh vote for himself had he chosen to do so. Thus the election was unanimous.

Strange to say, as the electors proceeded through the crowd from the hall of election to accompany the new emperor to the church where he was to receive the popular acclaim, the news reached them from Prague that the Elector Palatine had been elected King of Bohemia.

Thus Frederick, by voting for Ferdinand, had made himself voluntarily a rebel should he accept the crown now offered him. Had the news arrived sooner, a different result and even a different history might have been possible.

CHAPTER XIV

Barneveldt connected with the East India Company, but opposed to the West India Company—Carleton comes from Venice inimical to Barneveldt—Maurice openly the chieftain of the Contra-Remonstrants—Tumults about the churches—"Orange or Spain" the cry of Prince Maurice and his party—They take possession of the Cloister Church—The "Sharp Resolve"—Carleton's orations before the States-General.

KING JAMES never forgave Barneveldt for drawing from him those famous letters to the states in which he was made to approve the Five Points and to admit the possibility of salvation under them. These epistles had brought much ridicule upon James, who was not amused by finding his theological discussions a laughing-stock. He was still more incensed by the biting criticisms made upon the cheap surrender of the cautionary towns, and he hated more than ever the statesman who, as he believed, had twice outwitted him.

On the other hand, Maurice, inspired by his brother-in-law the Duke of Bouillon and by the infuriated Francis Aertsens, abhorred Barneveldt's French policy, which was freely denounced by the French Calvinists and by the whole orthodox church. In Holland he was still warmly sustained, except in the Contra-Remonstrant Amsterdam and a few other cities of less importance. But there were perhaps deeper reasons for the advocate's unpopularity in the great commer-

cial metropolis than theological pretexts. Barneveldt's name and interests were identified with the great East India Company, which was now powerful and prosperous beyond anything ever dreamed of before in the annals of commerce. That trading company had already founded an empire in the East. Fifty ships of war, fortresses guarded by four thousand pieces of artillery and ten thousand soldiers and sailors, obeyed the orders of a dozen private gentlemen at home seated in a back parlor around a green table. The profits of each trading voyage were enormous, and the shareholders were growing rich beyond their wildest imaginings.¹ To no individual so much as to Holland's advocate was this unexampled success to be ascribed. The vast prosperity of the East India Company had inspired others with the ambition to found a similar enterprise in the West. But to the West India Company then projected and especially favored in Amsterdam, Barneveldt was firmly opposed. He considered it as bound up with the spirit of military adventure and conquest, and as likely to bring on prematurely and unwisely a renewed conflict with Spain. The same reasons which had caused him to urge the truce now influenced his position in regard to the West India Company.

Thus the clouds were gathering every day more darkly over the head of the advocate. The powerful mercantile interest in the great seat of traffic in the Republic, the personal animosity of the stadholder, the execrations of the orthodox party in France, England, and all the Netherlands, the anger of the French princes and all those of the old Huguenot party

¹ Wagenaer, x. 97 seq.

who had been foolish enough to act with the princes in their purely selfish schemes against the government, and the overflowing hatred of King James, whose darling schemes of Spanish marriages and a Spanish alliance had been foiled by the advocate's masterly policy in France and in the duchies, and whose resentment at having been so completely worsted and disarmed in the predestination matter and in the redemption of the great mortgage had deepened into as terrible wrath as outraged bigotry and vanity could engender—all these elements made up a stormy atmosphere in which the strongest heart might have quailed. But Barneveldt did not quail. Doubtless he loved power, and the more danger he found on every side the less inclined he was to succumb. But he honestly believed that the safety and prosperity of the country he had so long and faithfully served were identified with the policy which he was pursuing. Arrogant, overbearing, self-concentrated, accustomed to lead senates and to guide the councils and share the secrets of kings, familiar with and almost an actor in every event in the political history not only of his own country but of every important state in Christendom during nearly two generations of mankind, of unmatched industry, full of years and experience, yet feeling within him the youthful strength of a thousand intellects compared to most of those by which he was calumniated, confronted, and harassed, he accepted the great fight which was forced upon him. Irascible, courageous, austere, contemptuous, he looked around and saw the Republic whose cradle he had rocked grown to be one of the most powerful and prosperous among the states of the world, and could with difficulty imagine that in this supreme

hour of her strength and her felicity she was ready to turn and rend the man whom she was bound by every tie of duty to cherish and to revere.

Sir Dudley Carleton, the new English ambassador to the states, had arrived during the past year red-hot from Venice. There he had perhaps not learned especially to love the new republic which had arisen among the Northern lagunes, and whose admission among the nations had been at last accorded by the proud Queen of the Adriatic, notwithstanding the objections and the intrigues both of French and English representatives. He had come charged to the brim with the political spite of James against the advocate, and provided, too, with more than seven vials of theological wrath. Such was the king's revenge for Barneveldt's recent successes. The supporters in the Netherlands of the civil authority over the church were, moreover, to be instructed by the political head of the English church that such supremacy, although highly proper for a king, was "thoroughly unsuitable for a many-headed republic."¹ So much for church government. As for doctrine, Arminianism and Vorstianism were to be blasted with one thunder-stroke from the British throne.

"In Holland," said James to his envoy, "there have been violent and sharp contestations among the towns in the cause of religion. . . . If they shall be unhappily revived during your time, you shall not forget that you are the minister of that master whom God hath made the sole protector of his religion."²

There was to be no misunderstanding in future as to

¹ Carleton's Letters.

² Instructions for Carleton, in Letters.

the dogmas which the royal pope of Great Britain meant to prescribe to his Netherland subjects. Three years before,¹ at the dictation of the advocate, he had informed the states that he was convinced of their ability to settle the deplorable dissensions as to religion according to their wisdom and the power which belonged to them over churches and church servants. He had informed them of his having learned by experience that such questions could hardly be decided by the wranglings of theological professors, and that it was better to settle them by public authority and to forbid their being brought into the pulpit or among common people. He had recommended mutual toleration of religious difference until otherwise ordained by the public civil authority, and had declared that neither of the two opinions in regard to predestination was in his opinion far from the truth or inconsistent with Christian faith or the salvation of souls.

It was no wonder that these utterances were quite after the advocate's heart, as James had faithfully copied them from the advocate's draft.

But, now in the exercise of his infallibility the king issued other decrees. His minister was instructed to support the extreme views of the orthodox both as to government and dogma, and to urge the national synod, as it were, at push of pike. "Besides the assistance," said he to Carleton, "which we would have you give to the true professors of the gospel in your discourse and conferences, you may let fall how hateful the maintenance of these erroneous opinions is to the majesty of God, how displeasing unto us their dearest friends,

¹ King James to States-General, March 16, 1613, Hague Archives MS.

and how disgraceful to the honor and government of that state.”¹

And faithfully did the ambassador act up to his instructions. Most sympathetically did he embody the hatred of the king. An able, experienced, highly accomplished diplomatist and scholar, ready with tongue and pen, caustic, censorious, prejudiced, and partial, he was soon foremost among the foes of the advocate in the little court of The Hague, and prepared at any moment to flourish the political and theological goad when his master gave the word.

Nothing in diplomatic history is more eccentric than the long sermons upon abstruse points of divinity and ecclesiastical history which the English ambassador delivered from time to time before the States-General in accordance with elaborate instructions drawn up by his sovereign with his own hand. Rarely has a king been more tedious, and he bestowed all his tediousness upon my lords the States-General. Nothing could be more dismal than these discourses, except perhaps the contemporaneous and interminable orations of Grotius to the states of Holland, to the magistrates of Amsterdam, to the states of Utrecht; yet Carleton was a man of the world, a good debater, a ready writer, while Hugo Grotius was one of the great lights of that age and which shone for all time.

Among the diplomatic controversies of history, rarely refreshing at best, few have been more droughty than those once famous disquisitions, and they shall be left to shrivel into the nothingness of the past, so far as is consistent with the absolute necessities of this narrative.

¹ Instructions, *ubi sup.*, 6.

The contest to which the advocate was called had become mainly a personal and a political one, although the weapons with which it was fought were taken from ecclesiastical arsenals. It was now an unequal contest.

For the great captain of the country and of his time, the son of William the Silent, the martial stadholder, in the fullness of his fame and vigor of his years, had now openly taken his place as the chieftain of the Contra-Remonstrants. The conflict between the civil and the military element for supremacy in a free commonwealth has never been more vividly typified than in this death-grapple between Maurice and Barneveldt.

The aged but still vigorous statesman, ripe with half a century of political lore, and the high-born, brilliant, and scientific soldier, with the laurels of Turnhout and Nieuport and of a hundred famous sieges upon his helmet, reformer of military science, and no mean proficient in the art of politics and government, were the representatives and leaders of the two great parties into which the commonwealth had now unhappily divided itself. But all history shows that the brilliant soldier of a republic is apt to have the advantage, in a struggle for popular affection and popular applause, over the statesman, however consummate. The general imagination is more excited by the triumphs of the field than by those of the tribune, and the man who has passed many years of life in commanding multitudes with necessarily despotic sway is often supposed to have gained in the process the attributes likely to render him most valuable as chief citizen of a free commonwealth. Yet national enthusiasm is so universally excited by splendid military service

as to forbid a doubt that the sentiment is rooted deeply in our nature, while both in antiquity and in modern times there are noble although rare examples of the successful soldier converting himself into a valuable and exemplary magistrate.

In the rivalry of Maurice and Barneveldt, however, for the national affection the chances were singularly against the advocate. The great battles and sieges of the prince had been on a world's theater, had enchained the attention of Christendom, and on their issue had frequently depended or seemed to depend, the very existence of the nation. The labors of the statesman, on the contrary, had been comparatively secret. His noble orations and arguments had been spoken with closed doors to assemblies of colleagues, rather envoys than senators, were never printed or even reported, and could be judged of only by their effects; while his vast labors in directing both the internal administration and especially the foreign affairs of the commonwealth had been by their very nature as secret as they were perpetual and enormous.

Moreover, there was little of what we now understand as the democratic sentiment in the Netherlands. There was deep and sturdy attachment to ancient traditions, privileges, special constitutions, extorted from a power acknowledged to be superior to the people. When, partly to save those chartered rights and partly to overthrow the horrible ecclesiastical tyranny of the sixteenth century, the people had accomplished a successful revolt, they never dreamed of popular sovereignty, but allowed the municipal corporations, by which their local affairs had been for centuries transacted, to unite in offering to foreign princes, one after

another, the crown which they had torn from the head of the Spanish king. When none was found to accept the dangerous honor, they had acquiesced in the practical sovereignty of the states; but whether the States-General or the States-Provincial were the supreme authority had certainly not been definitely and categorically settled. So long as the states of Holland, led by the advocate, had controlled in great matters the political action of the States-General, while the stadholder stood without a rival at the head of their military affairs, and so long as there were no fierce disputes as to government and dogma within the bosom of the Reformed Church, the questions which were now inflaming the whole population had been allowed to slumber.

The termination of the war and the rise of Arminianism were almost contemporaneous. The stadholder, who so unwillingly had seen the occupation in which he had won so much glory taken from him by the truce, might perhaps find less congenial but sufficiently engrossing business as champion of the church and of the Union.

The new church—not freedom of worship for different denominations of Christians, but supremacy of the Church of Heidelberg and Geneva—seemed likely to be the result of the overthrow of the ancient church. It is the essence of the Catholic Church to claim supremacy over and immunity from the civil authority, and to this claim for the Reformed Church, by which that of Rome had been supplanted, Barneveldt was strenuously opposed.

The stadholder was backed, therefore, by the church in its purity, by the majority of the humbler classes,—

who found in membership of the oligarchy of heaven a substitute for those democratic aspirations on earth which were effectually suppressed between the two mill-stones of burgher aristocracy and military discipline,—and by the States-General, a majority of which were Contra-Remonstrant in their faith.

If the sword is usually an overmatch for the long robe in political struggles, the cassock has often proved superior to both combined. But in the case now occupying our attention the cassock was in alliance with the sword. Clearly the contest was becoming a desperate one for the statesman.

And while the controversy between the chiefs waxed hotter and hotter, the tumults around the churches on Sundays in every town and village grew more and more furious, ending generally in open fights with knives, bludgeons, and brickbats, preachers and magistrates being often too glad to escape with a whole skin. One can hardly be ingenuous enough to consider all this dirking, battering, and fisticuffing as the legitimate and healthy outcome of a difference as to the knotty point whether all men might or might not be saved by repentance and faith in Christ.

The Greens and Blues of the Byzantine circus had not been more typical of fierce party warfare in the Lower Empire than the greens and blues of predestination in the rising commonwealth, according to the real or imagined epigram of Prince Maurice.

“Your divisions in religion,” wrote Secretary Lake to Carleton, “have, I doubt not, a deeper root than is discerned by every one, and I doubt not that the Prince Maurice’s carriage doth make a jealousy of affecting a party under the pretense of supporting one side, and

that the states fear his ends and aims, knowing his power with the men of war, and that, howsoever all be shadowed under the name of religion, there is on either part a civil end, of the one seeking a step of higher authority, of the other a preservation of liberty.”¹

And in addition to other advantages the Contra-Remonstrants had now got a good cry—an inestimable privilege in party contests.

“There are two factions in the land,” said Maurice, “that of Orange and that of Spain, and the two chiefs of the Spanish faction are those political and priestly Arminians, Uytenbogart and Olden-Barneveldt.”²

Orange and Spain! the one name associated with all that was most venerated and beloved throughout the country, for William the Silent since his death was almost a god; the other ineradicably entwined at that moment with everything execrated throughout the land. The Prince of Orange’s claim to be head of the Orange faction could hardly be disputed, but it was a master-stroke of political malice to fix the stigma of Spanish partizanship on the advocate. If the venerable patriot who had been fighting Spain, sometimes on the battle-field and always in the council, ever since he came to man’s estate, could be imagined even in a dream capable of being bought with Spanish gold to betray his country, who in the ranks of the Remonstrant party could be safe from such accusations? Each party accused the other of designs for altering or subverting the government. Maurice was suspected of what were called Leicestrian projects, “*Leycestrana consilia*,”—for the earl’s plots to gain possession of Leyden and Utrecht had never been forgotten,—while

¹ Carleton’s Letters, 170.

² Van der Kemp, iv. 40.

the prince and those who acted with him asserted distinctly that it was the purpose of Barneveldt to pave the way for restoring the Spanish sovereignty and the popish religion so soon as the truce had reached its end.¹

Spain and Orange! Nothing for a faction fight could be neater. Moreover, the two words rhyme in Netherlandish, which is the case in no other language: "Spanje—Oranje." The sword was drawn and the banner unfurled.

The "Mud Beggars" of The Hague, tired of tramping to Ryswyk of a Sunday to listen to Henry Rosaeus, determined on a private conventicle in the capital. The first barn selected was sealed up by the authorities, but Enoch Much, bookkeeper of Prince Maurice, then lent them his house. The prince declared that sooner than they should want a place of assembling he would give them his own. But he meant that they should have a public church to themselves, and that very soon. King James thoroughly approved of all these proceedings. At that very instant such of his own subjects as had seceded from the Established Church to hold conventicles in barns and breweries and back-shops in London were hunted by him with bishops' pursuivants and other beagles like vilest criminals, thrown into prison to rot, or suffered to escape from their fatherland into the transatlantic wilderness, there to battle with wild beasts and savages, and to die without knowing themselves the fathers of a more powerful United States than the Dutch Republic, where they were fain to seek in passing a temporary shelter. He none the less instructed his envoy at The Hague to

¹ Carleton's Letters, 89.

preach the selfsame doctrines for which the New England Puritans were persecuted, and importunately and dictatorially to plead the cause of those Hollanders who, like Bradford and Robinson, Winthrop and Cotton, maintained the independence of the church over the state.

Logic is rarely the quality on which kings pride themselves, and Puritanism in the Netherlands, although under temporary disadvantage at The Hague, was evidently the party destined to triumph throughout the country. James could safely sympathize, therefore, in Holland with what he most loathed in England, and could at the same time feed fat the grudge he owed the advocate. The calculations of Barneveldt as to the respective political forces of the commonwealth seem to have been to a certain extent defective. He allowed probably too much weight to the Catholic party as a motive power at that moment, and he was anxious both from that consideration and from his honest natural instinct for general toleration, his own broad and unbigoted views in religious matters, not to force that party into a rebellious attitude dangerous to the state. We have seen how nearly a mutiny in the important city of Utrecht, set on foot by certain Romanist conspirators in the years immediately succeeding the truce, had subverted the government, had excited much anxiety among the firmest allies of the Republic, and had been suppressed only by the decision of the advocate and a show of military force.

He had informed Carleton not long after his arrival that in the United Provinces, and in Holland in particular, were many sects and religions, of which, according to his expression, "the healthiest and the

richest part were the papists, while the Protestants did not make up one-third part of the inhabitants.”¹

Certainly, if these statistics were correct or nearly correct, there could be nothing more stupid from a purely political point of view than to exasperate so influential a portion of the community to madness and rebellion by refusing them all rights of public worship. Yet because the advocate had uniformly recommended indulgence, he had incurred more odium at home than from any other cause. Of course he was a papist in disguise, ready to sell his country to Spain, because he was willing that more than half the population of the country should be allowed to worship God according to their conscience. Surely it would be wrong to judge the condition of things at that epoch by the lights of to-day, and perhaps in the Netherlands there had before been no conspicuous personage, save William the Silent alone, who had risen to the height of toleration on which the advocate essayed to stand. Other leading politicians considered that the national liberties could be preserved only by retaining the Catholics in complete subjection.

At any rate, the advocate was profoundly convinced of the necessity of maintaining harmony and mutual toleration among the Protestants themselves, who, as he said, made up but one third of the whole people. In conversing with the English ambassador he divided them into “Puritans and double Puritans,” as they would be called, he said, in England. If these should be at variance with each other, he argued, the papists would be the strongest of all. “To prevent this inconvenience,” he said, “the states were endeavoring to set-

¹ Carleton's Letters, 99.

tle some certain form of government in the church, which being composed of divers persecuted churches such as in the beginning of the wars had their refuge here, that which during the wars could not be so well done they now thought seasonable for a time of truce, and therefore would show their authority in preventing the schism of the church which would follow the separation of those they call Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants.”¹

There being no word so offensive to Carleton’s sovereign as the word “Puritan,” the ambassador did his best to persuade the advocate that a Puritan in Holland was a very different thing from a Puritan in England. In England he was a noxious vermin, to be hunted with dogs. In the Netherlands he was the governing power. But his arguments were vaporous enough and made little impression on Barneveldt. “He would noways yield,” said Sir Dudley.

Meantime the Contra-Remonstrants of The Hague, not finding sufficient accommodation in Enoch Much’s house, clamored loudly for the use of a church. It was answered by the city magistrates that two of their persuasion, La Motte and La Faille, preached regularly in the Great Church, and that Rosaeus had been silenced only because he refused to hold communion with Uytenbogart. Maurice insisted that a separate church should be assigned them. “But this is open schism,” said Uytenbogart.

Early in the year there was a meeting of the Holland delegation to the States-General, of the state council, and of the magistracy of The Hague, of deputies from the tribunals, and of all the nobles resident in

¹ Carleton, *ubi sup.*

the capital. They sent for Maurice and asked his opinion as to the alarming situation of affairs. He called for the register-books of the states of Holland, and turning back to the pages on which was recorded his accession to the stadholderate soon after his father's murder, ordered the oath then exchanged between himself and the states to be read aloud.

That oath bound them mutually to support the Reformed religion till the last drop of blood in their veins.

"That oath I mean to keep," said the stadholder, "so long as I live."¹

No one disputed the obligation of all parties to maintain the Reformed religion. But the question was whether the Five Points were inconsistent with the Reformed religion. The contrary was clamorously maintained by most of those present. In the year 1586 this difference in dogma had not arisen, and as the large majority of the people at The Hague, including nearly all those of rank and substance, were of the Remonstrant persuasion, they naturally found it not agreeable to be sent out of the church by a small minority. But Maurice chose to settle the question very summarily. His father had been raised to power by the strict Calvinists, and he meant to stand by those who had always sustained William the Silent. "For this religion my father lost his life, and this religion will I defend," said he.²

"You hold, then," said Barneveldt, "that the Almighty has created one child for damnation and another for salvation, and you wish this doctrine to be publicly preached."

¹ Wagenaer, x. Van der Kemp, iv. 23. Carleton.

² Carleton, 87.

"Did you ever hear any one preach that?" replied the prince.

"If they don't preach it, it is their inmost conviction," said the other. And he proceeded to prove his position by copious citations.

"And suppose our ministers do preach this doctrine, is there anything strange in it, any reason why they should not do so?"

The advocate expressed his amazement and horror at the idea.

"But does not God know from all eternity who is to be saved and who to be damned, and does he create men for any other end than that to which he from eternity knows they will come?"

And so they inclosed themselves in the eternal circle out of which it was not probable that either the soldier or the statesman would soon find an issue.

"I am no theologian," said Barneveldt, at last, breaking off the discussion.

"Neither am I," said the stadholder. "So let the parsons come together. Let the synod assemble and decide the question. Thus we shall get out of all this."¹

Next day a deputation of the secessionists waited by appointment on Prince Maurice. They found him in the ancient medieval hall of the sovereign counts of Holland, and seated on their old chair of state.² He recommended them to use caution and moderation for the present, and to go next Sunday once more to Ryswyk. Afterward he pledged himself that they should have a church at The Hague, and, if necessary, the Great Church itself.³

¹ Van der Kemp, iv. 24.

² Van Rees and Brill, 700 seq.

³ Carleton, 87, 88.

But the Great Church, although a very considerable Catholic cathedral before the Reformation, was not big enough now to hold both Henry Rosaeus and John Uytenbogart. Those two eloquent, learned, and most pugnacious divines were the respective champions in the pulpit of the opposing parties, as were the advocate and the stadholder in the council. And there was as bitter personal rivalry between the two as between the soldier and statesman.

“The factions begin to divide themselves,” said Carleton, “betwixt his Excellency and M. Barneveldt as heads who join to this present difference their ancient quarrels. And the schism rests actually between Uytenbogart and Rosaeus, whose private emulation and envy (both being much applauded and followed) doth no good toward the public pacification.”¹ Uytenbogart repeatedly offered, however, to resign his functions and to leave The Hague. “He was always ready to play the Jonah,” he said.

A temporary arrangement was made soon afterward by which Rosaeus and his congregation should have the use of what was called the Gasthuis Kerk, then appropriated to the English embassy.

Carleton of course gave his consent most willingly. The prince declared that the states of Holland and the city magistracy had personally affronted him by the obstacles they had interposed to the public worship of the Contra-Remonstrants. With their cause he had now thoroughly identified himself.

The hostility between the representatives of the civil and military authority waxed fiercer every hour. The tumults were more terrible than ever. Plainly there

¹ Carleton, 89.

was no room in the commonwealth for the advocate and the stadholder. Some impartial persons believed that there would be no peace until both were got rid of. "There are many words among this free-spoken people," said Carleton, "that to end these differences they must follow the example of France in Marshal d'Ancre's case, and take off the heads of both chiefs."¹

But these decided persons were in a small minority. Meantime the states of Holland met in full assembly, sixty delegates being present.

It was proposed to invite his Excellency to take part in the deliberations. A committee which had waited upon him the day before had reported him as in favor of moderate rather than harsh measures in the church affair, while maintaining his plighted word to the seceders.²

Barneveldt stoutly opposed the motion.

"What need had the sovereign states of Holland of advice from a stadholder, from their servant, their functionary?" he cried.

But the majority for once thought otherwise. The prince was invited to come. The deliberations were moderate but inconclusive. He appeared again at an adjourned meeting, when the counsels were not so harmonious.

Barneveldt, Grotius, and other eloquent speakers endeavored to point out that the refusal of the seceders to hold communion with the Remonstrant preachers and their insistence on a separation were fast driving the state to perdition. They warmly recommended mutual toleration and harmony. Grotius exhausted learning and rhetoric to prove that the Five Points

¹ Carleton, 89.

² Van der Kemp, iv. 28, 29.

were not inconsistent with salvation nor with the constitution of the United Provinces.

The stadholder grew impatient at last and clapped his hand on his rapier.

"No need here," he said, "of flowery orations and learned arguments. With this good sword I will defend the religion which my father planted in these provinces, and I should like to see the man who is going to prevent me!"¹

The words had an heroic ring in the ears of such as are ever ready to applaud brute force, especially when wielded by a prince. The *argumentum ad ensem*, however, was the last plea that William the Silent would have been likely to employ on such an occasion, nor would it have been easy to prove that the Reformed religion had been "planted" by one who had drawn the sword against the foreign tyrant and had made vast sacrifices for his country's independence years before abjuring communion with the Roman Catholic Church.²

When swords are handled by the executive in presence of civil assemblies there is usually but one issue to be expected.

Moreover, three whales had recently been stranded at Scheveningen, one of them more than sixty feet long, and men wagged their beards gravely as they spoke of the event, deeming it a certain presage of civil commotions.³ It was remembered that at the outbreak of the great war two whales had been washed

¹ Van der Kemp, iv. 21.

² William of Orange first attended communion at a Calvinist meeting on October 23, 1573. (Dutch Republic, iii. 115, note 1. Van Wyn op Wagenaer, vi 73, and other authorities there cited.)

³ Carleton, 89. Wagenaer, x. 158. Baudart., ix. 97, 102.

ashore in the Schelde. Although some free-thinking people were inclined to ascribe the phenomenon to a prevalence of strong westerly gales, while others found proof in it of a superabundance of those creatures in the polar seas, which should rather give encouragement to the Dutch and Zealand fisheries, it is probable that quite as dark forebodings of coming disaster were caused by this accident as by the trumpet-like defiance which the stadholder had just delivered to the states of Holland.

Meantime the seceding congregation of The Hague had become wearied of the English or Gasthuis Church, and another and larger one had been promised them. This was an ancient convent on one of the principal streets of the town, now used as a cannon-foundry.¹ The prince personally superintended the preparations for getting ready this place of worship, which was thenceforth called the Cloister Church. But delays were, as the Contra-Remonstrants believed, purposely interposed, so that it was nearly midsummer before there were any signs of the church being fit for use. They hastened accordingly to carry it, as it were, by assault. Not wishing peaceably to accept as a boon from the civil authority what they claimed as an indefeasible right, they suddenly took possession one Sunday night of the Cloister Church.

It was in a state of utter confusion—part monastery, part foundry, part conventicle. There were few seats, no altar, no communion-table, hardly any sacramental furniture; but a pulpit was extemporized. Rosaeus preached in triumph to an enthusiastic congregation,

¹ Arend, *Vad. Gesch.*, continued by Van Rees and Brill, iii. 707-716.

and three children were baptized with the significant names of William, Maurice, and Henry.

On the following Monday there was a striking scene on the Voorhout. This most beautiful street of a beautiful city was a broad avenue, shaded by a quadruple row of lime-trees, reaching out into the thick forest of secular oaks and beeches—swarming with fallow-deer and alive with the notes of singing birds—by which The Hague, almost from time immemorial, has been embowered. The ancient cloister, house and church now reconverted to religious uses, was a plain, rather insipid structure of red brick picked out with white stone, presenting three symmetrical gables to the street, with a slender belfry and spire rising in the rear.

Nearly adjoining it on the northwestern side was the elegant and commodious mansion of Barneveldt, purchased by him from the representatives of the Aremberg family, surrounded by shrubberies and flower-gardens—not a palace, but a dignified and becoming abode for the first citizen of a powerful republic.

On that midsummer's morning it might well seem that, in rescuing the old cloister from the military purposes to which it had for years been devoted, men had given an even more belligerent aspect to the scene than if it had been left as a foundry. The miscellaneous pieces of artillery and other firearms lying about, with piles of cannon-ball which there had not been time to remove, were hardly less belligerent and threatening of aspect than the stern faces of the crowd occupied in thoroughly preparing the house for its solemn destination. It was determined that there should be accommodation on the next Sunday for all who came to the service. An army of carpenters, joiners, glaziers, and

other workmen, assisted by a mob of citizens of all ranks and ages, men and women, gentle and simple, were busily engaged in bringing planks and benches, working with plane, adz, hammer and saw, trowel and shovel, to complete the work.

On the next Sunday the prince¹ attended public worship for the last time at the Great Church under the ministration of Uytenbogart. He was infuriated with the sermon, in which the bold Remonstrant bitterly inveighed against the proposition for a national synod. To oppose that measure publicly in the very face of the stadholder, who now considered himself as the synod personified, seemed to him flat blasphemy. Coming out of the church with his stepmother, the widowed Louisa de Coligny, Princess of Orange, he denounced the man in unmeasured terms. "He is the enemy of God," said Maurice. At least from that time forth, and indeed for a year before, Maurice was the enemy of the preacher.

On the following Sunday, July 23, Maurice went in solemn state to the divine service at the Cloister Church, now thoroughly organized. He was accompanied by his cousin, the famous Count Louis William of Nassau, stadholder of Friesland, who had never concealed his warm sympathy with the Contra-Remonstrants, and by all the chief officers of his household and members of his staff. It was an imposing demonstration and meant for one. As the martial stadholder, at the head of his brilliant cavalcade, rode forth across the drawbridge from the inner court of the old moated palace, where the ancient sovereign Dirks and Florences of Holland had so long ruled their stout little

¹ Van Rees and Brill, *ubi sup.* Van der Kemp, iv. 45.

principality, along the shady and stately Kneuterdyk, and so through the Voorhout, an immense crowd thronged around his path and accompanied him to the church. It was as if the great soldier were marching to siege or battle-field where fresher glories than those of Sluis or Gertruydenberg were awaiting him.

The train passed by Barneveldt's house and entered the cloister. More than four thousand persons were present at the service or crowded around the doors, vainly attempting to gain admission into the overflowing aisles; while the Great Church was left comparatively empty, a few hundred only worshipping there. The Cloister Church was thenceforth called the Prince's Church, and a great revolution was beginning even in The Hague.

The advocate was wroth as he saw the procession graced by the two stadholders and their military attendants. He knew that he was now to bow his head to the church thus championed by the chief personage and captain-general of the state, to renounce his dreams of religious toleration, to sink from his post of supreme civic ruler, or to accept an unequal struggle in which he might utterly succumb. But his iron nature would break sooner than bend. In the first transports of his indignation he is said to have vowed vengeance against the immediate instruments by which the Cloister Church had, as he conceived, been surreptitiously and feloniously seized. He meant to strike a blow which should startle the whole population of The Hague, send a thrill of horror through the country, and teach men to beware how they trifled with the sovereign states of Holland, whose authority had so long been undisputed, and with him, their chief functionary.

He resolved—so ran the tale of the preacher Trigland, who told it to Prince Maurice and has preserved it in his chronicle¹—to cause to be seized at midnight from their beds four men whom he considered the ring-leaders in this mutiny, to have them taken to the place of execution on the square in the midst of the city, to have their heads cut off at once by warrant from the chief tribunal without any previous warning, and then to summon all the citizens at dawn of day, by ringing of bells and firing of cannon, to gaze on the ghastly spectacle, and teach them to what fate this pestilential schism and revolt against authority had brought its humble tools. The victims were to be Enoch Much, the prince's bookkeeper, and three others, an attorney, an engraver, and an apothecary, all of course of the Contra-Remonstrant persuasion. It was necessary, said the advocate, to make once for all an example and show that there was a government in the land.

He had reckoned on a ready adhesion to this measure and a sentence from the tribunal through the influence of his son-in-law, the Seignior van Veenhuizen, who was president of the chief court. His attempt was foiled, however, by the stern opposition of two Zealand members of the court, who managed to bring up from a bed of sickness, where he had long been lying, a Holland councilor whom they knew to be likewise opposed to the fierce measure, and thus defeated it by a majority of one.

Such is the story as told by contemporaries and repeated from that day to this.² It is hardly necessary

¹ Van der Kemp, iv. 43–46. Trigland, Hist., 908.

² It is very singular that Brandt (ii. 471) narrates the story on authority of Trigland, but without vouching for or denying it.

to say that Barneveldt calmly denied having conceived or even heard of the scheme. That men could go about looking each other in the face and rehearsing such gibberish would seem sufficiently dispiriting did we not know to what depths of credulity men in all ages can sink when possessed by the demon of party malice.

If it had been narrated on the Exchange at Amsterdam or Flushing during that portentous midsummer that Barneveldt had not only beheaded but roasted alive, and fed the dogs and cats upon, the attorney, the apothecary, and the engraver, there would have been citizens in plenty to devour the news with avidity.

But although the advocate had never imagined such extravagances as these, it is certain that he had now resolved upon very bold measures, and that, too, without an instant's delay. He suspected the prince of aiming at sovereignty not only over Holland but over all the provinces, and to be using the synod as a principal part of his machinery. The gauntlet was thrown down by the stadholder, and the advocate lifted it at once. The issue of the struggle would depend upon the political color of the town magistracies. Barneveldt instinctively felt that Maurice, being now resolved that the synod should be held, would lose no time in making a revolution in all the towns through the power he held or could plausibly usurp. Such a course would, in his opinion, lead directly to an unconstitutional and violent subversion of the sovereign rights of each province, to the advantage of the central government. A religious creed would be forced upon Holland, and perhaps upon two other provinces, which was repugnant to a considerable majority of the

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people. And this would be done by a majority vote of the States-General, on a matter over which, by the thirteenth article of the fundamental compact, the Union of Utrecht, the States-General had no control, each province having reserved the disposition of religious affairs to itself. For let it never be forgotten that the Union of the Netherlands was a compact, a treaty, an agreement between sovereign states. There was no pretense that it was an incorporation, that the people had laid down a constitution, an organic law. The people were never consulted, did not exist, had not for political purposes been invented. It was the great primal defect of their institutions, but the Netherlanders would have been centuries before their age had they been able to remedy that defect. Yet the Netherlanders would have been much behind even that age of bigotry had they admitted the possibility in a free commonwealth of that most sacred and important of all subjects that concern humanity, religious creed,—the relation of man to his Maker,—to be regulated by the party vote of a political board.

It was with no thought of treason in his heart or his head, therefore, that the advocate now resolved that the states of Holland and the cities of which that college was composed should protect their liberties and privileges, the sum of which, in his opinion, made up the sovereignty of the province he served, and that they should protect them, if necessary, by force. Force was apprehended. It should be met by force. To be forewarned was to be forearmed. Barneveldt forewarned the states of Holland.

On the 4th August, 1617, he proposed to that assembly a resolution which was destined to become famous.

A majority accepted it after brief debate. It was to this effect:¹

The states, having seen what had befallen in many cities, and especially in The Hague, against the order, liberties, and laws of the land, and having in vain attempted to bring into harmony with the states certain cities which refused to coöperate with the majority, had at last resolved to refuse the national synod, as conflicting with the sovereignty and laws of Holland. They had thought good to set forth in public print their views as to religious worship, and to take measures to prevent all deeds of violence against persons and property. To this end the regents of cities were authorized in case of need, until otherwise ordained, to enroll men-at-arms for their security and prevention of violence. Furthermore, every one that might complain of what the regents of cities by strength of this resolution might do was ordered to have recourse to no one else than the states of Holland, as no account would be made of anything that might be done or undertaken by the tribunals.

Finally, it was resolved to send a deputation to Prince Maurice, the princess widow, and Prince Henry, requesting them to aid in carrying out this resolution.

Thus the deed was done. The sword was drawn. It was drawn in self-defense and in deliberate answer to the stadholder's defiance when he rapped his sword-hilt in face of the assembly, but still it was drawn. The states of Holland were declared sovereign and supreme. The national synod was peremptorily rejected. Any decision of the supreme courts of the

¹ Wagenaer, x. 162 seq.; Baudart., ix. 37; and all the historians.

Union in regard to the subject of this resolution was nullified in advance. Thenceforth this measure of the 4th August was called the "Sharp Resolve." It might prove perhaps to be double-edged.

It was a stroke of grim sarcasm on the part of the advocate thus solemnly to invite the stadholder's aid in carrying out a law which was aimed directly at his head; to request his help for those who meant to defeat with the armed hand that national synod which he had pledged himself to bring about.

The question now arose what sort of men-at-arms it would be well for the city governments to enlist. The officers of the regular garrisons had received distinct orders from Prince Maurice, as their military superior, to refuse any summons to act in matters proceeding from the religious question. The prince, who had chief authority over all the regular troops, had given notice that he would permit nothing to be done against "those of the Reformed religion," by which he meant the Contra-Remonstrants and them only.

In some cities there were no garrisons, but only train-bands. But the train-bands (*schutters*) could not be relied on to carry out the Sharp Resolve, for they were almost to a man Contra-Remonstrants. It was therefore determined to enlist what were called "wartgelders," soldiers, inhabitants of the place, who held themselves ready to serve in time of need in consideration of a certain wage—mercenaries, in short.¹

This resolution was followed, as a matter of course, by a solemn protest from Amsterdam and the five cities who acted with her.²

¹ Wagenaer, x. 161 seq. Van der Kemp, iv. 49 seq.

² Ibid. Ibid. Van Rees and Brill, iii. 730 seq.

On the same day Maurice was duly notified of the passage of the law. His wrath was great. High words passed between him and the deputies. It could hardly have been otherwise expected. Next day he came before the assembly to express his sentiments, to complain of the rudeness with which the resolution of 4th August had been communicated to him, and to demand further explanations. Forthwith the advocate proceeded to set forth the intentions of the states, and demanded that the prince should assist the magistrates in carrying out the policy decided upon. Reinier Pauw, burgomaster of Amsterdam, fiercely interrupted the oration of Barneveldt, saying that although these might be his views, they were not to be held by his Excellency as the opinions of all. The advocate, angry at the interruption, answered him sternly, and a violent altercation, not unmixed with personalities, arose. Maurice, who kept his temper admirably on this occasion, interfered between the two and had much difficulty in quieting the dispute.¹ He then observed that when he took the oath as stadholder these unfortunate differences had not arisen, but all had been good friends together. This was perfectly true, but he could have added that they might all continue good friends unless the plan of imposing a religious creed upon the minority by a clerical decision were persisted in. He concluded that for love of one of the two great parties he would not violate the oath he had taken to maintain the Reformed religion to the last drop of his blood. Still, with the same *petitio principii* that the Reformed religion and the dogmas of the Contra-Remonstrants were one and the same thing,

¹ Van der Kemp, iv. 33.

he assured the assembly that the authority of the magistrates would be sustained by him so long as it did not lead to the subversion of religion.

Clearly the time for argument had passed. As Dudley Carleton observed, men had been disputing *pro aris* long enough. They would soon be fighting *pro focis*.¹

In pursuance of the policy laid down by the Sharp Resolution, the states proceeded to assure themselves of the various cities of the province by means of wartgelders. They sent to the important seaport of Brielle and demanded a new oath from the garrison. It was intimated that the prince would be soon coming there in person to make himself master of the place, and advice was given to the magistrates to be beforehand with him. These statements angered Maurice, and angered him the more because they happened to be true. It was also charged that he was pursuing his Leicestrian designs and meant to make himself, by such steps, sovereign of the country. The name of Leicester being a byword of reproach ever since that baffled noble had, a generation before, left the provinces in disgrace, it was a matter of course that such comparisons were excessively exasperating. It was fresh enough, too, in men's memory that the earl in his Netherland career had effected sympathy with the strictest denomination of religious reformers, and that the profligate worldling and arrogant self-seeker had used the mask of religion to cover flagitious ends. As it had indeed been the object of the party at the head of which the advocate had all his life acted to raise the youthful Maurice to the stadholderate expressly to foil the plots of Leicester,

¹ Carleton's Letters, 100.

it could hardly fail to be unpalatable to Maurice to be now accused of acting the part of Leicester.

He inveighed bitterly on the subject before the state council. The state council, in a body, followed him to a meeting of the States-General. Here the stadholder made a vehement speech and demanded that the states of Holland should rescind the Sharp Resolution, and should desist from the new oaths required from the soldiery. Barneveldt, firm as a rock, met these bitter denunciations. Speaking in the name of Holland, he repelled the idea that the sovereign states of that province were responsible to the state council or to the States-General either. He regretted, as all regretted, the calumnies uttered against the prince, but in times of such intense excitement every conspicuous man was the mark of calumny.

The stadholder warmly repudiated Leicestrian designs, and declared that he had been always influenced by a desire to serve his country and maintain the Reformed religion. If he had made mistakes, he desired to be permitted to improve in the future.¹

Thus having spoken, the soldier retired from the assembly, with the state council at his heels.

The advocate lost no time in directing the military occupation of the principal towns of Holland, such as Leyden, Gouda, Rotterdam, Schoonhoven, Hoorn, and other cities.

At Leyden especially, where a strong Orange party was with difficulty kept in obedience by the Remonstrant magistracy, it was found necessary to erect a stockade about the town hall and to plant caltrops and other obstructions in the squares and streets.

¹ Van der Kemp, iv. 57.

The broad space in front of the beautiful medieval seat of the municipal government, once so sacred for the sublime and pathetic scenes enacted there during the famous siege and in the magistracy of Peter van der Werf, was accordingly inclosed by a solid palisade of oaken planks, strengthened by rows of iron bars with barbed prongs. The intrenchment was called by the populace the Arminian Fort, and the iron spear-heads were baptized Barneveldt's teeth.¹ Cannon were planted at intervals along the works, and a company or two of the wartgelders, armed from head to foot, with snaphances on their shoulders, stood ever ready to issue forth to quell any disturbances. Occasionally a life or two was lost of citizen or soldier, and many doughty blows were interchanged.

It was a melancholy spectacle. No commonwealth could be more fortunate than this republic in possessing two such great leading minds. No two men could be more patriotic than both stadholder and advocate. No two men could be prouder, more overbearing, less conciliatory.

"I know M. Barneveldt well," said Sir Ralph Winwood, "and know that he hath great powers and abilities, and malice itself must confess that man never hath done more faithful and powerful service to his country than he. But *finis coronat opus* and *il di lodi lacera; oportet imperatorem stantem mori.*"²

The cities of Holland were now thoroughly "wartgeldered," and Barneveldt, having sufficiently shown his "teeth" in that province, departed for change of

¹ Broadsheets and caricatures of the year 1617. Baudartius. Van Rees and Brill, 751.

² Carleton's Letters, 193.

air to Utrecht.¹ His failing health was assigned as the pretext for the visit, although the atmosphere of that city has never been considered especially salubrious in the dog-days.

Meantime the stadholder remained quiet, but biding his time. He did not choose to provoke a premature conflict in the strongholds of the Arminians, as he called them, but with a true military instinct preferred making sure of the ports. Amsterdam, Enkhuizen, Flushing, being without any effort of his own within his control, he quietly slipped down the river Meuse on the night of the 29th September, accompanied by his brother Frederick Henry, and before six o'clock next morning had introduced a couple of companies of trustworthy troops into Brielle, had summoned the magistrates before him, and compelled them to desist from all further intention of levying mercenaries. Thus all the fortresses which Barneveldt had so recently and in such masterly fashion rescued from the grasp of England were now quietly reposing in the hands of the stadholder.²

Maurice thought it not worth his while for the present to quell the mutiny, as he considered it,—the legal and constitutional defense of vested right, as great jurists like Barneveldt and Hugo Grotius accounted the movement,—at “its fountain-head Leyden or its chief stream Utrecht,” to use the expression of Carleton.³ There had already been bloodshed at Leyden, a burgher or two having been shot and a soldier stoned

¹ Baudart., ix. 81. Wagenaer, x. 168 seq. Van der Kemp, iv. 60 seq.

² Wagenaer, xi. 174, 175. Van der Kemp, iv. 61, 62.

³ Carleton's Letters, 184.

to death in the streets, but the stadholder deemed it unwise to precipitate matters. Feeling himself, with his surpassing military knowledge and with a large majority of the nation at his back, so completely master of the situation, he preferred waiting on events. And there is no doubt that he was proving himself a consummate politician and a perfect master of fence. "He is much beloved and followed both of soldiers and people," said the English ambassador, "he is a man *innoxiæ popularitatis*, so as this jealousy cannot well be fastened upon him; and in this cause of religion he stirred not until within these few months he saw he must declare himself or suffer the better party to be overborne."¹

The chief tribunal—high council, so called—of the country soon gave evidence that the Sharp Resolution had judged rightly in reckoning on its hostility and in nullifying its decisions in advance.

They decided by a majority vote that the Resolution ought not to be obeyed, but set aside. Amsterdam and the three or four cities usually acting with her refused to enlist troops.

Rombout Hoogerbeets, a member of the tribunal, informed Prince Maurice that he "would no longer be present on a bench where men disputed the authority of the states of Holland, which he held to be the supreme sovereignty over him."²

This was plain-speaking, a distinct enunciation of what the states'-right party deemed to be constitutional law.

And what said Maurice in reply?

"I, too, recognize the states of Holland as sover-

¹ Carleton's Letters, 184.

² Wagenaer, x. 173.

eign; but we might at least listen to each other occasionally.”¹

Hoogerbeets, however, deeming that listening had been carried far enough, decided to leave the tribunal altogether, and to resume the post which he had formerly occupied as pensionary or chief magistrate of Leyden.

Here he was soon to find himself in the thick of the conflict. Meantime the States-General, in full assembly, on 11th November, 1617, voted that the national synod should be held in the course of the following year. The measure was carried by a strict party vote and by a majority of one. The representatives of each province voting as one, there were four in favor of to three against the synod. The minority, consisting of Holland, Utrecht, and Overijssel, protested against the vote as an outrageous invasion of the rights of each province, as an act of flagrant tyranny and usurpation.²

The minority in the states of Holland, the five cities often named, protested against the protest.

The defective part of the Netherland constitutions could not be better illustrated. The minority of the states of Holland refused to be bound by a majority of the provincial assembly. The minority of the States-General refused to be bound by the majority of the united assembly.

This was reducing politics to an absurdity and making all government impossible. It is, however, quite certain that in the municipal governments a majority had always governed, and that a majority vote in the provincial assemblies had always prevailed. The pres-

¹ Wagenaer, x. 173.

² Ibid., 177, 178. Van der Kemp, iv. 66, 67.

ent innovation was to govern the States-General by a majority.

Yet viewed by the light of experience and of common sense, it would be difficult to conceive of a more preposterous proceeding than thus to cram a religious creed down the throats of half the population of a country by the vote of a political assembly. But it was the seventeenth and not the nineteenth century.

Moreover, if there were any meaning in words, the thirteenth article of the Union, reserving especially the disposition over religious matters to each province, had been wisely intended to prevent the possibility of such tyranny.

When the letters of invitation to the separate states and to others were drawing up in the general assembly, the representatives of the three states left the chamber. A solitary individual from Holland remained, however, a burgomaster of Amsterdam.

Uytenbogart, conversing with Barneveldt directly afterward, advised him to accept the vote. Yielding to the decision of the majority, it would be possible, so thought the clergyman, for the great statesman so to handle matters as to mold the synod to his will, even as he had so long controlled the States-Provincial and the States-General.

"If you are willing to give away the rights of the land," said the advocate, very sharply, "I am not."¹

Probably the priest's tactics might have proved more adroit than the stony opposition on which Barneveldt was resolved.

But it was with the aged statesman a matter of prin-

¹ Wagenaer, x. 179. Compare Van Rees and Brill, 753; Uytenbogart, 881.

ciple, not of policy. His character and his personal pride, the dignity of opinion and office, his respect for constitutional law, were all at stake.

Shallow observers considered the struggle now taking place as a personal one. Lovers of personal government chose to look upon the advocate's party as a faction inspired with an envious resolve to clip the wings of the stadholder, who was at last flying above their heads.

There could be no doubt of the bitter animosity between the two men. There could be no doubt that jealousy was playing the part which that master passion will ever play in all the affairs of life. But there could be no doubt, either, that a difference of principle as wide as the world separated the two antagonists.

Even so keen an observer as Dudley Carleton, while admitting the man's intellectual power and unequalled services, could see nothing in the advocate's present course but prejudice, obstinacy, and the insanity of pride. "He doth no whit spare himself in pains nor faint in his resolution," said the envoy, "wherein notwithstanding he will in all appearance *succumbere* afore long, having the disadvantages of a weak body, a weak party, and a weak cause."¹ But Carleton hated Barneveldt, and considered it the chief object of his mission to destroy him, if he could. In so doing he would best carry out the wishes of his sovereign.

The King of Britain had addressed a somewhat equivocal letter to the States-General on the subject of religion in the spring of 1617.² It certainly was far

¹ Carleton's Letters, 202.

² "Missive van den Koning van England aan de Staten-Generaal," March 20, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

from being as satisfactory as the epistles of 1613, prepared under the advocate's instructions, had been, while the exuberant commentary upon the royal text, delivered in full assembly by his ambassador soon after the reception of the letter, was more than usually didactic, offensive, and ignorant. Sir Dudley never omitted an opportunity of imparting instruction to the States-General as to the nature of their constitution and the essential dogmas on which their church was founded. It is true that the great lawyers and the great theologians of the country were apt to hold very different opinions from his upon those important subjects, but this was so much the worse for the lawyers and theologians, as time perhaps might prove.

The king in this last missive had proceeded to unsay the advice which he had formerly bestowed upon the states, by complaining that his earlier letters had been misinterpreted. They had been made use of, he said, to authorize the very error against which they had been directed. They had been held to intend the very contrary of what they did mean. He felt himself bound in conscience, therefore, finding these differences ready to be "hatched into schisms," to warn the states once more against pests so pernicious.

Although the royal language was somewhat vague so far as enunciation of doctrine, a point on which he had once confessed himself fallible, was concerned, there was nothing vague in his recommendation of a national synod. To this the opposition of Barneveldt was determined not upon religious but upon constitutional grounds. The confederacy did not constitute a nation, and therefore there could not be a national synod nor a national religion.

Carleton came before the States-General soon afterward¹ with a prepared oration, wearisome as a fast-day sermon after the third turn of the hour-glass, pragmatical as a schoolmaster's harangue to fractious little boys.

He divided his lecture into two heads, the peace of the church and the peace of the provinces, starting with the first. "*A Jove principium*," he said, "I will begin with that which is both beginning and end. It is the truth of God's Word and its maintenance that is the bond of our common cause. Reasons of state invite us as friends and neighbors by the preservation of our lives and property, but the interest of religion binds us as Christians and brethren to the mutual defense of the liberty of our consciences."

He then proceeded to point out the only means by which liberty of conscience could be preserved. It was by suppressing all forms of religion but one, and by silencing all religious discussion. Peter Titelmann and Philip II. could not have devised a more pithy formula. All that was wanting was the ax and fagot to reduce uniformity to practice. Then liberty of conscience would be complete.

"One must distinguish," said the ambassador, "between just liberty and unbridled license, and conclude that there is but one truth single and unique. Those who go about turning their brains into limbees for distilling new notions² in religious matters only distract the union of the church which makes profession of this

¹ "Memorie van den Heere Dudley Carleton," etc. April 20 (O. S.), 1617, Archives at The Hague MS.

² "Ceux qui vont alembiquant leurs cerveaux pour exciter nouvelles opinions et disputes en matière de la religion," etc.

unique truth. If it be permitted to one man to publish the writings and fantasies of a sick spirit and for another moved by Christian zeal to reduce this wanderer *ad sanam mentem*, why, then, *patet locus adversus utrumque*, and the common enemy [the devil] slips into the fortress." He then proceeded to illustrate this theory on liberty of conscience by allusions to Conrad Vorstius.

This infamous sectary had in fact reached such a pitch of audacity, said the ambassador, as not only to inveigh against the eternal power of God, but to indulge in irony against the honor of his Majesty King James.

And in what way had he scandalized the government of the Republic? He had dared to say that within its borders there was religious toleration. He had distinctly averred that in the United Provinces heretics were not punished with death or with corporal chastisement.

"He declares openly," said Carleton, "that *contra hæreticos etiam vere dictos (ne dum falso et calumniose sic traductos)* there is neither sentence of death nor other corporal punishment, so that in order to attract to himself a great following of birds of the same feather he publishes to all the world that here in this country one can live and die a heretic, unpunished, without being arrested and without danger."

In order to suppress this reproach upon the Republic at which the ambassador stood aghast, and to prevent the Vorstian doctrines of religious toleration and impunity of heresy from spreading among "the common people, so subject by their natures to embrace new opinions," he advised, of course, that "the serpent be

sent back to the nest where he was born before the venom had spread through the whole body of the Republic.”

A week afterward a long reply was delivered on part of the States-General to the ambassador's oration.¹ It is needless to say that it was the work of the advocate, and that it was in conformity with the opinions so often exhibited in the letters to Caron and others of which the reader has seen many samples.

That religious matters were under the control of the civil government, and that supreme civil authority belonged to each one of the seven sovereign provinces, each recognizing no superior within its own sphere, were maxims of state always enforced in the Netherlands and on which the whole religious controversy turned.

“The States-General have always cherished the true Christian apostolic religion,” they said, “and wished it to be taught under the authority and protection of the legal government of these provinces in all purity, and in conformity with the Holy Scriptures, to the good people of these provinces. And my lords the states and magistrates of the respective provinces, each within their own limits, desire the same.”

They had therefore given express orders to the preachers “to keep the peace by mutual and benign toleration of the different opinions on the one side and the other, at least until with full knowledge of the subject the states might otherwise ordain. They had been the more moved to this because his Majesty, having carefully examined the opinions of the learned

“¹ Antwoord op de propositie van den Ambassadeur Carleton,” April 28, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

here on each side, had found both consistent with Christian belief and the salvation of souls."

It was certainly not the highest expression of religious toleration for the civil authority to forbid the clergymen of the country from discussing in their pulpits the knottiest and most mysterious points of the schoolmen lest the "common people" should be puzzled. Nevertheless, where the close union of church and state and the necessity of one church were deemed matters of course, it was much to secure subordination of the priesthood to the magistracy, while to enjoin on preachers abstention from a single exciting cause of quarrel, on the ground that there was more than one path to salvation, and that mutual toleration was better than mutual persecution, was, in that age, a stride toward religious equality. It was at least an advance on Carleton's dogma that there was but one unique and solitary truth, and that to declare heretics not punishable with death was an insult to the government of the Republic.

The States-General answered the ambassador's plea, made in the name of his master, for immediate and unguaranteed evacuation of the debatable land by the arguments already so often stated in the advocate's instructions to Caron. They had been put to great trouble and expense already in their campaigning and subsequent fortification of important places in the duchies. They had seen the bitter spirit manifested by the Spaniards in the demolition of the churches and houses of Mülheim and other places. "While the affair remained in its present terms of utter uncertainty, their Mightinesses," said the States-General, "find it most objectionable to forsake the places which they have

been fortifying, and to leave the duchies and all their fellow-religionists, besides the rights of the possessory princes, a prey to those who have been hankering for the territories for long years, and who would unquestionably be able to make themselves absolute masters of all within a very few days.”

A few months later Carleton came before the States-General again and delivered another elaborate oration, duly furnished to him by the king, upon the necessity of the national synod, the comparative merits of Arminianism and Contra-Remonstrantism, together with a full exposition of the constitution of the Netherlands.¹

It might be supposed that Barneveldt and Grotius and Hoogerbeets knew something of the law and history of their country.

But James knew much better, and so his envoy endeavored to convince his audience.

He received on the spot a temperate but conclusive reply from the delegates of Holland. They informed him that the war with Spain, the cause of the Utrecht Union, was not begun about religion, but on account of the violation of liberties, chartered rights, and privileges, not the least of which rights was that of each province to regulate religious matters within its borders.

A little later a more vehement reply was published anonymously in the shape of a pamphlet called “The Balance,”² which much angered the ambassador and goaded his master almost to frenzy. It was deemed so

¹ Carleton's Letters, 205 seq.

² The original is called “Weegschael om in alle billickheyt te overwegen de Oratie,” etc. The translation is entitled “Balance pour peser en toute équité la Harangue du très-noble, docte et prudent Seigneur Monseigneur Dudley Carleton, etc., l'an 1618.”

blasphemous, so insulting to the Majesty of England, so entirely seditious, that James, not satisfied with inditing a rejoinder, insisted through Carleton that a reward should be offered by the states for the detection of the author, in order that he might be condignly punished. This was done by a majority vote, one thousand florins being offered for the discovery of the author and six hundred for that of the printer.

Naturally the step was opposed in the States-General, two deputies in particular making themselves conspicuous. One of them was an audacious old gentleman named Brinius of Gelderland, "much corrupted with Arminianism," so Carleton informed his sovereign. He appears to have inherited his audacity through his pedigree, descending, as it was ludicrously enough asserted he did, from a chief of the Caninefates, the ancient inhabitants of Gelderland, called Brinio. And Brinio the Caninefat had been as famous for his stolid audacity as for his illustrious birth: "*Erat in Caninefatibus stolidae audaciae Brinio claritate natalium insigni.*"

The patronizing manner in which the ambassador alluded to the other member of the States-General who opposed the decree was still more diverting. It was "Grotius, the pensioner of Rotterdam, a young, petulant brain, not unknown to your Majesty," said Carleton.

Two centuries and a half have rolled away, and there are few majesties, few nations, and few individuals to whom the name of that petulant youth is unknown; but how many are familiar with the achievements of the able representative of King James? ¹

¹ Carleton's Letters, 216.

Nothing came of the measure, however, and the offer of course helped the circulation of the pamphlet.

It is amusing to see the ferocity thus exhibited by the royal pamphleteer against a rival, especially when one can find no crime in "The Balance" save a stinging and well-merited criticism of a very stupid oration.

Gillis van Ledenberg was generally supposed to be the author of it. Carleton inclined, however, to suspect Grotius, "because," said he, "having always before been a stranger to my house, he has made me the day before the publication thereof a complimentary visit, although it was Sunday and church-time; whereby the Italian proverb, 'Chi ti caresse più che suole,' etc., is added to other likelihoods."¹

It was subsequently understood, however, that the pamphlet was written by a Remonstrant preacher of Utrecht, named Jacobus Taurinus, one of those who had been doomed to death by the mutinous government in that city seven years before.²

It was now sufficiently obvious that either the governments in the three opposition provinces must be changed or that the national synod must be imposed by a strict majority vote in the teeth of the constitution and of vigorous and eloquent protests drawn up by the best lawyers in the country. The advocate and Grotius recommended a provincial synod first and, should that not succeed in adjusting the differences of church government, then the convocation of a general or eccumenical synod. They resisted the national synod because, in their view, the provinces were not a nation. A league of seven sovereign and independent states was all that legally existed in the Netherlands. It

¹ Carleton's Letters, 207.

² Wagenaer, x. 182.

was accordingly determined that the governments should be changed, and the stadholder set himself to prepare the way for a thorough and, if possible, a bloodless revolution. He departed on the 27th November for a tour through the chief cities, and before leaving The Hague addressed an earnest circular letter to the various municipalities of Holland.¹

¹ "In how mournful and dangerous a condition the country stands," he said, "through the religious differences and their results is so notorious as to be but too well known to you. We think, therefore, nothing more necessary than, while there is yet time, to work to that end that all misunderstandings may be reasonably removed, peace and unity brought back, and the state restored to its former splendor and reputation." He expressed his fear lest continued attempts should be made to carry into effect the Resolution of 4th August, the result of which could only be deeper disaster than any that had yet befallen. He intimated that the enemy might take advantage of the internal dissensions to attack and make himself master of the country. He urged them at the next meeting of the states to see to it that the deputies should decide nothing on the propositions which would probably be laid before them without thoroughly pondering and understanding their meaning and duly deliberating thereon with their constituents. He expressed his earnest hope that they would come to the next assembly of the states of Holland with instructions to vote for the national synod, to be preceded by a provincial one, believing that no more reasonable plan could be devised to bring about unity in religious matters, without prejudice to the general or special sovereignties and laws.

"As, next to religion, justice is the chief foundation of republics and kingdoms," he said, "which could not be denied to the inhabitants without breach of the privileges and laws of the land, therefore the due course of justice should not be diverted or hindered in the ordinary tribunals which were erected to dispense it."

After this allusion to the nullification of the courts of law by the Sharp Resolution, he spoke of the wartgelders and the new oaths exacted from those mercenaries, and urged that they be disbanded. They saddled the country with unnecessary expense, and

A more truly dignified, reasonable, right royal letter, from the stadholder's point of view, could not have been indited. The imperial "we" breathing like a morning breeze through the whole of it blew away all legal and historical mistiness.

But the clouds returned again, nevertheless. Unfortunately for Maurice, it could not be argued by the pen, however it might be proved by the sword, that the Netherlands constituted a nation, and that a convocation of doctors of divinity summoned by a body of envoys had the right to dictate a creed to seven republics.

All parties were agreed on one point. There must be unity of divine worship. The territory of the Netherlands was not big enough to hold two systems of religion, two forms of Christianity, two sects of Protestantism. It was big enough to hold seven independent and sovereign states, but would be split into fragments,

caused great unrest among the good citizens, increasing their distrust of the magistrates and the general confusion.

"And as we consider the new oaths and obligations," he continued, "which are now demanded of captains and soldiers to be of momentous import and for our person not a little burdensome, we will trust that you will deal therein with so much insight and discretion that the becoming and necessary respect which we have hitherto received and always must receive from the soldiery be not lessened, to the derogation of our dignity before all the world. Thus much we have deserved by our fidelity and our services to the provinces, resolved as we are to hold to the end in this our faithfulness.

"Herewith, honorable, wise, discreet, dearly beloved, we recommend you to God.

"Your good friend,

"MAURICE DE NASSAU.

"THE HAGUE, 26th November." (Brandt, *Hist. Ref.*, ii. 668-670.)

resolved into chaos, should there be more than one church, or if once a schism were permitted in that church. Grotius was as much convinced of this as Gomarus. And yet the thirteenth article of the Union stared them all in the face, forbidding the hideous assumptions now made by the general government. Perhaps no man living fully felt its import save Barneveldt alone. For groping however dimly and hesitatingly toward the idea of religious liberty, of general toleration, he was denounced as a papist, an atheist, a traitor, a miscreant, by the fanatics for the sacerdotal and personal power. Yet it was a pity that he could never contemplate the possibility of his country's throwing off the swaddling-clothes of provincialism which had wrapped its infancy. Doubtless history, law, tradition, and usage pointed to the independent sovereignty of each province. Yet the period of the truce was precisely the time when a more generous constitution, a national incorporation, might have been constructed to take the place of the loose confederacy by which the gigantic war had been fought out. After all, foreign powers had no connection with the states, and knew only the Union with which, and with which alone, they made treaties, and the reality of sovereignty in each province was as ridiculous as in theory it was impregnable. But Barneveldt, under the modest title of advocate of one province, had been in reality president and prime minister of the whole commonwealth. He had himself been the union and the sovereignty. It was not wonderful that so imperious a nature objected to transfer its powers to the church, to the States-General, or to Maurice.

Moreover, when nationality assumed the unlovely

form of rigid religious uniformity, when union meant an exclusive self-governed church enthroned above the state, responsible to no civic authority and no human law, the boldest patriot might shiver at emerging from provincialism.

CHAPTER XV

The commonwealth bent on self-destruction—Evils of a confederate system of government—Rem Bischop's house sacked—Aertsens's unceasing efforts against Barneveldt—The advocate's interview with Maurice—The states of Utrecht raise the troops—The advocate at Utrecht—Barneveldt urges mutual toleration—Barneveldt accused of being partizan of Spain—Carleton takes his departure.

It is not cheerful, after widely contemplating the aspect of Christendom in the year of supreme preparation, to examine with the minuteness absolutely necessary the narrow theater to which the political affairs of the great Republic had been reduced.

That powerful commonwealth, to which the great party of the Reformation naturally looked for guidance in the coming conflict, seemed bent on self-destruction. The microcosm of the Netherlands now represented, alas! the war of elements going on without on a world-wide scale. As the Calvinists and Lutherans of Germany were hotly attacking each other even in sight of the embattled front of Spain and the League, so the Gomarites and the Arminians by their mutual rancor were tearing the political power of the Dutch Republic to shreds and preventing her from assuming a great part in the crisis. The consummate soldier, the unrivaled statesman, each superior in his

sphere to any contemporary rival, each supplementing the other, and making up together, could they have been harmonized, a double head such as no political organism then existing could boast, were now in hopeless antagonism to each other. A mass of hatred had been accumulated against the advocate with which he found it daily more and more difficult to struggle. The imperious, rugged, and suspicious nature of the stadholder had been steadily wrought upon by the almost devilish acts of Francis Aertsens until he had come to look upon his father's most faithful adherent, his own early preceptor in statesmanship and political supporter, as an antagonist, a conspirator, and a tyrant.

The soldier whose unrivaled ability, experience, and courage in the field should have placed him at the very head of the great European army of defense against the general crusade upon Protestantism, so constantly foretold by Barneveldt, was now to be engaged in making bloodless but mischievous warfare against an imaginary conspiracy and a patriot foe.

The advocate, keeping steadily in view the great principles by which his political life had been guided, the supremacy of the civil authority in any properly organized commonwealth over the sacerdotal and military, found himself gradually forced into mortal combat with both. To the individual sovereignty of each province he held with the tenacity of a lawyer and historian. In that he found the only clue through the labyrinth which ecclesiastical and political affairs presented. So close was the tangle, so confused the medley, that without this slender guide all hope of legal issue seemed lost.

No doubt the difficulty of the doctrine of individual

sovereignty was great, some of the provinces being such slender morsels of territory, with resources so trivial, as to make the name of sovereignty ludicrous. Yet there could be as little doubt that no other theory was tenable. If so powerful a mind as that of the advocate was inclined to strain the theory to its extreme limits, it was because in the overshadowing superiority of the one province Holland had been found the practical remedy for the imbecility otherwise sure to result from such provincial and meager federalism.

Moreover, to obtain union by stretching all the ancient historical privileges and liberties of the separate provinces upon the Procrustean bed of a single dogma, to look for nationality only in common subjection to an infallible priesthood, to accept a catechism as the palladium upon which the safety of the state was to depend for all time, and beyond which there was to be no further message from Heaven—such was not healthy constitutionalism in the eyes of a great statesman. No doubt that without the fervent spirit of Calvinism it would have been difficult to wage war with such immortal hate as the Netherlands had waged it, no doubt the spirit of republican and even democratic liberty lay hidden within that rigid husk, but it was dishonor to the martyrs who had died by thousands at the stake and on the battle-field for the rights of conscience if the only result of their mighty warfare against wrong had been to substitute a new dogma for an old one, to stifle forever the right of free inquiry, theological criticism, and the hope of further light from on high, and to proclaim it a libel on the Republic that within its borders all heretics, whether Arminian or papist, were safe from the death-penalty or even from bodily pun-

ishment. A theological union instead of a national one, and obtained, too, at the sacrifice of written law and immemorial tradition, a congress in which clerical deputations from all the provinces and from foreign nations should prescribe to all Netherlanders an immutable creed and a shadowy constitution, were not the true remedies for the evils of confederacy, nor, if they had been, was the time an appropriate one for their application.

It was far too early in the world's history to hope for such a redistribution of powers and such a modification of the social compact as would place in separate spheres the church and the state, double the sanctions and the consolations of religion by removing it from the pollutions of political warfare, and give freedom to individual conscience by securing it from the interference of government.

It is melancholy to see the Republic thus perversely occupying its energies. It is melancholy to see the great soldier becoming gradually more ardent for battle with Barneveldt and Uytenbogart than with Spinola and Buequoy, against whom he had won so many imperishable laurels. It is still sadder to see the man who had been selected by Henry IV. as the one statesman of Europe to whom he could confide his great projects for the pacification of Christendom, and on whom he could depend for counsel and support in schemes which, however fantastic in some of their details, had for their object to prevent the very European war of religion against which Barneveldt had been struggling, now reduced to defend himself against suspicion hourly darkening and hatred growing daily more insane.

The eagle glance and restless wing, which had swept

the whole political atmosphere, now caged within the stifling limits of theological casuistry and personal rivalry, were afflicting to contemplate.

The evils resulting from a confederate system of government, from a league of petty sovereignties which dared not become a nation, were as woefully exemplified in the United Provinces as they were destined to be more than a century and a half later, and in another hemisphere, before that most fortunate and sagacious of written political instruments, the American Constitution of 1787, came to remedy the weakness of the old Articles of Union.

Meantime the Netherlands were a confederacy, not a nation. Their general government was but a committee. It could ask of, but not command, the separate provinces; it had no dealings with nor power over the inhabitants of the country; it could say "Thou shalt" neither to state nor citizen; it could consult only with corporations, fictitious and many-headed personages, itself incorporate. There was no first magistrate, no supreme court, no commander-in-chief, no exclusive mint nor power of credit, no national taxation, no central house of representation and legislation, no senate. Unfortunately, it had one church, and out of this single matrix of centralism was born more discord than had been produced by all the centrifugal forces of provincialism combined.

There had been working substitutes found, as we well know, for the deficiencies of this constitution, but the advocate felt himself bound to obey and enforce obedience to the laws and privileges of his country so long as they remained without authorized change. His country was the province of Holland, to which his alle-

giance was due and whose servant he was. That there was but one church paid and sanctioned by law, he admitted, but his efforts were directed to prevent discord within that church, by counseling moderation, conciliation, mutual forbearance, and abstention from irritating discussion of dogmas deemed by many thinkers and better theologians than himself not essential to salvation. In this he was much behind his age or before it. He certainly was not with the majority.

And thus, while the election of Ferdinand had given the signal of war all over Christendom, while from the demolished churches in Bohemia the tocsin was still sounding, whose vibrations were destined to be heard a generation long through the world, there was less sympathy felt with the call within the territory of the great Republic of Protestantism than would have seemed imaginable a few short years before. The capture of the Cloister Church at The Hague in the summer of 1617 seemed to minds excited by personal rivalries and minute theological controversy a more momentous event than the destruction of the churches in the Klostergrab in the following December. The triumph of Gomarism in a single Dutch city inspired more enthusiasm for the moment than the deadly buffet to European Protestantism could inspire dismay.

The church had been carried and occupied, as it were, by force, as if an enemy's citadel. It seemed necessary to associate the idea of practical warfare with a movement which might have been a pacific clerical success. Barneveldt and those who acted with him, while deploring the intolerance out of which the schism had now grown to maturity, had still hoped for possible

accommodation of the quarrel. They dreaded popular tumults leading to oppression of the magistracy by the mob or the soldiery, and ending in civil war. But what was wanted by the extreme partizans on either side was not accommodation, but victory.

“Religious differences are causing much trouble and discontent in many cities,” he said.¹ “At Amsterdam there were in the past week two assemblages of boys and rabble which did not disperse without violence, crime, and robbery. The brother of Professor Episcopus [Rem Bishop] was damaged to the amount of several thousands. We are still hoping that some better means of accommodation may be found.”

The calmness with which the advocate spoke of these exciting and painful events is remarkable. It was exactly a week before the date of his letter that this riot had taken place at Amsterdam, very significant in its nature and nearly tragical in its results. There were no Remonstrant preachers left in the city, and the people of that persuasion were excluded from the communion service. On Sunday morning, 17th February (1617), a furious mob set upon the house of Rem Bishop, a highly respectable and wealthy citizen, brother of the Remonstrant professor Episcopus of Leyden. The house, an elegant mansion in one of the principal streets, was besieged, and after an hour's resistance carried by storm.² The pretext of the assault was that Arminian preaching was going on within its walls, which was not the fact. The mistress of the house, half clad, attempting to make her escape by the rear of

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, February 26, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² P. van Limborch, *Leven van Simon Episcopus* (1693), 78-94.

the building, was pursued by the rabble with sticks and stones, and shrieks of "Kill the Arminian harlot, strike her dead," until she fortunately found refuge in the house of a neighboring carpenter. There the hunted creature fell insensible on the ground, the master of the house refusing to give her up, though the maddened mob surged around it, swearing that if the "Arminian harlot"—as respectable a matron as lived in the city—were not delivered over to them they would tear the house to pieces.¹ The hope of plunder and of killing Rem Bischop himself drew them at last back to his mansion. It was thoroughly sacked; every portable article of value, linen, plate, money, furniture, was carried off, the pictures and objects of art destroyed, the house gutted from top to bottom. A thousand spectators were looking on placidly at the work of destruction as they returned from church, many of them with Bible and Psalm-book in their hands.² The master effected his escape over the roof into an adjoining building. One of the ringleaders, a carpenter by trade, was arrested carrying an armful of valuable plunder. He was asked by the magistrate why he had entered the house. "Out of good zeal," he replied; "to help beat and kill the Arminians who were holding conventicle there." He was further asked why he hated the Arminians so much. "Are we to suffer such folk here," he replied, "who preach the vile doctrine that God has created one man for damnation and another for salvation?"³—thus ascribing the doctrine of the church of which he supposed himself a member to

¹ P. van Limborch, *Leven van Simon Episcopius* (1693), 87.

² *Ibid.*, 90. Van Limborch says five or six thousand.

³ *Ibid.*, 93.

the Arminians whom he had been plundering and wished to kill.

Rem Bishop received no compensation for the damage and danger, the general cry in the town being that the money he was receiving from Barneveldt and the King of Spain would make him good even if not a stone of the house had been left standing. On the following Thursday two elders of the church council waited upon and informed him that he must in future abstain from the communion service.¹

It may well be supposed that the virtual head of the government liked not the triumph of mob law, in the name of religion, over the civil authority. The advocate was neither democrat nor demagogue. A lawyer, a magistrate, and a noble, he had but little sympathy with the humbler classes, which he was far too much in the habit of designating as rabble and populace. Yet his anger was less against them than against the priests, the foreigners, the military and diplomatic mischief-makers, by whom they were set upon to dangerous demonstrations. The old patrician scorned the arts by which high-born demagogues in that as in every age affect adulation for inferiors whom they despise. It was his instinct to protect and guide the people, in whom he recognized no chartered nor inherent right to govern. It was his resolve, so long as breath was in him, to prevent them from destroying life and property and subverting the government under the leadership of an inflamed priesthood.

It was with this intention, as we have just seen, and in order to avoid bloodshed, anarchy, and civil war in the streets of every town and village, that a decisive,

¹ Van Limborch, *Leven van Simon Episcopus* (1693), 94.

but in the advocate's opinion a perfectly legal, step had been taken by the states of Holland. It had become necessary to empower the magistracies of towns to defend themselves by enrolled troops against mob violence and against an enforced synod considered by great lawyers as unconstitutional.

Aertsens resided in Zealand, and the efforts of that ex-ambassador were unceasing to excite popular animosity against the man he hated and to trouble the political waters, in which no man knew better than he how to cast the net.

"The states of Zealand," said the advocate to the ambassador in London,¹ "have a deputation here about the religious differences, urging the holding of a national synod according to the king's letters, to which some other provinces and some of the cities of Holland incline. The questions have not yet been defined by a common synod, so that a national one could make no definition, while the particular synods and clerical personages are so filled with prejudices and so bound by mutual engagements of long date as to make one fear an unfruitful issue. We are occupied upon this point in our assembly of Holland to devise some compromise and to discover by what means these difficulties may be brought into a state of tranquillity."

It will be observed that in all these most private and confidential utterances of the advocate a tone of extreme moderation, an anxious wish to save the provinces from dissensions, dangers, and bloodshed, is distinctly visible. Never is he betrayed into vindictive, ambitious, or self-seeking expressions, while sometimes, although rarely, despondent in mind. Nor was his op-

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, May 17, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

position to a general synod absolute. He was probably persuaded, however, as we have just seen, that it should of necessity be preceded by provincial ones, both in due regard to the laws of the land and to the true definition of the points to be submitted to its decision. He had small hope of a successful result from it.

The British king gave him infinite distress. As toward France, so toward England, the advocate kept steadily before him the necessity of deferring to powerful sovereigns whose friendship was necessary to the republic he served, however misguided, perverse, or incompetent those monarchs might be.

"I had always hoped," he said,¹ "that his Majesty would have adhered to his original written advice that such questions as these ought to be quietly settled by authority of law and not by ecclesiastical persons, and I still hope that his Majesty's intention is really to that effect, although he speaks of synods."

A month later² he felt even more encouraged. "The last letter of his Majesty concerning our religious questions," he said, "has given rise to various constructions, but the best advised, who have peace and unity at heart, understand the king's intention to be to conserve the state of these provinces and the religion in its purity. My hope is that his Majesty's good opinion will be followed and adopted according to the most appropriate methods."

Can it be believed that the statesman whose upright patriotism, moderation, and nobleness of purpose thus breathed through every word spoken by him in public or whispered to friends was already held up by a

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, May 17, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to same, June 21, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

herd of ravening slanderers to obloquy as a traitor and a tyrant?

He was growing old and had suffered much from illness during this eventful summer, but his anxiety for the commonwealth, caused by these distressing and superfluous squabbles, was wearing into him more deeply than years or disease could do.

“Owing to my weakness and old age I can’t go upstairs as well as I used,” he said,¹ “and these religious dissensions cause me sometimes such disturbance of mind as will ere long become intolerable, because of my indisposition and because of the cry of my heart at the course people are pursuing here. I reflect that at the time of Duke Casimir and the Prince of Chimay exactly such a course was held in Flanders, and in Lord Leicester’s time in the city of Utrecht, as is best known to yourself. My hope is fixed on the Lord God Almighty, and that he will make those well ashamed who are laying anything to heart save his honor and glory and the welfare of our country, with maintenance of its freedom and laws. I mean unchangeably to live and die for them. . . . Believe firmly that all representations to the contrary are vile calumnies.”

Before leaving for Vianen in the middle of August of this year (1617) the advocate had an interview with the prince.² There had been no open rupture between them, and Barneveldt was most anxious to avoid a quarrel with one to whose interests and honor he had always been devoted. He did not cling to power nor office. On the contrary, he had repeatedly importuned

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, July 31 and August 21, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Verhooren van Oldenbarneveld, 113, 114.

the states to accept his resignation, hoping that perhaps these unhappy dissensions might be quieted by his removal from the scene. He now told the prince that the misunderstanding between them arising from these religious disputes was so painful to his heart that he would make and had made every possible effort toward conciliation and amicable settlement of the controversy. He saw no means now, he said, of bringing about unity, unless his Excellency were willing to make some proposition for arrangement. This he earnestly implored the prince to do, assuring him of his sincere and upright affection for him, and his wish to support such measures to the best of his ability and to do everything for the furtherance of his reputation and necessary authority. He was so desirous of this result, he said, that he would propose now, as he did at the time of the truce negotiations, to lay down all his offices, leaving his Excellency to guide the whole course of affairs according to his best judgment. He had already taken a resolution, if no means of accommodation were possible, to retire to his Gunterstein estate and there remain till the next meeting of the assembly, when he would ask leave to retire for at least a year, in order to occupy himself with a revision and collation of the charters, laws, and other state papers of the country which were in his keeping, and which it was needful to bring into an orderly condition. Meantime some scheme might be found for arranging the religious differences more effective than any he had been able to devise.¹

His appeal seems to have glanced powerlessly upon the iron reticence of Maurice, and the advocate took his

¹ Verhooren van Oldenbarneveld, 113, 114.

departure disheartened. Later in the autumn, so warm a remonstrance was made to him by the leading nobles and deputies of Holland against his contemplated withdrawal from his post that it seemed a dereliction of duty on his part to retire. He remained to battle with the storm and to see "with anguish of heart," as he expressed it, the course religious affairs were taking.

The states of Utrecht on the 26th August resolved that, on account of the gathering of large masses of troops in the countries immediately adjoining their borders, especially in the episcopate of Cologne, by aid of Spanish money, it was expedient for them to enlist a protective force of six companies of regular soldiers in order to save the city from sudden and overwhelming attack by foreign troops.¹

Even if the danger from without were magnified in this preamble, which is by no means certain, there seemed to be no doubt on the subject in the minds of the magistrates. They believed that they had the right to protect and that they were bound to protect their ancient city from sudden assault, whether by Spanish soldiers or by organized mobs attempting, as had been done in Rotterdam, Oudewater, and other towns, to overawe the civil authority in the interest of the Contra-Remonstrants.

Six nobles of Utrecht were accordingly commissioned to raise the troops. A week later they had been en-

¹ "Extracten uit de Notulen der Staaten van Utrecht," MS. Kindly furnished to me by M. de Jonghe, assistant archivist of The Hague and the distinguished historian of Dutch India, from an extract-book of his late father, former archivist of the kingdom, and author of the History of the Dutch Navy and other valuable works.

listed, sworn to obey in all things the states of Utrecht, and to take orders from no one else.¹ Three days later the states of Utrecht addressed a letter to their Mightinesses the States-General and to his Excellency the Prince, notifying them that for the reasons stated in the resolution cited the six companies had been levied.² There seemed in these proceedings to be no thought of mutiny or rebellion, the province considering itself as acting within its unquestionable rights as a sovereign state and without any exaggeration of the imperious circumstances of the case.

Nor did the States-General and the stadholder at that moment affect to dispute the rights of Utrecht, nor raise a doubt as to the legality of the proceedings. The committee sent thither by the States-General, the prince, and the council of state in their written answer to the letter of the Utrecht government declared the reasons given for the enrolment of the six companies to be insufficient and the measure itself highly dangerous.³ They complained, but in very courteous language, that the soldiers had been levied without giving the least notice thereof to the general government, without ask-

¹ September 2, 1617. "Extracten uit de Notulen der Staaten van Utrecht," MS.

² September 5, 1617. Ibid.

³ September 13, 1617. Ibid. I have also read a large collection of MSS. in the Archives of the kingdom at The Hague, Locket Kastje AA, 61, docketed "Waartgelders"; "Eenige Minuten van Oldenbarneveld"; "Instructie"; "Lyst van Waartgelders"; "Copyen van Missiven," etc. Many of the notes and memoranda are in the advocate's handwriting, and the correspondence on the part of the states of Utrecht would appear to be founded, in part at least, on these loose hints and suggestions of his. The letters themselves of the states of that province in reply to the States-General in the years 1617 and 1618 do not seem to be actually drafted by him.

ing its advice or waiting for any communication from it, and they reminded the states of Utrecht that they might always rely upon the States-General and his Excellency, who were still ready, as they had been seven years before (1610), to protect them against every enemy and any danger.¹

The conflict between a single province of the confederacy and the authority of the general government had thus been brought to a direct issue, to the test of arms. For, notwithstanding the preamble to the resolution of the Utrecht assembly just cited, there could be little question that the resolve itself was a natural corollary of the famous Sharp Resolution, passed by the states of Holland three weeks before.² Utrecht was in arms to prevent, among other things at least, the forcing upon them by a majority of the States-General of the national synod to which they were opposed, the seizure of churches by the Contra-Remonstrants, and the destruction of life and property by inflamed mobs.

There is no doubt that Barneveldt deeply deplored the issue, but that he felt himself bound to accept it. The innate absurdity of a constitutional system under which each of the seven members was sovereign and independent, and the head was at the mercy of the members, could not be more flagrantly illustrated. In the bloody battles which seemed impending in the streets of Utrecht and in all the principal cities of the Netherlands between the soldiers of sovereign states and soldiers of a general government which was not sovereign, the letter of the law and the records of history were unquestionably on the side of the provincial and against the general authority. Yet to nullify the

¹ MS last cited.

² August 4, 1617.

authority of the States-General by force of arms at this supreme moment was to stultify all government whatever. It was an awful dilemma, and it is difficult here fully to sympathize with the advocate, for he it was who inspired, without dictating, the course of the Utrecht proceedings.¹

With him patriotism seemed at this moment to dwindle into provincialism, the statesman to shrink into the lawyer.

Certainly there was no guilt in the proceedings. There was no crime in the heart of the advocate. He had exhausted himself with appeals in favor of moderation, conciliation, compromise. He had worked night and day with all the energy of a pure soul and a great mind to assuage religious hatreds and avert civil dissensions. He was overpowered. He had frequently desired to be released from all his functions, but, as dangers thickened over the provinces, he felt it his duty so long as he remained at his post to abide by the law as the only anchor in the storm. Not rising in his mind to the height of a national idea, and especially averse from it when embodied in the repulsive form of religious uniformity, he did not shrink from a contest which he had not provoked, but had done his utmost to avert. But even then he did not anticipate civil war. The enrolling of the wartgelders was an armed protest, a symbol of legal conviction rather than a serious effort to resist the general government. And this is the chief justification of his course from a political point of view. It was ridiculous to suppose that

¹ An inspection of the MSS. (AA, 61) already cited and Barneveldt's presence in the city at the time show that the authorities followed him unhesitatingly at every step.

with a few hundred soldiers hastily enlisted—and there were less than eighteen hundred wartgelders levied throughout the provinces and under the orders of civil magistrates¹—a serious contest was intended against a splendidly disciplined army of veteran troops, commanded by the first general of the age.

From a legal point of view Barneveldt considered his position impregnable.

The controversy is curious, especially for Americans, and for all who are interested in the analysis of federal institutions and of republican principles, whether aristocratic or democratic. The states of Utrecht replied in decorous but firm language to the committee of the States-General that they had raised the six companies in accordance with their sovereign right so to do, and that they were resolved to maintain them. They could not wait, as they had been obliged to do in the time of the Earl of Leicester and more recently in 1610, until they had been surprised and overwhelmed by the enemy before the States-General and his Excellency the Prince could come to their rescue. They could not suffer all the evils of tumults, conspiracies, and foreign invasion, without defending themselves.

Making use, they said, of the right of sovereignty which in their province belonged to them alone, they thought it better to prevent in time and by convenient means such fire and mischief than to look on while it kindled and spread into a conflagration, and to go about imploring aid from their fellow-confederates, who, God better it, had enough in these times to do at home. This would only be to bring them as well as this province into trouble, disquiet, and expense. “My

¹ Wagenaer, x. 166. Grotius, *Verantw.*, c. xix. 23.

lords the states of Utrecht have conserved and continually exercised this right of sovereignty in its entirety ever since renouncing the King of Spain. Every contract, ordinance, and instruction of the States-General has been in conformity with it, and the states of Utrecht are convinced that the states of not one of their confederate provinces would yield an atom of its sovereignty.

They reminded the general government that by the first article of the Closer Union of Utrecht, on which that assembly was founded, it was bound to support the states of the respective provinces, and strengthen them with counsel, treasure, and blood, if their respective rights, more especially their individual sovereignty, the most precious of all, should be assailed. To refrain from so doing would be to violate a solemn contract. They further reminded the council of state that by its institution the States-Provincial had not abdicated their respective sovereignties, but had reserved them in all matters not specifically mentioned in the original instruction by which they were created.¹

Two days afterward Arnold van Randwyck and three other commissioners were instructed by the general government to confer with the states of Utrecht, to tell them that their reply was deemed unsatisfactory, that their reasons for levying soldiers in times when all good people should be seeking to restore harmony and mitigate dissension were insufficient, and to request them to disband those levies, without prejudice

¹ AA, 61, Hague Archives MS. There are rough notes in the advocate's handwriting which obviously formed the brief of this lengthy and, so far as the law was concerned, unanswerable argument.

in so doing to the laws and liberties of the province and city of Utrecht.¹

Here was perhaps an opening for a compromise, the instruction being not without ingenuity, and the word "sovereignty" in regard either to the general government or the separate provinces being carefully omitted. Soon afterward, too, the States-General went many steps farther in the path of concession, for they made another appeal to the government of Utrecht to disband the wartgelders on the ground of expediency, and in so doing almost expressly admitted the doctrine of provincial sovereignty. It is important in regard to subsequent events to observe this virtual admission.

"Your honors lay especial stress upon the right of sovereignty as belonging to you alone in your province," they said,² "and dispute therefore at great length upon the power and authority of the generality, of his Excellency, and of the state council. But you will please to consider that there is here no question of this, as our commissioners had no instructions to bring this into dispute in the least, and most certainly have not done so. We have only in effect questioned whether that which one has an undoubted right to do can at all times be appropriately and becomingly done—whether it was fitting that your honors, contrary to custom, should undertake these new levies upon a special oath and commission, and effectively complete the mea-

¹ "Instructie van Jonkheere Arnold van Randwyck," etc., September 19, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² "Generaliteyt aen de Hⁿ Staaten van Utrecht opte ligting van Waartgelderen," October 4, 1617, Hague Archives MS., AA, 61.

sure without giving the slightest notice thereof to the generality.”¹

It may fairly be said that the question in debate was entirely conceded in this remarkable paper, which was addressed by the States-General, the prince stadholder, and the council of state to the government of Utrecht. It should be observed, too, that while distinctly repudiating the intention of disputing the sovereignty of that province, they carefully abstain from using the word in relation to themselves, speaking only of the might and authority of the generality, the prince, and the council.

There was now a pause in the public discussion. The soldiers were not disbanded, as the states of Utrecht were less occupied with establishing the soundness of their theory than with securing its practical results. They knew very well, and the advocate knew very well, that the intention to force a national synod by a majority vote of the assembly of the States-General existed more strongly than ever, and they meant to resist it to the last. The attempt was in their opinion an audacious violation of the fundamental pact on which the confederacy was founded. Its success would be to

¹ “U. E. jugeren voornamentlick het Recht der Souviranheyt d’ welek haer in haere Provintie alleen toekomt disputeerende daerom int lang opte macht ende autoriteyt der Generaliteyt, v. syne Ex^{tie} ende van den Raed v. Staet. U. E. willen doch considereren dat hiervan hier geen questie en is, soo oock onse voors. gecommiteerden geenen last gehadt en hebben deselve eenichsins in dispute te bringen en ontwyffelyek niet gedaen en hebben, dan alleenlyk in effect off t’gcene men vermoch te doen oock alsoo altyt behoorlick ende gevoeglyk can ende mach gedaen werden. Dat is dat U. E. buytent gewoonlyk gebruyck dese nieuwe ligtinge op eenen besonderen eedt ende commissie voornemen ende effectivlyk volbringen sonder daervan de minste weete aende Generaliteyt te doen,” etc.

establish the sacerdotal power in triumph over the civil authority.

During this period the advocate was resident in Utrecht. For change of air, ostensibly at least, he had absented himself from the seat of government, and was during several weeks under the hands of his old friend and physician Dr. Saul.¹ He was strictly advised to abstain altogether from political business, but he might as well have attempted to abstain from food and drink. Gillis van Ledenberg, secretary of the states of Utrecht, visited him frequently. The proposition to enlist the wartgelders had been originally made in the assembly by its president, and warmly seconded by Van Ledenberg, who doubtless conferred afterward with Barneveldt in person, but informally and at his lodgings.²

It was almost inevitable that this should be the case, nor did the advocate make much mystery as to the course of action which he deemed indispensable at this period. Believing it possible that some sudden and desperate attempt might be made by evil-disposed people, he agreed with the states of Utrecht in the propriety of taking measures of precaution. They were resolved not to look quietly on while soldiers and rabble, under guidance perhaps of violent Contra-Remonstrant preachers,³ took possession of the churches and

¹ Barneveldt to Langerac, September 27, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Testimony of J. van Eyck, deputy of Utrecht, MS. collection of Van Voorst, kindly communicated to me by M. van Deventer. Testimony of Suylenstein, *ibid.* Deposition of Ledenberg, *ibid.*

³ “. . . soldaten mette eenige Cont. Remonstranten hadden willen toevallen omm eene Kereke inteneemen.”—Deposition of Groevestyn, MS. collection of Van Voorst.

even of the city itself, as had already been done in several towns.

The chief practical object of enlisting the six companies was that the city might be armed against popular tumults, and they feared that the ordinary military force might be withdrawn.¹

When Captain Harteveld, in his own name and that of the other officers of those companies, said that they were all resolved never to use their weapons against the stadholder or the States-General, he was answered that they would never be required to do so.² They, however, made oath to serve against those who should seek to trouble the peace of the province of Utrecht in ecclesiastical or political matters, and, further, against all enemies of the common country. At the same time it was deemed expedient to guard against a surprise of any kind and to keep watch and ward.

"I cannot quite believe in the French companies," said the advocate in a private billet to Ledenberg.³ "It would be extremely well that not only good watch should be kept at the city gates, but also that one might, from above and below the river Lek, be assuredly advised from the nearest cities if any soldiers are coming up or down, and that the same might be done in regard to Amersfoort." At the bottom of this letter, which was destined to become historical and will be afterward referred to, the advocate wrote, as he not unfrequently did upon his private notes: "When

¹ Deposition of Suylenstein, MS. last cited.

² *Ibid.*, and deposition of Captain Landeroon, *ibid.*

³ Barneveldt to Gillis van Ledenberg, October 7, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

read, burn, and send me back the two inclosed letters.”¹

The letter lies in the archives unburned to this day, but, harmless as it looked, it was to serve as a nail in more than one coffin.

In his confidential letters to trusted friends he complained of “great physical debility growing out of heavy sorrow,”² and described himself as entering upon his seventy-first year and no longer fit for hard political labor. The sincere grief, profound love of country, and desire that some remedy might be found for impending disaster, are stamped upon all his utterances, whether official or secret.

“The troubles growing out of the religious differences,” he said,³ “are running into all sorts of extremities. It is feared that an attempt will be made against the laws of the land through extraordinary ways, and by popular tumults to take from the supreme authority of the respective provinces the right to govern clerical persons and regulate clerical disputes, and to place it at the disposition of ecclesiastics and of a national synod.

“It is thought, too, that the soldiers will be forbidden to assist the civil supreme power and the government of cities in defending themselves from acts of violence which, under pretext of religion, will be attempted against the law and the commands of the magistrates.

¹ “Geleesen *igni* ende seynde my weder de 2 brieven.” He usually wrote in such cases, “*Leeta vulcano.*”

² Barneveldt to Langerac, September 27, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

³ Ibid. Same to Caron, same date. MSS. Much of the two letters is identical.

“This seems to conflict with the common law of the respective provinces, each of which from all times had right of sovereignty and supreme authority within its territory, and specifically reserved it in all treaties, and especially in that of the Nearer Union. . . . The provinces have always regulated clerical matters each for itself. The province of Utrecht, which under the pretext of religion is now most troubled, made stipulations to this effect, when it took his Excellency for governor, even more stringent than any others. As for Holland, she never imagined that one could ever raise a question on the subject. . . . All good men ought to do their best to prevent the enemies to the welfare of these provinces from making profit out of our troubles.”

The whole matter he regarded as a struggle between the clergy and the civil power for mastery over the state, as an attempt to subject provincial autonomy to the central government purely in the interest of the priesthood of a particular sect. The remedy he fondly hoped for was moderation and union within the church itself. He could never imagine the necessity for this ferocious animosity not only between Christians but between two branches of the Reformed Church. He could never be made to believe that the Five Points of the Remonstrance had dug an abyss too deep and wide ever to be bridged between brethren lately of one faith as of one fatherland. He was unceasing in his prayers and appeals for “mutual toleration on the subject of predestination.” Perhaps the bitterness, almost amounting to frenzy, with which abstruse points of casuistry were then debated, and which converted differences of opinion upon metaphysical divinity into

deadly hatred and thirst for blood, is already obsolete or on the road to become so. If so, then was Barneveldt in advance of his age, and it would have been better for the peace of the world and the progress of Christianity if more of his contemporaries had placed themselves on his level.

He was no theologian, but he believed himself to be a Christian, and he certainly was a thoughtful and a humble one. He had not the arrogance to pierce behind the veil and assume to read the inscrutable thoughts of the Omnipotent. It was a cruel fate that his humility upon subjects which he believed to be beyond the scope of human reason should have been tortured by his enemies into a crime, and that because he hoped for religious toleration he should be accused of treason to the commonwealth.

“Believe and cause others to believe,” he said,¹ “that I am, and with the grace of God hope to continue, an upright patriot, as I have proved myself to be in these last forty-two years spent in the public service. In the matter of differential religious points I remain of the opinions which I have held for more than fifty years, and in which I hope to live and die, to wit, that a good Christian man ought to believe that he is predestined to eternal salvation through God’s grace, giving for reasons that he through God’s grace has a firm belief that his salvation is founded purely on God’s grace and the expiation of our sins through our Savior Jesus Christ, and that if he should fall into any sins his firm trust is that God will not let him perish in them, but mercifully turn him to repentance, so that he may continue in the same belief to the last.”

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, October 18, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

These expressions were contained in a letter to Caron, with the intention, doubtless, that they should be communicated to the King of Great Britain, and it is a curious illustration of the spirit of the age, this picture of the leading statesman of a great republic unfolding his religious convictions for private inspection by the monarch of an allied nation. More than anything else it exemplifies the close commixture of theology, politics, and diplomacy in that age, and especially in those two countries.

Formerly, as we have seen, the king considered a too curious fathoming of divine mysteries as highly reprehensible, particularly for the common people. Although he knew more about them than any one else, he avowed that even his knowledge in this respect was not perfect. It was matter of deep regret with the advocate that his Majesty had not held to his former positions and that he had disowned his original letters.

"I believe my sentiments thus expressed," he said, "to be in accordance with Scripture, and I have always held to them without teasing my brains with the precise decrees of reprobation, foreknowledge, or the like, as matters above my comprehension. I have always counseled Christian moderation. The states of Holland have followed the spirit of his Majesty's letters, but our antagonists have rejected them, and with seditious talk, sermons, and the spreading of infamous libels have brought matters to their present condition. There have been excesses on the other side as well."

He then made a slight, somewhat shadowy allusion to schemes known to be afloat for conferring the sovereignty upon Maurice. We have seen that at former

periods he had entertained this subject and discussed it privately with those who were not only friendly but devoted to the stadholder, and that he had arrived at the conclusion that it would not be for the interest of the prince to encourage the project. Above all, he was sternly opposed to the idea of attempting to compass it by secret intrigue. Should such an arrangement be publicly discussed and legally completed, it would not meet with his unconditional opposition.

“The Lord God knows,” he said, “whether underneath all these movements does not lie the design of the year 1600, well known to you. As for me, believe that I am and by God’s grace hope to remain, what I always was, an upright patriot, a defender of the true Christian religion, of the public authority, and of all the power that has been and in future may be legally conferred upon his Excellency. Believe that all things said, written, or spread to the contrary are falsehoods and calumnies.”¹

He was still in Utrecht, but about to leave for The Hague, with health somewhat improved, and in better spirits in regard to public matters.

“Although I have entered my seventy-first year,” he said, “I trust still to be of some service to the commonwealth and to my friends. . . . Don’t consider an arrangement of our affairs desperate. I hope for better things.”²

Soon after his return he was waited upon one Sunday evening, late in October,—being obliged to keep his house on account of continued indisposition,—by a certain solicitor named Nordlingen, and informed that

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, October 18, 1617, Hague Archives MS.

² Ibid.

the prince was about to make a sudden visit to Leyden at four o'clock next morning.

Barneveldt knew that the burgomasters and regents were holding a great banquet that night, and that many of them would probably have been indulging in potations too deep to leave them fit for serious business. The agitation of people's minds at that moment made the visit seem rather a critical one, as there would probably be a mob collected to see the stadholder; and he was anxious, both in the interest of the prince and the regents and of both religious denominations, that no painful incidents should occur if it was in his power to prevent them.

He was aware that his son-in-law, Cornelis van der Myle, had been invited to the banquet, and that he was wont to carry his wine discreetly. He therefore requested Nordlingen to proceed to Leyden that night and seek an interview with Van der Myle without delay. By thus communicating the intelligence of the expected visit to one who, he felt sure, would do his best to provide for a respectful and suitable reception of the prince, notwithstanding the exhilarated condition in which the magistrates would probably find themselves, the advocate hoped to prevent any riot or tumultuous demonstration of any kind. At least he would act conformably to his duty and keep his conscience clear should disasters ensue.

Later in the night he learned that Maurice was going, not to Leyden, but to Delft, and he accordingly despatched a special messenger to arrive before dawn at Leyden in order to inform Van der Myle of this change in the prince's movements. Nothing seemed simpler or more judicious than these precautions on the part

of Barneveldt. They could not fail, however, to be tortured into sedition, conspiracy, and treason.¹

Toward the end of the year a meeting of the nobles and knights of Holland, under the leadership of Barneveldt,² was held to discuss the famous Sharp Resolution of 4th August and the letters and arguments advanced against it by the stadholder and the council of state. It was unanimously resolved by this body, in which they were subsequently followed by a large majority of the states of Holland, to maintain that Resolution and its consequences and to oppose the national synod. They further resolved that a legal provincial synod should be convoked by the states of Holland and under their authority and supervision. The object of such synod should be to devise "some means of accommodation, mutual toleration, and Christian settlement of differences in regard to the Five Points in question."

In case such compromise should unfortunately not be arranged, then it was resolved to invite to the assembly two or three persons from France, as many from England, from Germany, and from Switzerland, to aid in the consultations. Should a method of reconciliation and mutual toleration still remain undiscovered, then, in consideration that the whole Christian world was interested in composing these dissensions, it was proposed that a "synodal assembly of all Christendom," a Protestant ecumenical council, should in some solemn manner be convoked.

¹ Verhooren van Oldenbarneveld, 274, 277, 278.

² December 4, 5, 6, 1617. "Angelegenheden der Synode," Hague Archives MS. The papers are all in Barneveldt's handwriting. The copies were kindly furnished me by M. van Deventer.

These resolutions and propositions were all brought forward by the advocate, and the drafts of them in his handwriting remain. They are the unimpeachable evidences of his earnest desire to put an end to these unhappy disputes and disorders in the only way which he considered constitutional.

Before the close of the year the states of Holland, in accordance with the foregoing advice of the nobles, passed a resolution, the minutes of which were drawn up by the hand of the advocate, and in which they persisted in their opposition to the national synod. They declared by a large majority of votes that the assembly of the States-General without the unanimous consent of the Provincial States were not competent according to the Union of Utrecht—the fundamental law of the general assembly—to regulate religious affairs, but that this right belonged to the separate provinces, each within its own domain.

They further resolved that, as they were bound by solemn oath to maintain the laws and liberties of Holland, they could not surrender this right to the generality, nor allow it to be usurped by any one; but in order to settle the question of the Five Points, the only cause known to them of the present disturbances, they were content under their own authority to convoke a provincial synod within three months, at their own cost, and to invite the respective provinces, as many of them as thought good, to send to this meeting a certain number of pious and learned theologians.¹

It is difficult to see why the course thus unanimously proposed by the nobles of Holland, under guidance of

¹ Hague Archives MS. "Angelegenheden der Synode." "Copie de ce qui s'est passé dans les États de la Hollande, 1617, 1618."

Barneveldt, and subsequently by a majority of the states of that province, would not have been as expedient as it was legal. But we are less concerned with that point now than with the illustrations afforded by these long-buried documents of the patriotism and sagacity of a man than whom no human creature was ever more foully slandered.

It will be constantly borne in mind that he regarded this religious controversy purely from a political, legal, and constitutional, and not from a theological, point of view. He believed that grave danger to the fatherland was lurking under this attempt, by the general government, to usurp the power of dictating the religious creed of all the provinces. Especially he deplored the evil influence exerted by the King of England since his abandonment of the principles announced in his famous letter to the states in the year 1613. All that the advocate struggled for was moderation and mutual toleration within the Reformed Church. He felt that a wider scheme of forbearance was impracticable. If a dream of general religious equality had ever floated before him or before any one in that age, he would have felt it to be a dream which would be a reality nowhere until centuries should have passed away. Yet that moderation, patience, tolerance, and respect for written law paved the road to that wider and loftier region can scarcely be doubted.

Carleton, subservient to every changing theological whim of his master, was as vehement and as insolent now in enforcing the intolerant views of James as he had previously been in supporting the counsels to tolerance contained in the original letters of that monarch.

The ambassador was often at the advocate's bedside¹ during his illness that summer, enforcing, instructing, denouncing, contradicting. He was never weary of fulfilling his duties of tuition, but the patient Barneveldt, haughty and overbearing as he was often described to be, rarely used a harsh or vindictive word regarding him in his letters.

"The ambassador of France,"² he said, "has been heard before the assembly of the States-General, and has made warm appeals in favor of union and mutual toleration, as his Majesty of Great Britain so wisely did in his letters of 1613. . . . If his Majesty could only be induced to write fresh letters in similar tone, I should venture to hope better fruits from them than from this attempt to thrust a national synod upon our necks, which many of us hold to be contrary to law, reason, and the Act of Union."

So long as it was possible to hope that the action of the states of Holland would prevent such a catastrophe, he worked hard to direct them in what he deemed the right course.

"Our political and religious differences," he said, "stand between hope and fear."³

The hope was in the acceptance of the provincial synod; the fear, lest the national synod should be carried by a minority of the cities of Holland combining with a majority of the other Provincial States.

"This would be in violation," he said, "of the so-called Religious Peace, the Act of Union, the treaty

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, March 28, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to same, January 4, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

³ Same to same, January 29, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

with the Duke of Anjou, the negotiations of the states of Utrecht with Prince Maurice in 1590, and with cognizance of the States-General and those of Holland, for the governorship of that province, the custom of the generality for the last thirty years, according to which religious matters have always been left to the disposition of the states of each province. . . . Carleton is strenuously urging this course in his Majesty's name, and I fear that in the present state of our humors great troubles will be the result."

The expulsion by an armed mob, in the past year, of a Remonstrant preacher at Oudewater, the overpowering of the magistracy and the forcing on of illegal elections in that and other cities, had given him and all earnest patriots grave cause for apprehension. They were dreading, said Barneveldt, a course of crimes similar to those which under the Earl of Leicester's government had afflicted Leyden and Utrecht.¹

"Efforts are incessant to make the Remonstrants hateful," he said to Caron, "but go forward resolutely and firmly in the conviction that our friends here are as animated in their opposition to the Spanish dominion now, and by God's grace will so remain, as they have ever proved themselves to be, not only by words, but works. I fear that Mr. Carleton gives too much belief to the enviers of our peace and tranquillity under pretext of religion, but it is more from ignorance than malice." ²

Those who have followed the course of the advocate's correspondence, conversation, and actions, as thus far detailed, can judge of the gigantic nature of the cal-

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, January 29, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

² Same to same.

umny by which he was now assailed. That this man, into every fiber of whose nature was woven undying hostility to Spain, as the great foe to national independence and religious liberty throughout the continent of Europe, whose every effort, as we have seen, during all these years of nominal peace had been to organize a system of general European defense against the war now actually begun upon Protestantism, should be accused of being a partizan of Spain, a creature of Spain, a pensioner of Spain, was enough to make honest men pray that the earth might be swallowed up. If such idiotic calumnies could be believed, what patriot in the world could not be doubted? Yet they were believed. Barneveldt was bought by Spanish gold. He had received whole boxes full of Spanish pistoles, straight from Brussels.¹ For his part in the truce negotiations he had received one hundred and twenty thousand ducats in one lump.

"It is plain," said the greatest man in the country to another great man,² "that Barneveldt and his party are on the road to Spain."

"Then it were well to have proof of it," said the great man.

"Not yet time," was the reply. "We must flatten out a few of them first."³

Prince Maurice had told the princess dowager the winter before (8th December, 1616) that those dissensions would never be decided except by use of wea-

¹ Uytenbogarts *Leven*, c. x. 171-175. Wagenaer, x. 200. K. Brandt, *Leven van de Groot*, 61, 119.

² Uytenbogart, *ubi sup.*

³ ". . . men most eerst platteformen scheeren over eenighe."—*Ibid.*

pons;¹ and he now mentioned to her that he had received information from Brussels, which he in part believed, that the advocate was a stipendiary of Spain.² Yet he had once said, to the same Princess Louisa, of this stipendiary that "the services which the advocate had rendered to the house of Nassau were so great that all the members of that house might well look upon him, not as their friend, but their father."³ Councilor van Maldere, president of the states of Zealand and a confidential friend of Maurice, was going about The Hague saying that "one must string up seven or eight Remonstrants on the gallows; then there might be some improvement."⁴

As for Arminius and Uytenbogat, people had long told each other and firmly believed it, and were amazed when any incredulity was expressed in regard to it, that they were in regular and intimate correspondence with the Jesuits, that they had received large sums from Rome, and that both had been promised cardinals' hats. That Barneveldt and his friend Uytenbogat were regular pensioners of Spain admitted of no dispute whatever. "It was as true as the holy evangel."⁵ The ludicrous chatter had been passed over with absolute disdain by the persons attacked, but calumny is often a stronger and more lasting power than disdain. It proved to be in these cases.

¹ Uytenbogat, ix. 122. The princess repeated the fact with her own lips to the preacher. "Whether it were a prophecy or a design," says Uytenbogat, "is to me unknown. But this I do know, that without the clash of steel used by his Excellency, or by the weapons of the country, this process never would have been settled on the Dortian footing."

² Ibid., x. 171.

³ Ibid., 157.

⁴ Ibid., x. 141.

⁵ Ibid., 161, 162.

“You have the plague-mark on your flesh, O pope, O pensioner,” said one libeler. “There are letters safely preserved to make your process for you. Look out for your head. Many have sworn your death, for it is more than time that you were out of the world. We shall prove, O great bribed one, that you had the one hundred and twenty thousand little ducats.” The preacher Uytenbogart was also said to have had eighty thousand ducats for his share. “Go to Brussels,” said the pamphleteer; “it all stands clearly written out on the register, with the names and surnames of all you great bribe-takers.”¹

These were choice morsels from the lampoon of the notary Danckaerts.

“We are tortured more and more with religious differences,”² wrote Barneveldt, “with acts of popular violence growing out of them the more continuously as they remain unpunished, and with ever-increasing jealousies and suspicions. The factious libels become daily more numerous and more impudent, and no man comes undamaged from the field. I, as a reward for all my troubles, labors, and sorrows, have three double portions of them. I hope, however, to overcome all by God’s grace and to defend my actions with all honorable men so long as right and reason have place in the world, as to which many begin to doubt. If his Majesty had been pleased to stick to the letters of 1613, we should never have got into these difficulties. . . . It were better, in my opinion, that Carleton should be instructed to negotiate in the spirit of those epistles

¹ Uytenbogarts *Leven*, x. 173, 174.

² Barneveldt to Caron, March 26, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

rather than to torment us with the national synod, which will do more harm than good."

It is impossible not to notice the simplicity and patience with which the advocate, in the discharge of his duty as minister of foreign affairs, kept the leading envoys of the Republic privately informed of events which were becoming day by day more dangerous to the public interests and his own safety. If ever a perfectly quiet conscience was revealed in the correspondence of a statesman, it was to be found in these letters.

Calmly writing to thank Caron for some very satisfactory English beer which the ambassador had been sending him from London,¹ he proceeded to speak again of the religious dissensions and their consequences. He sent him the letter and remonstrance which he had felt himself obliged to make, and which he had been urged by his ever warm and constant friend the widow of William the Silent to *make*,² on the subject of "the seditious libels, full of lies and calumnies, got up by conspiracy against him." These letters were never published, however, until years after he had been in his grave.³

"I know that you are displeased with the injustice done me," he said, "but I see no improvement. People are determined to force through the national synod. The two last ones did much harm. This will do ten times more, so intensely embittered are men's tempers against each other." Again he deplored the king's departure from his letters of 1613, by adherence

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, March 26 and May 5, 1618, Hague Archives MSS.

² Uytenbogart, x. 171.

³ Wagenaer, x. 203.

to which almost all the troubles would have been spared.¹

It is curious, too, to observe the contrast between

¹ Letters of Barneveldt to Caron, last cited MSS.

Writing to Langerac almost at the same moment, he used similar language. "Several provinces and some of the cities of Holland," he said, "are still urging the national synod. I cannot conceive that the affair can be brought to this point unanimously, while to allow the generality to carry it through by main force and outvoting, and to leave the clergy masters of the subject, in a state where the supreme authority protects the true religion, is judged by many to be too dangerous. I know that over there many false and calumnious things are said to the prejudice of the states of Holland in general, and some members in particular, but you will not believe that anything unbecoming proceeds from them. They are desirous to prevent popular factions, seditions, and illegal acts to the detriment of the community."—Barneveldt to Langerac, March 13, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

Three months later he set forth the whole matter more elaborately for the information of the ambassador in France, who was hardly capable of going alone in this or any other important affair, and leaned on the advocate at every step. It will be seen how exactly the states of Utrecht, as well as the states of Holland, had followed his arguments and adopted his language throughout the controversy. "Our affairs remain in the old points," he said; "the provinces have all their deputies here; Count William has come. We hope for accommodation, but I feel far from certain, as I can observe nothing but pure embitterment of humors. Let people there understand thoroughly that the nobles and cities, although desiring tolerance in the Five Points, remain as firmly opposed to the Spaniards and their partizans as they or their ancestors have been since the year '72 till this hour, and as determined as ever to maintain the Reformed religion in its purity, only asking for toleration in the Five Points, and leaving others to retain their own sentiments, without wishing to impose an opinion upon any man against his conscience. We wish also to remain as to government as we have been for the last thirty years, to preserve our old laws, traditions, and liberties, and to protect the good people against acts of violence and compulsion of conscience,

public opinion in Great Britain, including its government, in regard to the constitution of the United Provinces at that period of domestic dissensions and incipient civil war and the general impressions mani-

and to maintain his Excellency [Prince Maurice] in his lawful authority. Observe, however, that people are trying to introduce new, evil, and unfounded maxims, wishing to transfer the sovereignty to the States-General, which cannot be done beyond the limit defined by the Treaty of Union. In every point not specifically conferred on the generality the sovereignty remains to the states of each province, as religion, state, justice, polity, and all else. Above all, in the matter of religion, this is especially reserved to the respective provinces by the thirteenth article. This was also expressly stipulated in the year '90, when the governorship of Utrecht was conferred on his Excellency, and was confirmed by his oath, with cognizance of the States-General, and of Holland in particular. His Excellency, as governor of several provinces, has sworn in each one respectively to maintain its rights and execute its laws. The officers and privates of the army are sworn to obedience and fidelity ["gehouw en getrouw"] to the respective states their paymasters and within whose territory they are employed. This is now disputed in Holland, six cities refusing to conform with the nobles and the great majority of the cities, which is against all law and order, especially as one wishes to compel the nobles and most of the cities to surrender, against their duty and oath, their reserved rights and supreme authority to the States-General or to a pretended national synod. It is true that in the year 1606, after a pressure during several years, it was agreed by unanimous consent to hold a national synod, but thereby it was agreed that the Confession and Catechism should be revised, and the points out of which all questions have arisen be duly considered. The preachers of the Contra-Remonstrant persuasion made difficulties in this, so that the respective provinces, each within its own domain, both politically and ecclesiastically, regulated these points in question. Thus nothing can be founded now upon that common consent, the whole proceedings having been a blank desert, running to nothing."—Barneveldt to Langerac, June 17, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

fested in the same nation two centuries and a half later, on the outbreak of the slavery rebellion, as to the constitution of the United States.

The States in arms against the general government on the other side of the Atlantic were strangely but not disingenuously assumed to be sovereign and independent, and many statesmen and a leading portion of the public justified them in their attempt to shake off the central government, as if it were but a board of agency established by treaty among sovereigns and terminable at pleasure of any one of them.

Yet even a superficial glance at the written Constitution of the Republic showed that its main object was to convert what had been a confederacy into an incorporation, and that the very essence of its renewed political existence was an organic law laid down by a whole people in their primitive capacity in place of a league banding together a group of independent little corporations. The chief attribute of sovereignty—the rights of war and peace, of coinage, of holding armies and navies, of issuing bills of credit, of foreign relations, of regulating and taxing foreign commerce—having been taken from the separate States by the united people thereof and bestowed upon a government provided with a single executive head, with a supreme tribunal, with a popular House of Representatives and a Senate, and with power to deal directly with the life and property of every individual in the land, it was strange indeed that the feudal, and in America utterly unmeaning, word “sovereign” should have been thought an appropriate term for the different States which had fused themselves three quarters of a century before into a Union.

When it is remembered, too, that the only dissolvent of this Union was the intention to perpetuate human slavery, the logic seemed somewhat perverse by which the separate sovereignty of the States was deduced from the Constitution of 1787.

On the other hand, the Union of Utrecht of 1579 was a league of petty sovereignties, a compact less binding and more fragile than the Articles of Union made almost exactly two hundred years later in America, and the worthlessness of which, after the strain of war was over, had been demonstrated in the dreary years immediately following the peace of 1783. One after another certain Netherland provinces had abjured their allegiance to Spain, some of them afterward relapsing under it, some having been conquered by the others, while one of them, Holland, had for a long time borne the greater part of the expense and burden of the war.

"Holland," said the advocate, "has brought almost all the provinces to their liberty. To receive laws from them or from their clerical people now is what our state cannot endure. It is against her laws and customs, in the enjoyment of which the other provinces and his Excellency as governor of Holland are bound to protect us."¹

And as the preservation of chattel slavery in the one case seemed a legitimate ground for destroying a government which had as definite an existence as any government known to mankind, so the resolve to impose a single religious creed upon many millions of individuals was held by the king and government of Great Britain to be a substantial reason for imagining a central sovereignty which had never existed at all. This

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, May 5, 1618, Hague Archives MS.

was still more surprising, as the right to dispose of ecclesiastical affairs and persons had been expressly reserved by the separate provinces in perfectly plain language in the Treaty of Union.

"If the king were better informed," said Barneveldt,¹ "of our system and laws, we should have better hope than now. But one supposes through notorious error in foreign countries that the sovereignty stands with the States-General, which is not the case, except in things which by the Articles of Closer Union have been made common to all the provinces, while in other matters, as religion, justice, and polity, the sovereignty remains with each province, which foreigners seem unable to comprehend."

Early in June Carleton took his departure for England on leave of absence. He received a present from the states of three thousand florins, and went over in very ill humor with Barneveldt. "Mr. Ambassador is much offended and prejudiced," said the advocate, "but I know that he will religiously carry out the orders of his Majesty. I trust that his Majesty can admit different sentiments on predestination and its consequences, and that in a kingdom where the supreme civil authority defends religion the system of the Puritans will have no foothold."²

Certainly James could not be accused of allowing the system of the Puritans much foothold in England, but he had made the ingenious discovery that Puritanism in Holland was a very different thing from Puritanism in the Netherlands.

¹ Barneveldt to Caron, May 5, 1618, Hague Archives, MS.

² Same to same, June 7, 1618. Same to same, July 8, 1618. Hague Archives MSS.

